


INDIAN THEORIES OF MEANING

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PREFACE TO THE REPRINT

The present reprint of the second edition of the *Indian Theories of Meaning* is designed to meet the continuous demand from scholars of Sanskrit, Indian philosophy, Literary Criticism and Linguistics in India and abroad. It is a pleasure to note that the book has attracted the attention of serious teachers and students, as well as research scholars. Further light has been thrown on one of the topics touched on in this book in the lectures on 'The Language of Poetry' I delivered in the Karnatak University, Dharwar, which are being brought out in a book form.

Madras
12 May 1977

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

It is indeed a matter of gratification to the author and the publishers that the first edition of *Indian Theories of Meaning* was exhausted within the short period of five years. The warm reception accorded to it by scholars is partly due to the need for a book of this kind giving an authentic and clear idea about India's great contribution to the theory of meaning. The book has received appreciative and encouraging reviews from well-known scholars like Dr. Siddheshwar Varma (*VIJ* 2, 1964), M. Biardeau (*IIJ*, 1965), J. F. Staal (*JAOS* 81, 1966), J. C. Wright (*BSOS* 28, 1965) and A. Kunst (*JRAS*, 1966).

The scope of the work is indicated in the Preface to the first edition; while revising it for the second edition I have not made any substantial change. During the past few years there have been revolutionary changes taking place in the field of general linguistics under the leadership of Chomsky, and in 1965 we started an international journal, *Foundations of Language* (Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Netherlands) to facilitate interdisciplinary contact and for research in basic problems on language. Regarding the Indian theories of meaning several important books and papers have been published during the period. A list of some of the important publications has been included as

'Additional Bibliography' at the end of this book. Prof. Subramania Iyer's book on Bhartṛhari's philosophy is being published from the Deccan College, Poona.

Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer refers (*ABORI* 46, 1965, p. 63) to my description of the *prākṛtadhvani* as 'the acoustic image or the abstract sound pattern with its time sequence still attached to it, or the phonematic pattern' and says that this seems to be something mental only, whereas to Bhartṛhari it is something actually uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener. According to my understanding of Bhartṛhari's linguistic theory, the *prākṛtadhvani* is the linguistically relevant sound pattern revealing the sentence or the *śphoṭa* which is the meaning-bearer. When a speaker utters a sentence he intends to pronounce it perfectly without adding any extra-linguistic personal idiosyncracies. But the actual sounds uttered will naturally contain many extra-linguistic elements; these may not be noticed even by the listeners in a speech situation. The *prākṛtadhvani* is thus the linguistically relevant sounds with their time-sequence, whether conceived as the actual sounds uttered or as a mental acoustic image.

Mlle. Dr. M. Biardeau has taken objection to my treatment of the *śphoṭa* theory as a linguistic one free from metaphysical hypotheses, since according to her this theory is traditionally inseparable from the monistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari with its mystic implications and cannot be isolated from it. It is true.

that Bhartṛhari was a great philosopher and the *sphoṭa* theory formed part of his philosophy; but that does not mean that this theory cannot be studied purely from the linguistic point of view. In fact, Maṇḍana-miśra, another great philosopher and an able exponent of the *sphoṭa* theory, has dealt with it in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* purely as a linguistic one. Moreover other grammarians like Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, author of the *Mañjūṣā* and the *Sphoṭavāda*, have treated the theory purely from the linguistic point of view. Those who have criticized the *sphoṭa* theory like Dharmakīrti, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Śaṅkara, Vācaspatimiśra, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have all taken it as a theory on the linguistic aspect of verbal comprehension which has nothing to do with metaphysics. Hence it is not correct to say that the theory is traditionally inseparable from Bhartṛhari's monistic philosophy. Even if it were so, an attempt to study the linguistically relevant aspect of it would have been welcome to the students of language.

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

Madras

20 October 1969

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THE PURPOSE of this work is to bring out in a systematic form the linguistically relevant views on the different aspects of meaning given by the various schools of thought in ancient India. Ever since the discovery of the Sanskrit language by European scholars at the end of the eighteenth century which inaugurated the science of linguistics, ancient Indian thought has continuously been exerting a stimulating and benign influence on modern linguistic studies. Bloomfield spoke about Pāṇini's work as 'an indispensable model for the description of languages'¹ and, as Professor M.B. Emeneau puts it, 'most of the specific features that are taken at the present day to distinguish an "American" school of linguistics from others are Bloomfieldian and . . . many are Pāṇinean'.² Professor W. S. Allen, whose *Phonetics in Ancient India* gives a systematic account of Indian phonetic doctrines and their evaluation in the light of modern linguistic theories, points out that 'the link between ancient Indian and the modern western schools of linguistics

¹ *Language*, vol. 5, p. 268.

² *JAOS*, vol. 75, p. 150.

is considerably closer in phonetics than in grammar'.¹ So also in the field of semantics, which is the youngest branch of modern linguistics, an acquaintance with the ancient Indian theories is sure to be of help in clarifying many an intricate problem confronting the modern linguist and in stimulating further work in the field.

Regarding the importance of the Indian contribution to this field of linguistics, Professor Emeneau says: 'Certainly in one other slowly awakening department of linguistics, that concerned with meaning, the West still has something to learn from India. There grammarians, literary theoreticians and philosophers were all concerned with problems of meaning, and much was thought and written on the subject. Of this the West is for all practical linguistic purposes innocent. The Hindu treatises are in a difficult style, and few in the West will be qualified to deal with them, as Sanskritists, philosophers, and linguistic scholars. Yet the results are likely to be worth the effort.'² Hence no apology is needed in making a modest attempt in this direction.

This study of mine owes its inspiration to the suggestion and encouragement of Professor John Brough of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, under whose direction and guidance I studied as a British Council Scholar for two years from 1952 to 1954. His stimulating papers and the weekly discussions I had with him helped me to steer this work

¹ Preface, p. 3.

² *JAOS*, vol. 75, p. 151.

to its completion. With his intimate knowledge of Sanskrit texts like the *Vākyapadīya* and the *Dhvaṇyāloka* and his penetrating insight, he could illuminate many a complicated issue on the subject. He also introduced me to the modern trends in western logic and philosophy regarding linguistic problems. I take this opportunity to acknowledge my warmest gratitude to him.

I am grateful to the late Professor J. R. Firth and his colleagues in the Linguistics Department of the School, especially Dr. W. S. Allen (now Professor at Cambridge) and Mr. R. H. Robins, for training me in modern linguistic methods. To Dr. David Friedman of the Indian Department of the School I am greatly indebted for clarifying many a problem in Indian philosophy and Buddhism. I must also pay my respect to the memory of the late Professor L. D. Barnett and the late Professor Betty Heimann who gave me encouragement and help. My thanks are also due to the authorities of the British Museum Library, the India Office Library and the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies. Above all I must express my grateful thanks to the British Council whose generous award of a scholarship enabled me to go to the United Kingdom and study there for two years preparing this thesis.

This book represents substantially the thesis for which the University of London awarded me the degree of Ph.D. in 1954; it is now published with some minor changes and corrections. The section on 'multiple

meaning' has been revised, and a new section on 'Tātparya as a Separate Vṛtti' added. Some sections of the thesis have already appeared in research journals and volumes. *The Adyar Library Bulletin* published the following seven papers:

- 'The Theory of Meaning according to Buddhist Logicians', vol. 18, pp. 178-95
- 'The Theory of Suggestion in Indian Semantics', vol. 19, pp. 20-6
- 'Indian Theories on Homophones and Homonyms', vol. 19, pp. 193-222
- 'Sphoṭa: The Theory of Linguistic Symbols', vol. 20, pp. 84-116
- 'Transfer of Meaning: a Buddhist View', vol. 20, pp. 345-8
- 'Ākāṅkṣā: The Main Basis of Syntactic Unity', vol. 21, pp. 282-95
- 'The Elliptical Sentence: Indian Theories', vol. 22, pp. 25-31

The paper on 'Tātparya as a Separate Vṛtti' appeared in the *Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference*, Twentieth session, vol. II, pp. 319-32. And the paper on 'The Basic Triangle of Meaning and Indian Theories' was published in the *Annals of Oriental Research*, University of Madras, vol. 16.

Some important publications have appeared in the field since the preparation of this thesis in 1954. Of these the books by Dr. D. S. Ruegg and Dr. Gaurinath

Sastri deserve special mention (see bibliography for details). Their approach is different from mine, and I have not found it necessary to make any major revision of my book.

My special thanks are due to my preceptor Professor C. Kunhan Raja, and my friends Mlle M. Biardeau, Dr. E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma, Dr. J. F. Staal and Dr. A. G. Krishna Warriar who saw the thesis in manuscript form and made many useful suggestions. I am also obliged to Professor V. Raghavan whom I consulted on certain points during his visit to London in 1954, and who also gave constructive suggestions at the time of publication.

I cannot express adequately my indebtedness to the Adyar Library and Research Centre who have undertaken the publication of this work in their well-known series. I am particularly grateful to its joint Director, Mrs. Radha Burnier, for the keen interest she has taken in this publication. I am thankful to the entire staff of the Library, particularly to the Librarian, Mrs. Seetha Neelakantan, and Pandit K. P. Aithal. The Vasanta Press deserves warm appreciation for maintaining its usual high standard.

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

Madras

31 March 1963

ABBREVIATIONS

- ABORI* ... Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.
- ALB* ... The Adyar Library Bulletin, Madras.
- BSOAS* ... Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.
- Cours* ... *Cours de Linguistique générale* by de Saussure.
- IHQ* ... Indian Historical Quarterly.
- JAOS* ... Journal of the American Oriental Society.
- JBRAS* ... Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
- JGRI* ... Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad.
- JRAS* ... Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
- Mbh* ... *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali.
- NVTT* ... *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* by Vācaspati-miśra.
- POC* ... Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference.
- TPS* ... Transactions of the Philological Society, London.
- VP* ... *Vākyapadīya* by Bhartr̥hari.
- WZKM* ... Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.
- ZDMG* ... Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.

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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

THE MEANING OF 'MEANING'

THE MEANING OF 'MEANING'

THE meaning of 'Meaning' has attracted the attention of philosophers throughout the ages; reflections on the epistemological problem as to 'what is the relation subsisting between thoughts, words or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean' have occupied the human mind in the East as well as in the West. Though the theory of meaning is the youngest branch of modern linguistics, it is one of its most vigorous branches. In recent years the problem of meaning has been studied in its manifold aspects by philosophers like Bertrand Russell, Urban, Ayer, Wittgenstein and Cassirer, by logicians like Carnap, by psychologists like Paul, Wundt, Pillsbury and Köhler, by anthropologists like Malinowski and Sapir, by rhetoricians like Richards and Empson and by linguists like Breal, Erdmann, Jespersen, de Saussure, Ogden, Stern, Gardiner, Firth and Ullmann. There is such an abundance of material for a study of the problem of meaning that one is often left perplexed. The lack of a uniform metalanguage has added to the difficulties.

The fundamental problems that face the student of semantics are so vast that certain leading linguists, especially in America, try to exclude meaning from scientific linguistics. Thus, Bloomfield says: 'The situations which prompt people to utter speech include every object and happening in the universe. In order to give a scientifically accurate definition of meaning for every form of a language, we should have a scientifically accurate knowledge of everything in the speaker's world. . The actual extent of human knowledge is very small, compared to this.' He comes to the conclusion that 'the statement of meaning is, therefore, the weak point in language study, and will remain so until human knowledge advances very far beyond its present state'.¹ This defeatist attitude is, perhaps, based on a wrong approach to the problem of meaning, assuming that every word in language must have a definite and precise meaning and that we cannot talk sensibly about meaning until we are able to define everything that is meant by words. Yet language is being used by everyone without any such knowledge, and it works quite well.

In India the various schools of philosophy, including those of the Sanskrit grammarians and the rhetoricians, devoted much thought to the problems of linguistic philosophy and general linguistics and evolved different theories to explain the manifold aspects of language behaviour. Writers in the West, while

¹ Bloomfield, *Language*, p. 140.

recognizing the importance of Pāṇini's method in the formal analysis of Sanskrit language into a system of roots, stems and suffixes, and acknowledging their indebtedness to Pāṇini in the matter of formal analysis, have not yet paid enough attention to the Indian theories about the various aspects of meaning. The discussions on the problem of meaning by the great Indian thinkers like Bhartṛhari, Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Ānandavardhana show extraordinary linguistic and philosophic acumen and are full of valuable observations which can be of considerable help in clarifying complicated issues in modern discussions on the subject.

Some work has already been done towards modern expositions of the Indian theories on general linguistics. *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* and *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*¹ showed to the modern world a glimpse of the vast treasures of Indian contribution to the problem. Various aspects of the problem of meaning have been discussed in some of the modern expositions of Indian philosophical systems such as *The Six Ways of Knowing* by D. M. Datta, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources* by Ganganatha Jha, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* by S. C. Chatterjee, *A Primer of Indian Logic* by Kuppuswami Sastri, and the *Introduction to the Tattva-bindu* by V. A. Ramaswami Sastri. Substantial contributions have been made recently on different problems connected with the Indian theory of meaning by scholars like Edgerton, Siddheshwar Varma, K. A. Subrahmanya

¹ P. C. Chakravarti.

Iyer, M. Hiriyanna, P. T. Raju and J. Brough.¹ Much more remains to be done in the same field. An attempt is made in the following pages to give a brief survey of the various theories of meaning held by the different schools of Indian thought and to bring out their significance in modern linguistic discussions on meaning.

In Indian thought we find two main approaches to the study of the problem of meaning: the *khaṇḍapakṣa* and the *akhaṇḍapakṣa*, which are roughly analogous to the Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology. According to the *khaṇḍapakṣa* or the analytical method, a word is considered as an autonomous unit of thought and sense, and language studies are made on the basis of words, and the sentence is taken to be a concatenation of words. 'In the early stages of linguistic studies in India, as elsewhere, attention is found focused on individual words and their isolated meanings; the idea that an individual word possesses an individual word-meaning is generally current in all schools of Indian philosophy in ancient times, and in the case of nouns the word is taken as the 'name' of the 'thing'. Thus, the regular philosophic term for a 'thing', namely *padārtha*, is literally 'the meaning of a word, that which a word means'.² The Sanskrit term *nāmarūpa* which stands for the world of things also suggests the view that objects can be comprehended by

¹ See Bibliography for details.

² J. Brough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', *TPS*, 1953, p. 163.

means of their names or their visible shapes, and that the name and the shape constitute the essence of a thing. The *Nyāyasūtra-s* discuss the nature of the individual words only; the discussions about the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence are found only in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works. Grammarians like Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are mainly concerned with the derivation of the correct forms of words; and Yāska and his followers deal with the etymological study of word-meanings. It is the Mīmāṃsā school that started a detailed study of sentences and developed elaborate canons of interpretation;¹ but even this study was mainly on the basis of words and word-meanings, and consequently, the relationship between word and sentence, between word-meaning and sentence-meaning, remained a central problem.

But even in ancient India there were some scholars who emphasized the unreal nature of words. Yāska refers ² to the view of Audumbarāyaṇa that it is the statement as a whole which is regularly present in the perceptive faculty of the hearer,³ and that the fourfold classification of words into noun, verb, *upasarga* and *nīpāta* does not hold good. Words are used for naming, even in everyday life, because of their universal

¹ Hence Mīmāṃsā is called Vākyaśāstra.

² *Nirukta*, I. 1: *indriyanityaṃ vacanaṃ audumbarāyaṇaḥ. tatra catuṣṭvaṃ nopapadyate.*

³ For a discussion of this theory, see J. Brough, 'Audumbarāyaṇa's Theory of Language', *BSOAS*, vol. 14, part 1. Also K. M. Sarma, 'Vāk before Bhartṛhari', *The Poona Orientalist*, vol. 8.

applicability and their convenience owing to simplicity.¹ Bhartrhari refers to this view and says that Vārtākṣa also held the theory that it is only the sentence that is regularly present in the mind of the hearer.²

Even among those who accept the reality of words there are two different views regarding the nature of verbal comprehension arising from a sentence. Some Naiyāyika-s and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsaka-s hold the *abhihitānvaya* theory, according to which first we remember the isolated word-meanings and then a simultaneous collective memory gives us the same as mutually connected. Syntactically related word-meanings constitute sentence-meaning. In a sentence each word performs the task of conveying its own isolated meaning, and stops with that; the syntactic relation is conveyed not by the words, but by the word-meanings. The Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Prābhākara school accept the *anvitābhidhāna* theory which is an advance on the previous one. According to this the words themselves convey the connected sentence-meaning gradually, step by step. The individual words do not convey any meaning except in the context of a sentence, and a word must always be associated syntactically with an injunctive verb. The sentence is the unit of speech, though the word which is the product of analysis from the sentences can be considered as

¹ *Nirukta*, I. 1: *vyāptimatvāt tu śabdasyāñiyastvāc ca śabdena samjñākaranaṃ vyavahārārthaṃ loke.*

² *VP*, II. 345-9.

the unit of language. Both these theories accepted that the conditions for syntactic relation between words in a sentence are mutual expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), consistency (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*saṃnidhi*) and also recognized the importance of contextual factors and the intention of the speaker in determining the meaning of words.

According to the *akhaṇḍapakṣa* advocated by Bhartṛhari the fundamental linguistic fact is the sentence. It takes the sentence as a Gestalt whose parts are not relevant to it. The theory owes its inspiration to the theory of Audumbarāyaṇa; but Bhartṛhari developed it as a perfect theory which can explain all the anomalies in language behaviour. He defines the sentence as 'a single integral symbol' (*eko 'navāyavaḥ śabdah*) which is revealed by the individual letters and the words that comprise it. The meaning is conveyed by this *vākya-sphoṭa*, the sentence considered as an indivisible and integral linguistic symbol. And the meaning conveyed by it is an 'instantaneous flash of insight or intuition' (*pratibhā*). The meaning is also partless. The words have no reality of their own; they are only hints that help the listener to arrive at the meaning. Many of the problems in the study of meaning in linguistics are based on the primary assumption that words are the counters of thought; but when once that assumption is set aside and words given their proper place in the language system as unreal abstractions just like roots and suffixes, many of these problems fade away. The words have a reality only at the pragmatic level. This theory of Bhartṛhari may be a welcome corrective to

the prevailing tendency among some modern linguists to lay undue stress on words.

Ānandavardhana took the cue from Bhartṛhari and developed his theory of *vyañjanā* or suggestion. Under the term *artha* or meaning he included not only the cognitive, logical meaning, but also the emotive elements and the 'social-cultural' significance of utterances which are suggested with the help of contextual factors. The logicians and the philosophers may be satisfied with that portion of the total meaning of an utterance which is precise and accurate and which can be objectively studied; but the poets—and also the linguists—cannot neglect vast areas of language behaviour as unreal or indescribable. Ānandavardhana lays great stress on the suggestive element in poetry, and advocates the Dhvani theory, which is *vyañjanā* or suggestion applied to poetry.

The problem of change of meaning is also studied by the different schools of thought in India. But the conditions for a metaphorical transfer of meaning are discussed there mainly from a synchronic point of view, unlike the study of the change of meaning in the West. It is only in the discussion of faded metaphors (*nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā-s*) that a historical approach can be seen. Even etymology is not studied from a diachronic point of view. The aim of etymology is not to find out the origin or the history of a word, but to understand its real significance. It is not a subject of antiquarian interest, but is of great importance to the study of meaning.

The fundamental problem regarding the interrelation of facts, speech and thought has not yet been solved. Although we can perceive facts, we cannot handle them directly in speech or in thought. Language is indispensable for communication. In the *Togasūtra* of Patañjali it is assumed that 'word, idea and object are really distinct entities and that though in ordinary experience they are found to be interrelated, they may be separated from one another by a process of abstraction'.¹ 'The very nature of discursive thought is based on the non-recognition of this distinction [between these three factors] and on the consequent assumption of a real identity among all the three things.'²

In India all the schools of thought have assumed a direct relationship between *śabda* and *artha*, which correspond to the *signifiant* and *signifié* of de Saussure.³ Hence the severe attack made on de Saussure in the first chapter of *The Meaning of Meaning*⁴ by Ogden and Richards for emphasizing the relationship between *signifiant* and *signifié* seems to apply to the Indian theories also. That is why P. C. Chakravarti says⁵ that the theory of signs or symbolism as worked out by Ogden and Richards 'has maintained a peculiar position that

¹ Gopinatha Kaviraja, 'The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy', *ABORI*, 1924, p. 7.

² *ibid.*


³ *Cours.*

⁴ *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 11.

⁵ *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*, p. 392.

goes directly against the view of Indian grammarians'. A detailed examination of the views will, however, show that there is no fundamental difference between the Indian theories and the theory advocated by Ogden and Richards.

The Ogden-Richards basic triangle has the following shape:



Here they point out that there is no direct relationship between a word and the referent and that the relation is only imputed. Sir A. Gardiner,¹ while emphasizing the distinction between meaning and the thing-meant, criticizes de Saussure for the omission of any clear reference to the things. His analysis is similar to that of Ogden-Richards, though he uses different terms. He uses the terms 'word', 'meaning' and 'thing-meant' respectively for the 'symbol', 'reference' and 'referent' of the Ogden-Richards triangle.

It must be noticed that de Saussure's analysis of the *signifiant-signifié* relation, as well as the Indian

¹ *The Theory of Speech and Language*, pp. 29 ff., 58 ff.

conception about the permanent nature of the *śabda-
artha* relation, confines itself to the left hand side of the triangle, as the only one where linguistic elements are directly involved. It is admitted that the relation between words and the external objects is indirect and imputed. There is no contradiction between the two schools. The symbol is directly related only to the thought or meaning, and not to the thing-meant.¹

When the meaning and the thing-meant are distinguished, it is also necessary to distinguish between the permanent word, the word-engram of the language or the 'word universal' on the one hand and the ephemeral actualized word as it is uttered in speech. The essential word is not 'the somewhat shifty hummock on the contour of a breath-group'² which vanishes as soon as it is uttered, but something permanent in the minds of the people belonging to the linguistic community. Sir A. Gardiner himself is conscious of the logical necessity of accepting this distinction. He says:³ 'a word can be used and re-used on many different occasions, and . . . the same word can be employed by all the different members of a linguistic community It is in fact something relatively permanent, wide-spread and capable of being possessed in common by a multitude of individuals. All these considerations prove, beyond the possibility of contradiction, that words transcend, and are altogether


¹ Ullmann, *The Principles of Semantics*, p. 72.

² William J. Entwistle, *Aspects of Language*, p. 226.

³ op. cit., p. 69 f.

less evanescent entities than the sounds which issue from the speaker's mouth and vanish into nothingness soon after they have reached the listener's ear.'

According to the Indian grammarians, the former is the *prākṛta-dhvani* and the latter the *vaikṛta-dhvani*. The Mīmāṃsaka-s call the former a pattern of the permanent *varṇa-s* (analogous to the modern phoneme) and the latter is called *dhvani*.¹ The Naiyāyika-s consider the former as a class (*jāti*) of which the latter is an instance. Thus, the speech situation can be represented as a rectangle rather than the usual triangle.



Direct relation is only between A and B in the diagram. Relations between C and D, C and B, and A and D are all indirect and imputed.

In this diagram the upper portion gives de Saussure's analysis, and the portion ABD refers to the Ogden-Richards triangle.

In the *sphoṭa* doctrine, Bhartṛhari gives a more penetrating and minute analysis of the speech situation. First, we have the actual sounds of the words uttered; this is the *vaikṛta-dhvani*. These sounds reveal the

¹ *vide infra*, p. 282, n. 3.

permanent *prākṛta-dhvani* which is an abstraction from the various *vaikṛta-dhvani-s*, or which may be considered as the linguistically normal form devoid of the personal variations which are linguistically irrelevant. The third stage is the *sphoṭa* which is the whole utterance considered as an integral unit, as an indivisible language-symbol. It is this *sphoṭa* that reveals the meaning which is in the form of an intuition. Strictly both the *sphoṭa* and the meaning are different aspects of the same speech-principle. Bhartṛhari seems to synthesize these various aspects of speech with the threefold nature of the revelation of speech: *paśyanti*, *madhyamā* and the *vaikhari* stages, corresponding respectively to *sphoṭa*, *prākṛta-dhvani* and *vaikṛta-dhvani*.

Divested of all the metaphysical elements, the *sphoṭa* doctrine advocated by Bhartṛhari emphasizes the importance of considering the sentence (which is only any complete utterance) as an indivisible, integral language symbol. The division into words, and their classification as verbs, nouns and so on, as well as the sub-divisions into roots and suffixes, are all means for the study of language, without any absolute reality in themselves. But they cannot be neglected by the grammarian, since they are of great help in language study.

CHAPTER

2

ABHIDHĀ

THE PRIMARY MEANING OF A WORD

THE PRIMARY MEANING OF A WORD

THE essential nature of a word lies in its significative power.¹ This significative power or *śakti* is defined as the relation that exists between the word and its meaning, by which the meaning is cognized whenever the word is heard.² Speculations about the nature of this relation of meaning with words are found in India, as in ancient Greece; the two main schools, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya, support respectively theories of a 'natural' and of a 'conventional' origin of this relation.

¹ *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Śabda: *śaktaṃ padam*; *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 282. Formally, a word is also defined as a group of letters in a fixed order, ending in nominal or verbal inflection. *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 2. 60: *te vibhaktiyantāḥ padam*. Pāṇini, I. 4. 14: *supīṇantaṃ padam*. It may be noted that to the modern Naiyāyika-s the stem and the suffix are separate *pada*-s, each being significant by itself.

² *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 265: *śaktiś ca paḍena saha paḍārthasya saṃbandhaḥ*.

Laghumañjūṣā, p. 28: *padapaḍārthayoḥ saṃbandhāntaram eva śaktiḥ, vācyavācakahāvāparaparyāyā*.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s the significative power is inherent in the words themselves.¹ They were not concerned with the ultimate origin of the relationship between words and meaning. To them it was impossible to conceive of a society without language. We learn our language from our parents and elders; they, in their turn, learned it from their forefathers; thus, it could be traced back to any conceivable period of human society. What the Mīmāṃsaka-s meant by the eternality of words and their meaning was that it is not possible to trace the origin of the relationship to a person.² The grammarians also agree with the Mīmāṃsaka-s that the permanent nature of the relation between words and meaning is to be understood from popular usage itself.³

This natural connection between words and meaning has also been explained in terms of the innate capacity or *yogyatā* of the words. Just as the *indriya-s* or the organs of perception have a natural power to perceive what comes into their purview, so also words

¹ *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, I. 1. 5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ*.

See also W. S. Allen, 'The Origin and Development of Language', *TPS*, 1948.

² This is called *pravāha-nityatā*. Cf. Allen, loc. cit. This is different from the natural theory of the Greek scholars who believed that 'in giving names to objects the primitive man was inspired by some innate quality or psychological effect of the thing itself'.

³ Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* begins: *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokataḥ* . . . ; see also Patañjali's *bhāṣya* on that. Bhartṛhari too says (*VP*, I. 23): *nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhāḥ*.

have a natural capacity for conveying ideas.¹ Speech is the natural means of communication. Thus, any word has the natural capacity to express anything; this power is restricted by convention.² The permanent relation between a proper noun and its bearer is to be explained in this way.

Yāska refers to *śabdānukṛti* or onomatopoeia as a factor in the naming of some birds.³ He says that a few words like *kāka* (crow) could be traced to the sound produced by the birds; but Aupamanyava denies the existence of onomatopoeia as a linguistic factor.

The theory of natural relationship between words and meaning is rejected by the Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-s who advocate the conventional origin of relationship. Gautama says that it is by the conventional significance that the meaning of a word is understood.⁴ The Vaiśeṣika-s also take the same view;⁵

¹ VP, III. 3. 29:

*indriyāṇāṃ svaviśayeṣu anādir yogyatā yathā
anādir arthaiḥ śabdānāṃ sambandho yogyatā tathā.*

This verse is also explained to mean that each word has a natural capacity to express its meaning; it is this natural capacity of the word that is called its denotative power. Cf. *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 188 ff. But see VP, II. 136.

² *Ślokaṇvārttika*, Pratyakṣa section, verse 228:

*sarvākāraparicchedyaśakte 'rthe vācaka 'pi vā
sarvākārārthavijñānasamarthe niyamaḥ kṛtaḥ.*

See *Kāśikā* on that.

³ *Nirukta*, III. 18: *kāka iti śabdānukṛtiḥ tad idaṃ śakuniṣu bahulam.*

⁴ *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 1. 55: *sāmayikatvāc chaddārthasampratyayaḥ.*

⁵ *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, VII. 2. 20: *sāmayikaḥ śabdād arthapratyayaḥ.*

they assert that there is no direct natural relationship between *śabda* and *artha*, between words and the objects denoted.¹

They argue that if there were any natural relationship between a word and its meaning, as between fire and burning, then the word should have already co-existed with the object signified; but we do not perceive any such relationship. A word does not co-exist with the object it denotes. The word 'fire' does not burn the mouth, and the word 'razor' does not cut it; nor does the word 'honey' sweeten the mouth.²

Another substantial argument brought against the natural relationship between words and their meanings is that if words had a natural relation with the objects, the same words should have meant the same thing everywhere. The variation in the meanings of words cannot be explained satisfactorily on such a hypothesis. The use of different words for the same object is also against the theory of natural connection between words and their meanings.³

According to the ancient Naiyāyika-s and the Vaiśeṣika-ś the connection between words and objects

¹ *ibid.*, VII. 2. 14-20.

² *Śābarabhāṣya*, under *sūtra* I. 1. 5: *syāc ced arthena sambandhaḥ kṣuramodakaśabdoccāraṇe mukhasya pāṇanapūraṇe syātām.*

See also *Ślokavārttika*, *Sambandha* section, verse 8; *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *sūtra-s* II. 1. 54 and 55.

³ *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 1. 56: *jātivīṣeṣe cānīyamāt.* See also the *bhāṣya*: *sāmayikaḥ śabdād arthasampratyayo na svābhāvikaḥ; ṛṣyāyamlecchānām yathākāmaṁ śabdavinīyogo 'rthapratyāyanāya pravartate.*

is not natural, but it is conventional, being established by the will of God.¹ In the *Tarkasaṃgraha* also *śakti* is defined as the convention made by the will of God that such and such a meaning should be understood from such and such a word.² According to the later Naiyāyika-s, however, this relation need not always be established by the will of God; it can also be by the will of man.³ When the *saṃketa* or the conventional relation is established by the will of God, it is permanent and is called *abhidhā* or *śakti*. When the relation is not permanent, but is established by the will of a man, it is called *paribhāṣā*.⁴ Bhartṛhari also refers to these two types of relationship. He says:⁵ ' *Saṃketa* is of two kinds, *ājānika* or permanent, and *ādhunika* or modern; the former is the permanent primary relation, while

¹ See *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 1. 55: quoted above, p. 21, n. 4.

² *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Śabda: *asmāt padād ayam artho boddhavya itiśvarasaṃketaḥ śaktiḥ*. In *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, ch. V, this convention is given as a reason for the inference of God's existence.

³ According to the ancient Naiyāyika-s, *śakti* exists only when it is based on the will of God, and the meaning is permanent, and not in the case of proper nouns and technical terms. But later Naiyāyika-s accept *śakti* in all such cases. See *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 266: *ādhunikasaṃketite tu na śaktir iti saṃpradāyaḥ. navyās tu īśvarecchā na śaktiḥ, kiṃ tu icchāiva, tenādhunikasaṃketite 'pi śaktir asty evety āhuḥ*.

⁴ *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 122 f; S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 449 f.

⁵ VP quoted in *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, loc. cit.:
ājānikaś cādhunikaḥ saṃketo dvividho mataḥ
nitya ājānikaḥ tatra yā śaktir iti gīyate
kādācitkas tu ādhunikaḥ sāstrakārādibhiḥ kṛtaḥ.

the latter refers to the technical terms with their specialized and well-defined meanings, coined by writers of various scientific works.' ¹

In both these cases the relation between the word and the meaning is direct. When the relation is only indirect, being based on the similarity or contiguity of the actual intended sense with the original primary sense, the relation is called *lakṣaṇā* or *gauṇī*. It has no direct power to convey the sense intended; its power is derived from the primary sense.

Thus, in India, we find that all the schools of thought accept a functional definition of meaning. *Vṛtti* or the function of a word is its relation to the sense. This relation is also considered as a power residing in the word, which enables it to denote the sense. The *Mīmāṃsaka*-s consider this power as a separate category (*padārtha*), while the *Naiyāyika*-s assume that it is based on convention. Even the *Buddhists* accept the relation between the *śabda* and the *vikalpa* or the mental construct of the image; and recognize a reciprocal relationship between the two.¹ The *Naiyāyika*'s objection against a permanent relation between the word and the object denoted is only against an assumed relationship between the words uttered and the external objects symbolized by them.

¹ See the section on *Apoha*. Prof. Siddheshwar Varma's distinction of the Hindu view of meaning as a relation and the Buddhist view of meaning as a negation (*JRAS*, 1925) is due to a confusion between the *function* and the *sense*.

The Indian conception of the relation between *śabda* and *artha* (word and sense) is quite analogous to de Saussure's definition of a linguistic sign as a relation between the *signifiant* and the *signifié*. He says: *Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique*.¹ Here it must be noted that both the *signifiant* and the *signifié* are psychical entities and the relation is subjective. The word is not the actual sounds uttered in actual speech (*la parole*), but the abstracted phonological pattern, or the engram of the word in the language (*la langue*), or the class of which the individual utterances are instances. Similarly the *signifié* or the *artha* is also different from the external particular object; it is the concept of the object, or *vikalpa*, the mental construct produced by the object, or the universal of which the particular things in the external world are related through inherence. A fundamental identity of opinion is often concealed by divergent and overlapping terminologies.² Thus the *artha* or sense appears as *signifié* in de Saussure, *thought* or *reference* in Ogden-Richards, *mental content* in Stern, *sense* in Gombocz, *idea* in Roudet, *concept* in Weisberger and *meaning* in Gardiner. It is the *artha-jāti* or the object universal of the Mīmāṃsaka-s, the *vikalpa* in the form of *apoha* or a negation of all other things according to the Buddhists, the permanent *vyakti* or *dravya*, or a mental image.³

¹ *Cours*, p. 100.

² Ullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³ *vide infra*, pp. 69 ff.

How Do We Learn the Meanings of Words?

There are different ways by which we may learn the meanings of words. Eight such well-known methods used for learning the relation between words and the objects meant by them are mentioned.¹

(a) *Vṛddhavyavahāra* or the usage of words by elders. This is the most important among all the eight methods and is the natural way of observation in actual life. According to the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, this is the only method of learning a language;² it is only from sentences in the imperative mood that we can observe some kind of visible activity on the part of the listener, and therefore, such sentences are of great importance in the natural method of learning a language.³ As Wittgenstein says: 'One cannot guess how a word functions, one has to look at its use and learn from that.'⁴

Hearing the utterance of a sentence by A to B and observing the consequent activity on the part of the listener B, an onlooker C gets the idea that the activity of B is based on his understanding the meaning of the

¹ See Mathurānātha on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 481.

śaktigrahaṇ vyākaraṇopamānakosāptavākyaḍ vyavahārataś ca, vākyaśya śeṣād viurter vadanti sāmniidhyataḥ siddhapadaśya vṛddhāḥ.

Also *Tattvacintāmaṇi* p. 649; *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 266.

² *Bṛhatī*, (Benares ed.) p. 258: *na cātra vṛddhavyavahāraṇ muktā anyat kāraṇaṃ upalabhāmahe.*

³ See the section on Anvitābhīdhāna theory.

⁴ *Philosophical Investigations*, § 499.

sentence. At this time the whole action of B is understood as the meaning of the whole utterance of A. From several such observations of various utterances and their meanings, c is able to understand the meaning of single words, through a process of assimilation and elimination (*āvāpodvāpa*). Kumārilabhaṭṭa says¹ that in this method there are three definite stages: (a) *Pratyakṣa* or direct perception. The child hears the utterance of the speaker and sees the activity on the part of the listener. (b) *Anumāna* or inference. The child infers from the listener's action that he has understood the meaning of the utterance. (c) *Arthāpatti* or postulation. The child knows that the activity of the listener is inexplicable except on the presumption of a relation existing between the utterance and the meaning.²

Nāgeśa, the grammarian, considers this as the best method of learning the meanings of words.³ Jagadiśa, the great Naiyāyika, also says that the first and foremost method of learning the meanings of words is that of observing the use of language in actual life.⁴

¹ *Śloka-vārttika*, Saṃbandhākṣepa, vv. 140-1; see also S. Varma, *JRAS*, 1925, p. 22.

² Wittgenstein (op. cit., § 498) says: "Bring me sugar, bring me milk", make sense, but not the combination "milk me sugar". But the utterance has effect, though it is not its meaning (stare and gape).

³ *Laghumañjūṣā*, (p. 64) refers to '*vṛddhavyavahāra*' as *śakti-grāhakaśiromaṇi*.

⁴ *Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā*, p. 103 f: *saṃketasya grahaḥ pūrvam vṛddhasya vyavahāra'ah*. See also Gaṅgeśa, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, vol. IV, pt. 2, p. 462: *vṛddhavyavahārād eva sarveṣāṃ ādyā vyutpattiḥ*.

It is in this way that children generally pick up the use of language. It is a natural and subconscious method of learning language. 'When a context has affected us in the past, the recurrence of merely a part of the context will cause us to react in the way we reacted before.'¹ Kātyāyana begins his *Vārttika-s* with the statement that the relation between words and their meanings is got from worldly usage.²

(b) *Āptavākya* or the direct statement of a trustworthy authority is another way by which people generally understand the meanings of words.³ In this case the learning is conscious and deliberate. When parents or other relations directly point out with the finger the various persons and objects, and say to the child, 'This is your father', 'This is your mother', 'This is your brother eating the banana', etc., the child can understand the relation between the words and the persons or objects denoted by them.⁴ We may also know the meanings of certain words when an 'authority' tells us that such and such words denote such and such objects. St. Augustine gives a clear

¹ Urban, *Language and Reality*, p. 102. This is following the Behaviouristic theory, according to which meaning is the evocation of a total response by a partial stimulus.

² *Siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokataḥ*

³ *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 1. 52: *āptopadeśasāmarthyāc chabdād arthasampratyayaḥ*.

⁴ *Nyāyakōśa*, p. 860: *aṅgulīprasāraṇādīpūrvakam nirdeśena śaktigraho bhavati. yathā, bāla, taveyaṃ mātā, tavāyaṃ pitā, ayaṃ te bhrātā kadalīphalam abhyavaharaḥ itī nirdeśena bālasya mātrādau śaktigrahaḥ*.

description of this method of learning a language; in his *Confessions*, he says: ¹

‘When they [my elders] named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were, the natural language of all people: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learned to understand what objects they signified, and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.’

(c) *Vyākaraṇa* or grammar. We learn the meanings of the roots, suffixes and derivatives from grammar. In fact, the most important use of grammar is to help people to learn a language quickly ² and correctly. All the normal derivative words and their meanings can be understood from grammar on knowing the root-meanings and the significance of the suffixes.

¹ *Confessions*, I. 8 (quoted by Wittgenstein, op. cit., §. 1). Strictly speaking, this method described here involves both *vyādhavyavahāra* and *āptavākya*.

² Patañjali gives (*Mbh.*, first Āhnika) *laghu* as an important use of grammar.

(d) *Upamāna* or analogy. A man who does not know what a *gavaya*, the Gayal or a kind of wild ox, is, can identify it through perception aided by the description of the animal heard previously. He is told that a *gavaya* is like a cow, and then, if he actually meets a *gavaya* in the forest, he is able to identify it at once. This method of knowing is considered by the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s as a *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge different from perception and inference. It is one of the means of our knowledge about the relation between words and their meanings. The identification of herbs and plants from known descriptions come under *upamāna*.¹

(e) *Kośa* or lexicon. The meaning of a word may be understood from a lexicon also. The lexicon may even give the metaphorical senses sanctioned by usage; but the primary significative power should not be assumed in such cases.²

(f) *Vākyaśeṣa* or the rest of the passage in the context. Jaimini says³ that when there is a doubt about the meaning of a word, the rest of the passage should be taken into account. Thus, in the Vedic

¹ A. Foucher (*Le Compendium des Topiques—Tarkasaṅgraha d'Annambhaṭṭa*, pp. 148 ff.) suggests that the term is better explained as 'identification'. D. H. H. Ingalls also prefers the term 'identification' to the usual 'analogy' (*Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*).

² *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 272. Thus, the term *nīla* refers primarily to the colour only, the reference to the thing having the colour is through *lakṣaṇā*.

³ *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, I. 4. 24: *saṁdigdheṣu vākyaśeṣāt*.

sentence *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti* (The wet pebbles are placed nearby), the meaning of the term *akta* (wet) is to be understood from the rest of the passage *tejo vai ghṛtam* (clarified butter is the brilliance); from this it is known that the pebbles are to be soaked in clarified butter. This method may be used in obtaining the correct meaning of a word; thus, the meaning of the word *yava* (generally used by the Ārya-s in the sense of the long-bearded barley, and by the Mleccha-s in the sense of the Panic seed) in the sentence *yavamayaś carur bhavati* is known to be the long-bearded barley from the rest of the passage, *yatrānyā oṣadhayo mlāyante athaite modamānā ivottiṣṭhanti* (when the other plants droop down, these stand up as if they are happy).¹

(g) *Vivṛti* or explanation. We may know the meaning of any word from a commentary giving the synonyms of the word, or describing the meaning. Patañjali says ² that the meaning of a word is to be determined by the commentator's explanation, especially in cases of doubt.

(h) *Siddhapadasāṃnidhya* or the syntactic connection with words already known. In the sentence ³ 'The *pika* sings beautifully on this mango tree' the meaning of the word *pika* is known to be 'cuckoo' from the presence of the other well-known words.

¹ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 859; *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 275.

² *Mbh.*, vol. I, p. 42: *vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir na hi saṃdehād alakṣaṇam.*

³ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 859: *iha sahakāratarau madhuraṃ piko rauti.*

Multiple Meaning: Homophones and Homonyms

The binary semantic relationship requires a word to have only one sense, and a sense to have only one word to denote it. But every natural language in the world contains elements running counter to this 'monosemy' in the language system. This discrepancy between the *signifiant* and the *signifié* of linguistic symbol has attracted the attention of scholars in India even from ancient times.

There are two main categories of this 'multiple meaning' ¹ synonyms or *paryāya-śabda-s*, where several different words are used for the same sense, and homonyms or *nānārtha-śabda-s*, where the same word is found to have various senses. Sanskrit language is full of synonyms and homonyms, and the various lexicons in Sanskrit deal with words usually arranged as *paryāya-s* and *nānārtha-s*. Patañjali has drawn attention to this feature of language. He says that there are many words with the same sense, and that one and the same word is also found to have different senses.²

Yāska refers to the theory of the etymologists and the grammarian Śākaṭāyana, that all nouns are derived from verbal roots, and says that this theory seems to be too sweeping; for if all nouns are derived from verbs

¹ 'Multiple meaning is one of the chief symptoms of a wider feature of speech and language: discrepancy between the *signifiant* and the *signifié* of linguistic symbols.' (Ullmann, op. cit., p. 107).

² *Mbh.* under *sūtra* I. 3. 1: *bahavo hi śabdā ekārthā bhavanti. tad yathā indraḥ śakraḥ puruhūtaḥ puraṇḍaraḥ. ekaś ca śabdo bahvarthaḥ tad yathā akṣaḥ pādāḥ māśāḥ iti.*

which denote action, every object will have as many names as the actions with which it is concerned, and, on the other hand, each noun could be applied to as many objects as are concerned with the action indicated by the verbal root.¹ This may be taken as one of the explanations for the presence of synonyms and homonyms in language. Yāska generally subscribes to the verbal derivation of nouns and we find in the *Nirukta* the tendency, often mechanical, to offer different etymologies for a single word, when its meaning becomes different.²

The problem of synonyms is not very great; for, according to the Indian writers, exact synonyms are rare,³ and there will be shades of difference in the meanings of the so-called synonyms. Popular new forms of old words are taken to be their corruptions (*apabhraṃśa*); still certain well-known synonyms had to be accepted. Even these show different aspects of the same 'thing-meant'; and the emotive value associated with the words will be different in each case.

¹ *Nirukta*, I. 12: *nāmāny ākhyātājānīti śākaṭāyano nairuktasamayaś ca. na sarvānīti gārgyo vaiyākaraṇānām caīke . . . atha cet sarvāny ākhyātājāni nāmāni syuḥ, yaḥ kaścana taddharmaṃ kuryāt sarvaṃ tat sativaṃ tathācakṣīran . . . athāpi . . . yāvadbhir bhāvaiḥ samprayujyeta tāvadbhyo nāmadheyapratilambhaḥ syāt.*

² Dr. Siddheshwar Varma (*The Etymologies of Yāska*, p. 8) points out that this is perhaps the germ of the double-meanings (*śleṣa*) of later classical Sanskrit literature. *Vide infra*, p. 38.

³ Like *hasta*, *pāṇi* and *kara* for the hand; in such cases of well-known synonyms all the words are considered to have equal denotative power.

The occurrence of plurivalence (one name with several senses) is more likely to give rise to ambiguities. Every language contains, in a greater or lesser measure, words which are different in meaning, but identical in sound. In English we have 'hare' and 'hair', 'I' and 'eye', 'waist' and 'waste', 'straight' and 'strait', 'right' and 'write'; in French *sans*, *cent* and *sang* are all pronounced alike (*san*); in German *Tor* is either 'foot', or 'gate', *acht* is either 'eight' or 'attention'.¹

An interesting problem about the exact nature of homonyms is discussed by the Indian grammarians. Are we to consider them as the same word with different senses, or as different words having the same sound? Both the views are known; Puṇyarāja calls² them the 'one-word theory' (*eka-śabda-darśana*) and the 'many-words theory' (*aneka-śabda-darśana*). These are

¹ In languages like Chinese, Sanskrit and Arabic the number of such words is very large. In some languages like Chinese and English each homophone may have a different symbol in writing; but in Sanskrit and other 'phonetic' languages they are also written alike. In Chinese keywords are added as determinants; the *upasarga-s* in Sanskrit are also considered as keywords. Cf.

upasargavaśād dhātur balād anyatra nīyate
prahārāhārasaṃhāravihārāparihāravat.

² Commentary on *VP*, II. 252: *atra ekaśabdadarśanam anekaśabdadarśanam ceti dvau pakṣau*. He says that, according to Bhartrhari, these two theories are referred to by Patañjali himself in the *Mbh.*: *etac ca bhedābhedaśvabhāvaṃ darśanadvayaṃ śabdānāṃ bhāṣyakāreṇa vārttikavākyānāvāsare darśitam*. *ibid.*, p. 189. These two views are also referred to as *bhedapakṣa* and *abhedapakṣa*, as well as *nānāvapakṣa* and *ekatvapakṣa* in the *Vākyapadīya*. See also, *Mbh.*, I, p. 179.

analogous to what some of the modern linguists call homonyms and homophones;¹ the former is usually the result of 'divergent sense-development' and the latter that of 'convergent sound-development'.

Bhartṛhari refers to both the theories as prevalent among linguists; but he seems to prefer the latter theory, since, according to him, the semantic aspect of a word is more important than the phonological aspect.² As Professor Brough puts it, 'it is necessary to recognize that when we talk of "the word *X* with meaning *A*", and "the word *X* with meaning *B*", the identification of the two "*X*"s as "one word" is a mere practical convenience for lexicography and exegesis, something which belongs not to the material, and that this method is not necessarily the best approach to a satisfactory description of language in operation'.³

Bhartṛhari discusses these two theories in various contexts. First we have the problem of metaphorical transfers based on similarity or contiguity, and shifts in meaning, where a word expresses not only its primary meaning, but some other meaning also. Here Bhartṛhari

¹ Ullmann, op. cit., p. 130. Bally calls them *homonymes sémantiques* and *homonymes étymologiques*. See Ullmann, loc. cit.

² Strictly speaking Bhartṛhari takes only the sentence as the unit of speech and does not accept the autonomy of the word. Still for practical purposes of analysis he takes them as units of language.

³ 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', p. 169.

says¹ that, according to those who hold that a word can have more than one meaning, the distinction between the primary and secondary senses of a word is based merely on the relative frequency of usage; that which is well known through constant usage is called the primary and normal sense, while the less frequently used sense is called secondary. The same word can have more than one meaning, one after another, but not simultaneously.² It is the context or the collocation of other words that determines the sense to be taken in a particular case.³ On the other hand those who hold that a word can have only one sense consider that the word having the primary sense and the word having the secondary sense are actually different, though they seem alike in sound.⁴

Again, dealing with homonymous words (*nānārtha-s*) where various senses are associated with the same sound, Bhartṛhari refers to the two theories. According to the former, it is the same word that gives the various senses, the senses depending not merely on the form of the word, but on the various contextual factors; according to the latter theory they are different words having the same sound, and the ambiguity due to the

¹ VP, II. 252: *ekam āhur anekārthaṃ śabdān anye parīkṣakāḥ.*

II. 255: *prasiddhibhedād gaṇatvaṃ mukhyatvaṃ copavarnyate.* Kumārilaḥṭṭa rejects this view. *Vide infra*, p. 43.

² *ibid.*, II. 252: *yaugapadyam atikramya paryāye vyavatiṣṭhate.*

³ *ibid.*, II. 253: *arthaprakaraṇābhyāṃ vā yogāc chabdhāntareṇa vā.*

⁴ *ibid.*, II. 256:

*ekatvaṃ tu svarūpatvāc chabdayor gaṇanamukhyayoḥ
prāhur atyantabhede 'pi bheda mārgānudarśinaḥ.*

various words having the same form is to be removed with the help of contextual factors.¹

It is quite possible that two or more different words, derived from different roots with different prefixes and suffixes, may assume the same form. Though identical in form, they have different meanings. Thus the word *samāna*, derived from the root *an* 'to breath' (*sam+an*) with the prefix *sam*, means 'one of the vital airs'; *samāna*, connected with the form *sama*, means 'similar' or 'identical'; *samāna*, derived from *māna* with the prefix *sa*, means 'having the same measure', 'honoured' or 'proud'. Here we have three different words having the same form. Similarly *su-tapa* means 'practising great austerities', while *suta-pa* is 'the drinker of Soma juice'.² Even in the *Dhātupāṭha*, roots having the same form but differing in meaning and conjugated differently are held to be different. Thus *pā* 'to drink' is different from *pā* 'to protect'.³ In cases where the derivations are clear, there is no doubt as to whether the words are homophones or homonyms; but at times the exact derivations may not be clear.

¹ *ibid.*, II. 316: *śabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante na rūpād eva kevalāt.*

II. 318:

*bhedapakṣe 'pi sārūpyād bhinnārthāḥ pratipattiṣu
niyatā yānti abhivṛtyakṛtīm śabdāḥ prakaraṇādibhiḥ.*

See also Puṇyārāja's commentary on verse II. 317.

² See Monier-Williams's Dictionary.

³ The *Daiva* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. 1) discusses the purpose of the repetition of roots of like forms. Cf. *pāṭhitasya punaḥ pāṭhe phalaṃ vṛttina lakṣyate.*

It is equally possible that a word which was originally associated with only one sense, was also applied to another sense through metaphorical transfer or slight shift in meaning, and that, in course of time, the transferred sense also gained currency to such an extent that both the meanings are held to be primary. It is only by the historical study of the words that one can arrive at the truth as to whether it is a case of divergent sense development or one of convergent sound development. In English 'flower—flour' is an instance of the former.¹

Confusion between homonyms and homophones is quite likely in a synchronic study of words. Yāska usually gives different etymologies for a word, when its meaning becomes different. Thus the word *vr̥ka*, meaning 'the moon' is derived from *vi+vr̥*, *vi+kr̥* and *vi+kram*; meaning 'the sun', it is derived from *vr̥j*, and, meaning 'a dog', it is derived from *vi+kr̥nt*. He seems to have held the view that when the meanings differ, the words are also different.

It must be noted in this connection that the Indian scholars were mainly concerned with the descriptive, synchronic, study of language, with describing the language as it exists, and, therefore, it did not occur to them to distinguish clearly the two types of such

¹ Ullmann, op. cit. Patañjali says (*Mbh.*, I, p. 247) that homonyms like *akṣa* can be explained to have a common element in all their different meanings: *vibhinnārtheṣu ca sāmānyāt siddham sarvam. aśnoter akṣaḥ, pādyateḥ pādaḥ, mīmīter māṣaḥ. tatra kriyā-sāmānyāt siddham.*

occurrences from each other—those arising through divergent sense development, and those arising through convergent sound development. Such a distinction is easy in a historical, diachronic, study of language. The Indian scholars studied the problem of shifts in application under metaphor or *lakṣaṇā*, and discussed the problem of *nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā*, where the acquired sense becomes the normal sense; but they did not observe that polysemy, which in synchronic terms means that one word can have more than one sense, implies from a diachronic point of view, that a word may retain its previous sense or senses and at the same time acquire one or several new ones. The homophones are, on the other hand, different words which, in the course of historical development, accidentally converge in shape.

It is true that the distinction between homonyms and homophones does not normally exist synchronically. As Jespersen says: 'The psychological effect of these cases of polysemy, where "one and the same word" has many meanings, is exactly the same as that of those cases where two or three words of different origin have accidentally become homophones.'¹ It is to the credit of the Indian writers like Bhartṛhari that they were able to discuss the homonyms (*nānārtha-s*) from two different points of view: as homonyms and as

¹ Jespersen, *Linguistica*, p. 405. See also A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 120: 'The unreflecting user of language makes no difference between homophones, at least so long as they are written alike.'

This cannot apply to homophones which belong to distinct morphological categories, where the difference is quite clear.

homophones, even though they were primarily engaged in a synchronic study of language.

The ancient writers on language in India were mainly concerned with the primary senses of words. Even Yāska and Pāṇini seem not to have fully appreciated the importance of metaphorical transfer in language. Yāska gives different etymologies to the same word, in order to explain the different meanings it has in different contexts. 'The fact that a sign can intend one thing without ceasing to intend another, that, indeed, the very condition of its being an expressive sign for the second is that it is also a sign for the first—is precisely what makes language an instrument of knowing.'¹ Yāska sometimes forgets that the literal meaning of a word could be shifted or extended or changed according to various contexts; he offers separate etymologies of a single word, when its meaning becomes different, and even with a metaphorical meaning. Thus the term *keśin* (for the 'rays') is derived from the root *kāś* which is not correct phonologically or semantically² although the literal sense, 'hairy', could be applied to the 'rays' metaphorically.

The author of the *Uṇādi-sūtra-s*, on the other hand, seems to have believed that the same word can have more than one sense; for in the *Uṇādi-sūtra-s* we generally

¹ Ullmann, op. cit., p. 115; Urban, *Language and Reality*, p. 112 f.

² *Nirukta*, 12. 25. The term is related to Indo-European *qaiḱ* 'to comb'. See Dr. Siddheshwar Varma, *Etymologies of Yāska*, p. 8.

find only one derivation for each word discussed; only in rare cases¹ does he give different derivations for the same form. In the case of the word *akṣa*, he says that it should be derived from the root *aś*, when it refers to the 'die' in gambling.²

Even Pāṇini does not refer to the metaphorical use of language.³ He sanctions in *sūtra* II. 3. 46 the nominative case not only for the primary sense of the stem, but also for gender, number, etc. From the discussion of the term *parimāṇa* (measure) in that *sūtra* by later commentators, it is clear that Pāṇini included even metaphorical transfers under the primary sense itself.⁴ He seems to accept the 'many-words' theory regarding homonyms.⁵

The later lexicographers follow the 'one-word' theory; the very terms *nānārtha-s* and *anekārtha-s* applied to homonyms in the lexicons show that they believed

¹ Like *varti*.

² *aśer devane*. No other derivation for the word is given.

³ That Pāṇini was aware of the existence of faded metaphors in language is clear from his derivation of the words *śitaka*, *uśraka* (V. 2. 72), *ayaḥśūlika*, *daṇḍājina* (V. 2. 76), *pārśvaka* (V. 2. 75), *chāttra* (IV. 4. 62), etc.

⁴ cf. Dasgupta, *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 514. The term used for the 'measure' is applied to what it measures.

⁵ Pāṇini does not refer to *lakṣaṇā* even in cases like *siṃho māṇava-
vakah*. The grammarians do not accept *lakṣaṇā* to explain the variations of meaning in compound words, but assume a separate function for compound words (*samāsa-vṛtti*). Roots in the *Dhātupāṭha* are repeated when there is difference in meaning and also in the conjugational form, and there is confusion between the primary and secondary meanings of roots, as given in the *Dhātupāṭha*.

the same word could have more than one meaning. Confusion between the primary and secondary senses of words is also quite common in the lexicons. So also confusion between similar words.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s we have to assume 'monosemy' in the language system as far as possible. Since the relation between a word and its sense, *śabda* and *artha*, is permanent, this invariable connection of words with their senses shows that it is not proper for an object to have many words to express it; it is equally improper for a word to have more than one sense. As far as possible we should try to explain away all instances of multiple meaning;¹ it is only when there is no other way that we should accept synonyms and homonyms.

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa says in his *Tantravārttika*² that the corrupt forms of words (*apabhraṃśa*), which have gained currency among the people, express their meanings only indirectly by manifesting the potentiality of the original correct words through their similarity with it. Such corrupt forms originate owing to the discrepancy of the speakers;³ but due to long usage people may in course of time mistake them as correct

¹ *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I. 3. 26: *anyāyaś cānekaśabdatvam*; on the basis of this Śabara in his *bhāṣya* on *sūtra* III. 2. 1 says: *anyāyaś cānekārthatvam*.

See also *Tantravārttika* on I. 3. 26: *ekātmakayor eva hi vācya-vācakayor anyonyākṣepāt paraṣparaniyamaḥ sambhavati, anyatarasyāpi tu anekatve sati vyabhicārān niyamahāniḥ*.

² under *sūtra* I. 3. 28.

³ cf. Puṇyārāja on *VP*, I. 149:

śabdaprakṛtir apabhraṃśa iti saṃgrahakārokteḥ.

words. Still they cannot be considered as synonyms for the original word. It is only in the case of well-known synonyms like *hasta*, *pāṇi* and *kara* (all denoting the hand) that we need assume all the three to be correct words; here there is no other way since all words are quite well known.¹ Kumārilabhaṭṭa points out that since names are used for referring to objects, it is unnecessary to have more than one name for an object.² The connection between *śabda* and *artha* must be accepted as invariable and constant as far as possible.

The same principle is accepted regarding homonyms also. Śabara says, while commenting on *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* III. 2. 1, that it is not proper for a word to have more than one sense. In the case of well-known homonyms like *akṣa* which means the 'die' in gambling, as well as an 'axle', all the meanings have to be considered as primary and authoritative; frequency of usage has nothing to do with the authoritativeness of the sense assumed.³ In other cases the

¹ *Tantravārttika* on I. 3. 26:

*ananyagatikatvena sā dṛdhasmarāṇena ca
ekaśaktyanusāreṇa yāvat tv asti gatih kvacit
upamānānumānābhyāṃ tāvat saivānugamyate.*

² *ibid*:

*nāma ca vyavahārārtham arthasyābhyupagamyate
tenaikenaiva siddhe 'rthe dvitīyādi ca nīṣphalam.*

³ *Tantravārttika*, pp. 216-17:

*na cālpatvabahutvābhyāṃ prayoktīṇāṃ viśisyate
vācyavācakabhāvo 'yam akṣapādādiśabdavat
vibhītake 'kṣaśabdo hi yady apy alpaiḥ prayujyate
tathāpi vācakas tasya jñāyate śak nāḥkṣavat.*

Mīmāṃsaka-s assume corruption of meaning as a cause for homonyms; thus in the case of the word *pīlu* which means a kind of tree according to the Ārya-s and 'an elephant' according to the Mleccha-s the latter sense is held to be the result of corruption of the sense at the hands of the Mleccha-s. In the case of secondary power of words by metaphorical transfer or shift, the Mīmāṃsaka-s assert that the true sense is the primary sense and that the transferred senses are merely derived from the primary sense. From this discussion it is clear that the Mīmāṃsaka-s believed in the 'one word' theory regarding true homonyms.

Among the literary critics Udbhata stood by the 'many-words' theory, which asserts that the words should be regarded as different when they have different senses, even though their forms may be the same.¹ Discussing the figure of speech called *śleṣa* (paranomasia) or pun, Udbhata says that when two expressions are exactly identical in form, the form employed once can convey both the meanings; but if they differ in minor details such as accent, etc., when one of the expressions is employed, the other is also brought forth

¹ *Kāvya-lamkārasārasaṃgraha*, IV. 50:

*eka-prayatnoccāryāṇāṃ tacchāyāṃ caiva bibhratām
svaritādi-guṇair bhinnair bandhaḥ śliṣṭam ihocyate.*

See also Indurāja's commentary thereon: *iha khalu śabdānām
anekārthānām yugapad anekārthavivakṣyāṃ dvayī gatiḥ. arthabhedena
tāvaca chabdā bhidyanta iti bhāṭṭodbhāṭasya siddhāntaḥ. tatprārthabhedena
bhidyamānāḥ śabdāḥ kecit tantreṇa prayoktum śakyāḥ kecin na.*

through the similarity of forms. Udbhaṭa distinguishes between these two types of puns.

Among the later critics, Mammaṭa seems to hold that in *śleṣa* or paranomasia we have two different expressions, identical in sound, uttered simultaneously.¹ An expression can give only one sense at a time; hence in order to convey two different senses, it has to be assumed that two expressions, similar in form, are being uttered simultaneously.

It is also assumed that, so far as literary figures of speech are concerned, slight difference in accent can be neglected.² The simultaneous utterance of two identical expressions is indicated by the term *tantra*. The understanding of the expression by the hearer in the two different senses intended is by repetition or *āvṛtti*.³ Bhāmaha too states clearly that a word cannot have more than one meaning.⁴

Critics like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha consider that paranomasia based on homonymous expressions should be classed among the figures of speech depending on sound, since the effect would be lost if the synonyms

¹ *Kāvyaṭīkā*, IX. 84:

*vācyabhedena bhinnā yad yugapad bhāṣaṇasprśaḥ
śliṣyanti śabdāḥ śleṣo 'sau*

² *ibid.*: *kāvyamārge svarō na ganyata iti ca naye.*

³ See Nāgeśa's *Laghuśabdenduśekhara* on the *sūtra* of Pāṇini: *sarūpānām ekaśeṣaḥ* (I. 2. 64): *boddhur āvṛtīyaiva bodhaḥ, uccāraṇam tu tantreṇaiva*; also *VP*, II. 478 ff.

⁴ *Kāvyaṭīkā*, VI. 18: *arthajñānaphalāḥ śabdā na caikasya phaladvayam.*

were substituted for the words. This type of paranomasia is divided into two classes: that based on homonymous words, and that where the similarity of expressions is based on the peculiar coalescence of different words; the former is called *abhaṅga-śleṣa* (double meaning with the same word-division) and the latter *sabhaṅga-śleṣa*¹ (double meaning with a different word-division). According to them paranomasia depending on sense (*artha-śleṣa*) is that where the same expression is applicable to two things; here we get only a slight shift in meaning, and even the substitution of a synonymous word will not affect the sense.² It is the sense that can be applied in two different ways, and hence it is *artha-śleṣa*, a single meaning with different applications.

Some Naiyāyika-s seem to hold the 'one-word' theory (*ekatva-pakṣa*) regarding homonyms. According to them words are divided into four classes:³ etymological (*yaugika*), conventional (*rūḍha*), 'etymological and conventional' (*yoga-rūḍha*), and 'etymological or conventional' (*yaugika-rūḍha*). Of these the last type,

¹ Thus in the expression *rājā harati lokasya hṛdayaṃ mṛdulaṃ karaiḥ* 'The king attracts the people's heart by mild taxation,' or 'The moon attracts the heart of the world by its soft rays', the two meanings are based on the homonymous words *rājā*, *loka* and *kara*. This is *abhaṅga-śleṣa*. But, in *śveto dhāvati* 'The white runs' or 'Here runs the dog', the syllables are separated in two ways: *śvā itaḥ dhāvati*, *śvetaḥ dhāvati*. This is *sabhaṅga-śleṣa*.

² e.g. *kuṣṭhāḥ śyāmalā dīrghāḥ kaṭākṣāḥ kuntalāś ca te*. 'Your eyes and your hair are not straight [and they are] dark and long.'

³ *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, p. 282 f.: *śaktaṃ padam, tac caturvidham, kvacid yaugikaṃ kvacid rūḍham kvacid yogarūḍham kvacid yaugikarūḍham*.

the *yaugika-rūḍha*, also called *rūḍha-yaugika*, refers to words the meaning of which can be taken either as a *yaugika* (etymological) or as a *rūḍha* (conventional) one. It is quite possible to consider such a word as an instance of two words with different meanings, having the same form. The inclusion of the *yaugika-rūḍha* words as a separate class by the Naiyāyika-s shows that they did not treat homophones separately, but included them under homonyms themselves.

There are various means by which the potential ambiguity in the case of homophones and homonyms is removed in different languages. Homophones, or words alike in their form, may easily be differentiated by spelling; this is what we find in languages like English and French. In fact the role of writing has often been given as an argument for the retention of historical spelling in these languages. But, as Jespersen points out,¹ the difference in spelling cannot remove the ambiguity in the spoken form of the phrase, it only gives a false sense of security to the poet who would otherwise try to avoid the phrase. And it does not apply to the Indian languages, where the spelling is phonetic.

The real differentiation possible in all cases of ambiguity is by grammatical means and by the context of situation. When two or more homonyms belong to entirely different spheres of thought, or when they belong to different morphological categories, there is

¹ *Linguistica*, p. 401, n. 1.

very little chance of real confusion. Thus we need not agree with Dr. Bridges ¹ that the verb 'know' is doomed because of clashes between 'know—no', knows—nose' and 'knew—new', since 'the influence of the context, working hand in hand with grammatical discrimination, is likely to forestall any ambiguity'.²

In Sanskrit the noun *aśvaḥ* can never be confused with the verb *aśvaḥ* (from the root *śvi*). 'Actual misunderstandings of any importance are only imaginable when the two words belong to the same part of speech',³ and it is quite clear that there could not be any real confusion, as, otherwise, a synonymous word or phrase would have stepped forward to prevent misunderstanding.

Contextual Factors

The importance of contextual factors in determining the exact meaning of an expression has been emphasized by various writers in India from very early times. In the *Bṛhaddevatā* ⁴ it is said that the established rule regarding the meaning of a Vedic passage, as well as that of an ordinary sentence, is that the meaning is to be determined from considerations of the purpose

¹ R. Bridges, *English Homophones*, p. 22.

² Ulmann, op. cit., p. 132.

³ Jespersen, *Language*, p. 285.

⁴ II. 118:

*arthāt prakaraṇāl līṅgād aucityād deśakālataḥ
manreṣu arthavivṛkṣaḥ syād itareṣu iti ca sthitiḥ.*

to be served (*artha*),¹ the subject matter under discussion (*prakaraṇa*), an indication from another place (*liṅga*),² propriety (*aucitya*), the place (*deśa*) and the time (*kāla*) Bhartṛhari agrees with this view and says that the meaning of an expression is determined not merely by its form, but by the contextual factors also.³ In the *Vākyapadīya* he quotes the same list with a slight modification, substituting *vākya* or syntactic relation for *liṅga*.⁴ Of these terms *vākya*,⁵ *prakaraṇa*, *liṅga* and *artha* are known to the Mīmāṃsaka-s also. The process of subordinating the details of a sacrifice is done by the six means of proof: *śruti* or direct statement, *liṅga* or the implication from another word, *vākya* or syntactic connection, *prakaraṇa* or context of situation, *sthāna* or position, and *samākhyā* or the etymological meaning. Of these each preceding one is stronger than each succeeding one. Bhartṛhari gives another list of such

¹ Macdonell translates the term *artha* as 'the sense (of the word)'.

² Macdonell translates the term as 'the gender'; the exact meaning of the term is discussed later.

³ VP. II. 316:

*vākyāt prakaraṇād arthād aucityād deśakālataḥ
śabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante na rūpād eva kevalāt.*

Clearly the first half of this verse is a quotation from the *Bṛhaddevatā*, in spite of Puṇyarāja's statement that the list embodies Bhartṛhari's own views (see the commentary on the verse).

⁴ cf. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, III. 3. 14: *śrutiliṅgavākyaṣprakaraṇasthāna-samākhyānām samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviṣprakarṣāt.*

⁵ *Vākya* is the connected utterance of words indicating the relation of an adjective and a substantive; the meaning of the substantive is restricted by that of the adjective.

contextual factors that determine the exact meaning of a word in the case of ambiguous and equivocal expressions:¹

*samsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā
arīhaḥ prakaraṇaṃ liṅgaṃ śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ
sāmarthyam aucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ
śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ.*

This list is taken up for detailed discussion by later grammarians like Nāgeśa and Ālamkārika-s like Mammāṭa, Viśvanātha, Hemacandra, Appayadīkṣita and Jagannātha.² It may be pointed out that the list is concerned with ambiguous expressions. Whether we take them as homophones or as homonyms there is a possibility of doubt as to the exact meaning intended. Here contextual factors help to determine the meaning. The contextual factors mentioned by Bhartṛhari³ are the following:

(a) *Samsarga* (contact) or *saṃyoga* (association) is a connection that is generally known to exist between

¹ VP, II. 317 f. For the second verse see errata at the end of the text.

The reading found in all the quotations is *saṃyoga* for *samsarga* (except in Hemacandra's *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*). The meaning is not however affected.

² *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 109 f.; *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, II; *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II; *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, p. 39; *Vṛttivārttika*, p. 6; *Rasagaṅgādhara*, pp. 118-26.

³ Puṇyarāja, in his commentary, says that the list gives earlier views; but the list is quoted everywhere as embodying the views of Bhartṛhari himself. In the commentary ascribed to Bhartṛhari (Adyar Library MS.) these verses are introduced as another view (*apara āha*).

two things; e.g. the term *dhenu*, which normally means 'cow' or 'mare', is restricted to the sense of a cow in the expression *savatsā dhenuḥ* 'dhenu with its calf' and to that of a mare in *sakiśorā dhenuḥ* 'dhenu with its colt'. Similarly, in the phrase *saśaṅkhacakro hariḥ* 'Hari with a conch and a discus', the meaning of the ambiguous term *hari* (which means Viṣṇu, a monkey, etc.) is restricted to the sense of Viṣṇu alone, since the association with the conch and the discus is applicable only to him.

(b) *Viprayoga* (dissociation) is the disappearance of the connection that is known to exist between two things; e.g. *dhenu* refers to the cow in the phrase *avatsā dhenuḥ* 'dhenu without its calf'. Similarly, the word *hari* refers to Viṣṇu in the expression *viśaṅkhacakro hariḥ* 'Hari without the conch and the discus', since the possibility of association with the conch and the discus is found only in him.

(c) *Sāhacarya* (companionship) is mutual association. Thus, in the expression 'Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa', 'Rāma' refers to Śrī Rāma, the brother of Lakṣmaṇa, and not to Balarāma or Paraśurāma. Jagannātha distinguishes¹ this from *samyoga* and *viprayoga* thus: When the connection (or the separation from that well-known connection) restricting the denotation of a word is actually expressed by a word (like 'with' or 'without'), it is *samyoga* or *viprayoga*; but when two

¹ *Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 120. See also *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, no. 112: *sahacaritāsahacaritayoḥ sahacaritasyaiva grahaṇam.*

related things are stated together, as in a *dvandva* compound, it is *sāhacarya*.

(d) *Virodhitā* (opposition) is well-known hostility. Thus in the expression 'Karna and Arjuna', 'Arjuna' refers only to the enemy of Karna, and not to Arjuna, the son of Kṛtavīrya. *Virodhitā* may also be explained as contrast as in 'chāyā and light', where the term *chāyā* means 'shade' and not 'beauty'.

It may be noted here that even in the case of unambiguous terms the semantic range is not definitely fixed. 'The frontiers of verbal significations are often fluid, even though the core may be perfectly clear and unmistakable. "Man" has a wider area of meaning when opposed to "animal" or "God" than in contradistinction to "woman".'¹

All these four factors can be brought together under 'association of meaning'. The meaning of a word can be determined by the meanings of the words collocated with it; in certain collocations a word may have one meaning and in certain other collocations a different meaning.²

(e) *Artha* or the purpose served. Speech is purposive in nature, and the meanings of the words must be explained in such a way as to serve the purpose. In the sentence *sthāṇum bhaja bhavacchide*, 'Worship *sthāṇu* for removing the shackles of worldly existence', the term

¹ Ullmann, op. cit., p. 62 f.

² Prof. Firth has developed his theory of meaning partly on the basis of collocation. See his article on 'The Modes of Meaning' in *Essays and Studies*, London, 1951.

sthānu refers to the god Śiva, and not to a pillar, though the word means both; the intended object could be obtained only by worshipping the god. Nāgeśa explains the term *artha* as 'the meaning of another word' and gives the examples *añjalīnā juhōti* 'He offers oblation with folded hands' and *añjalīnā sūryam upatiṣṭhate*, 'He worships the sun with folded hands'.¹ Here, in the former case the term *añjali* has to be taken in the sense of 'hands placed side by side slightly hollowed so as to hold the oblation' and in the latter case, in the sense of 'hands fully folded palm to palm as a mark of salutation'.²

(f) *Prakaraṇa* or the context of situation;³ e.g. *devo jānāti sarvaṃ* 'My Lord knows everything'. Whether the term *deva* means 'king' or 'god' is to be decided from the context. Another example is *saindhavam ānaya* 'Bring *saindhava*'. The word *saindhava* means 'salt' as well as 'horse'. If the sentence is uttered when a man is taking his meal, the term denotes 'salt', and if it is uttered when he is about to go out, the

¹ *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 109. Also Puṇyarāja on *VP*, II. 316.

² cf. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, I. 4. 25: *arthād vā kalpanaikadeśatvāt* and the commentary thereon. Suitability to the context shows that folded hands must be closed for prayer, and open for drinking water. Similarly 'He eats on the mat' means 'He eats sitting on the mat', and 'He eats in a copper plate' means 'He eats placing the food in the copper plate'. (*kaṭe bhuñkte kāmśyapātryām bhuñkte ity arthāt kalpyate—kaṭe samāsīnaḥ kāmśyapātryām odanaṃ nidhāya bhuñkte iti.*)

³ Appayadīkṣita (*Vṛttivārttika*, p. 6) defines *prakaraṇa* as *vaktṛ-śrotṛbuddhisthātā*.

sense is to be taken as 'horse'. In the *Mahābhāṣya* (VI. 1. 84) Patañjali lays stress on the importance of *artha* and *prakaraṇa* in deciding the meaning of words: *arthāt prakaraṇād vā loke dvayor ekasyābhinivṛttiḥ*.

The importance of the context of situation in deciding the meaning of speech has been fully appreciated by modern writers on linguistics. Professor Firth, in his context-theory, has given great prominence to the context as the basis of determining the meanings of expressions, and has taken into consideration the influence of non-verbal elements of the situation such as the social setting and the cultural background.¹

(g) *Liṅga* is 'indication' from another place. Thus in the Vedic passage *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti*, 'The wet pebbles are placed nearby', the meaning of the term *aktāḥ* (wet) is not clear, since the pebble could be made wet with many different liquids. But from another passage in the same context, *tejo vai ghytam*, 'clarified butter is the brilliance', it is to be understood that the pebbles are to be soaked in clarified butter.² The term *liṅga* is also explained as an indication taken from another word, such as an attribute, in the same sentence, to restrict the meaning of the word, e.g. the meaning of the term *makaradhvaja* (which normally means 'god of love' and 'ocean') is restricted to that of 'the god of love' in the expression *kupito makaradhvajah*, 'Makaradhvaja is angry', since

¹ J. R. Firth, 'Technique of Semantics', *TPS*, 1935, pp. 36-72

² See Puṇyarāja on *VP*, loc. cit.

‘ anger ’ is applicable only to him, and not to the ocean. In this case the association need not be a well-known one as in the case of *saṃyoga*, the attribute used being only for rejecting the other meaning.¹

(h) *Śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ*, ‘ the vicinity of another word ’. It is the use of a word having a meaning logically connected with only one of the possible meanings of the ambiguous word, e.g. *devasya purārāteḥ* ‘ of the god, the enemy of the Pura-s ’. Here the adjective ‘ god ’ restricts the meaning of *purārāti* to the god Śiva. (Otherwise, the word could have meant a king who destroyed cities.) Jagannātha gives² as example *kareṇa rājate nāgaḥ*, ‘ The *nāga* shines by its *kara* ’. Here both the words *kara* and *nāga* are ambiguous (*kara* meaning ‘ hand ’ or ‘ trunk ’, and *nāga* meaning ‘ elephant ’ or ‘ snake ’), but in this sentence each word restricts the meaning of the other, and we get the meaning ‘ the elephant is conspicuous by its trunk ’.

In this connection it is of interest to note the theory of meaning on the basis of collocation, developed by Prof. Firth.³ According to this theory the meaning of a word is determined by its collocation with other words; in certain collocations a word may have one meaning, and in certain other collocations, a different meaning.

¹ *Pradīpa* commentary on *Kāvyaṇṇakāśa*, loc. cit.; *līṅgaṃ saṃyogātiriktaśaṃbandhena parapakṣavyāvartako dharmah*.

² *Rasagaṇḍadhara*, p. 124. See also *Mbh.*, on II. 1. 55.

³ ‘ The Modes of Meaning ’, *Essays and Studies*.

(i) *Sāmarthya* is the capacity that is known from the result. In the example *madhumattaḥ kokilaḥ* 'The cuckoo is intoxicated by *madhu*', the word *madhu* means 'spring season' and not 'honey', since only the former has the power to intoxicate the cuckoo.¹

(j) *Aucitī* is propriety or congruity. In the example *pātu vo dayitāmukham*, 'May your beloved girl's *mukha* protect you', the term *mukha* means 'favour' (*sāmmukhya*), not 'face', since only the former meaning will be proper in the context.² Perhaps, what is meant by taking this sentence as an example of *aucitī* is that there is no necessity of resorting to *lakṣaṇā* to understand the meaning of the expression 'May the face of your beloved preserve you', since the meaning is obtained from the direct sense of the words themselves.

(k) *Deśa* or place. In the sentence *bhātīha paramēśvaraḥ* 'Here shines Paramēśvara', the reference to the place (here) shows that by the term *paramēśvara* is meant 'king' and not the god Śiva.

(l) *Kāla* or 'time'. e.g. *citrabhānur vibhāty asau*, 'citrabhānu is now shining'. If the reference is during day-time, the word *citrabhānu* in the sentence means

¹ *Kāvya-prakāśa*, loc. cit. Even the meaning of ordinary words is restricted by this; thus Puṇyarāja gives the example 'a girl without a waistline' (*anudarā kanyā*) in the sense of 'a girl with a narrow waistline'.

² According to Ganganatha Jha's translation of the *Kāvya-prakāśa* (chapter II), it is the meaning of the word *pātu* that is restricted to the sense of 'turning agreeably'.

‘sun’, and if the reference is at night, it means the ‘light of fire’.

(m) *Vyakti* or grammatical gender.¹ The term *mitra* in Sanskrit means ‘sun’ when used in the masculine gender, and ‘friend’, when used in the neuter gender.

(n) *Svara* or accent. The meaning of a Vedic passage depends on the proper accent used. Thus the term *indraśatruḥ* (accent on last syllable) means ‘killer of Indra’, but *indraśatruḥ* (accent on first syllable) means ‘one whose killer is Indra’.² The *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* refers to the story of Vṛtra who lost his life, because of the wrong use of accent in the chanting of the *mantra*-s.³ In the Vedic language the proper use of accents is absolutely necessary; and even in classical Sanskrit, accent plays an important role in determining the sense of an expression, according to Pāṇini. The meaning of a compound often depends on the position of the accent.⁴ From the grammatical rules we know that the word *kṣāya* (accent on first syllable) means ‘abode’; but ‘*kṣayá* (with accent on the final syllable) means ‘destruction’.⁵ The importance of accent was

¹ For the use of the term in this sense, see Pāṇini, I. 2. 51.

² cf. *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā*, verse 52:

*mantra hīnaḥ svarato varṇato vā mithyāprayukto na tam artham āha
sa vāgvajro yajamānaḥ hinasti yathendraśatruḥ svarato ’parādhāt.*

³ *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, I. 6. 3. 1: *atha yad abravīd indraśatruḥ vardha-
sveti tasmād u hainam indra eva jaghāna.*

⁴ Pāṇini, VI. 1. 223 and VI. 2. 1.

⁵ *ibid.*, VI. 1. 20.

neglected in later times, and many of the literary critics assumed that accent need not be considered in Sanskrit literature.¹ Accents are employed only in the Vedic language; they are not considered as restricting the meaning of a word in classical Sanskrit. The *svara* or accent must be distinguished clearly from *kāku* or intonation which plays a prominent role in bringing out the nuances in most of the languages. The former is capable of objective analysis, and belongs to the primary meaning of words, whereas the latter can only suggest the subtle variations of meaning. The accent restricts the primary meaning of a word in Vedic Sanskrit, but not in classical Sanskrit. The intonation cannot restrict the primary meaning of a word, but can only suggest new and subtle ideas and emotions. The accent refers mainly to the word, while the intonation refers to the expression as a whole.

This list is not considered exhaustive. Thus *abhinaya* or gesture, *apadeśa* or pointing out directly, etc. are also to be taken as determining the exact meaning of an ambiguous expression.

There is some overlapping also in the functions of these various means of determining the exact meaning of words in ambiguous cases. All these factors discussed above could be classified under three headings: (1) grammatical means such as gender, part of speech and flectional endings, (2) verbal context and (3) non-verbal, situational context. In the *Vākyapadīya*,²

¹ *kāvyamārge svaro na gaṇyate*, *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, IX. 84.

² *VP*, II. 253, 267, 268, 335, 338, etc.

Bharṭṛhari refers again and again to the importance of contextual factors in the determination of the meaning of expressions. It is the context that helps us in understanding elliptical sentences; similarly contextual factors decide whether a word should be taken in its primary sense or in its secondary metaphorical sense.

Classification of Words: Yaugika, Rūḍha, Yogarūḍha and Yaugikarūḍha

Words are usually divided into four classes according to the different ways in which their meaning is determined: *yaugika* or derivative, *rūḍha* or conventional, *yogarūḍha* or derivative-conventional, and *yaugikarūḍha* or that which could be taken either as derivative or as conventional. Corresponding to these, the expressive powers of the words are called *yoga*, *rūḍhi*, *yogarūḍhi* and *yaugikarūḍhi*.

(a) *Yaugika* or derivative. When a word retains that signification which belongs to it according to its etymology, it is called *yaugika* or derivative. Its meaning is determined by those of its component parts, as it does not signify anything more or less than the meanings of its parts, e.g. *pācaka* (cook); here the meaning of the word is known from the verbal root *pac* (to cook) and the suffix *aka* signifying the agent of action. The meanings of such words can easily be understood from grammar and etymology.

Yaugika words are mainly of three kinds, *kṛdanta* or primary derivative formed by the addition of suffixes to verbal roots, *taddhita* or secondary derivative formed by

the addition of suffixes to nouns, and *samasta-pada* or compound words.

In the *Bṛhaddevatā* it is said 'a word can be explained in five ways, namely, as derived from a root, as derived from a derivative of a root, as derived from a compound meaning, as derived from a sentence and as of confused derivation'.¹

(b) *Rūḍha* or conventional. When a word has a meaning which is not directly connected with its derivation, it is called *rūḍha*. In this case the meaning of the word is determined by the whole word independently of the part meanings, e.g. *gauḥ* (cow), *ghaṭaḥ* (a pot).² Underivable simple words (*avyutpanna-s*) belong to this class; though they can be derived with the help of *uṇādi* suffixes, their meaning is not based on the derived sense. The Naiyāyika-s clearly state that there is no proof for holding that suffixes belonging to the *uṇādi* group have any denotative power.³ The grammarians too consider them as underivable words (*avyutpanna*). Even *rūḍha* words can be derived from verbal roots,

¹ *Bṛhaddevatā*, II. 104:

*dhātujam dhātujāṅ jātam samastārthajam eva vā
vākyajam vyatikīrṇam ca nirvācyaṁ pañcadhā padam.*

See Macdonell's translation also.

Word derived from a sentence, e.g. *itihāsa*, (history) is derived from the sentence *iti ha āsa* (It happened thus). For examples of words derived from confusion of letters, etc. see *Nirukta* II. 1. Thus, *siṃha* (a lion) is derived from *hiṃs*, to kill, by haplology.

² cf. *gacchatīti gauḥ*, *ghaṭyata iti ghaṭaḥ*.

³ *Mañikana*, p. 82: *auṇādikapratyayānām śaktatve mātābhāvāt*.

but the meaning will not depend on the etymological sense.¹

(c) *Yogarūḍha* or derivative-conventional. When the meaning determined by the whole word taken together (*samudāyaśakti*) agrees with that determined by the parts, it is called *yogarūḍha*. Here the derivative meaning and the conventional meaning coincide and refer to the same object. Thus, it is partly derivative and partly conventional; e.g. *pañkaja* which popularly means 'lotus' by convention; the etymological sense 'what grows in the mud' is also applicable to it. The conventional usage restricts the application of the derivative sense. Otherwise the term *pañkaja* might refer to anything that grows in mud. Even though both the meanings are applicable to the word, it is the conventional meaning that comes to the mind immediately on hearing the word. The well-known rule accepted by all Indian writers is that the conventional meaning is more powerful than the etymological meaning, since the former occurs to the mind immediately whereas the latter has to be known through analysis.² Another

¹ The term *maṇḍapa* is sometimes given as an example of a *rūḍha* word. It normally means 'open hall', but the etymological meaning of 'one who drinks the scum of boiled rice' is also possible and hence the word belongs to the *yaugikarūḍha* class. In the *Dinakariya* it is pointed out that the reading *maṇḍapa* in the *Siddhāntamuktāvali* is a corrupt form for *maṇḍala*. (See *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 283 and *Dinakariya* thereon.) On *maṇḍapa*, see also V. Raghavan, *Indian Linguistics*, Bagchi Memorial Volume, 1957, p. 96.

² *yogād rūḍhir baliyāṣī śīghravṛttitvāt.*

example generally given for this class of words is *kṛṣṇa-sarpa*, which etymologically means 'black snake', but which is restricted by convention to the poisonous cobra.¹

It is of interest to compare the *yogarūḍha* words with the *nirūḍhalakṣaṇa-s*.² The former is an example of the 'law of specialization' in meaning, whereas the latter is an example of the 'law of generalization'. The original etymological sense is discernible in both cases; but it has slightly changed in popular usage; thus, *pāṇkaja* (mud-born) is not applied to all things that grow in the mud, but is restricted to the lotus. So also the word *kuśala* 'one who cuts grass' is used not only to denote one who is good at cutting grass, but mainly in the sense of an 'expert'.³ According to some scholars, *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā* should be taken as the primary meaning itself.

(d) *Yaugikarūḍha* is derivative or conventional. It is also referred to as *rūḍhayaugika*. When the meaning of the word can be ascertained either etymologically from the meanings of its component parts, or conventionally from usage by the whole word taken together, it is called *yaugikarūḍha*. Both the meanings are determined independently of each other, and understood separately. The same word gives one meaning when taken

¹ *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, 26: *yan nāma svāyavavṛtilabhyārthena samaṃ svārthasyānvayakṛt tan nāma yogarūḍham. yathā paṇkajakṛṣṇa-sarpādharmaḍi.*

² Discussed in the chapter on 'Lakṣaṇā'.

³ See *Śābarabhāṣya* on VI. 7. 22: *bahuṣu kuśār ām lātūr guṇeṣu tatsu nipuṇatāyām eva kuśalaśabdaprayogād rūḍhiśabda eva bhavati.*

in its conventional sense and quite another if viewed as a derivative; e.g. the word *udbhid* means 'tree', when taken in its etymological sense, while conventionally it is also used as the name of a sacrifice. Similarly the term *aśvagandhā* can be used in its etymological sense of 'having the smell of a horse'; it is also used popularly as the name of a particular plant. It is quite possible to consider that it is an instance of two words with two different meanings having the same form, one being *yaugika* and the other *rūḍha*. Some scholars do not consider *yaugikarūḍha* as a separate class.¹

It may be noted that this classification is mainly applicable to the nouns. Jagadīśa includes words commonly used in their metaphorical sense (*nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā*) as another group in this classification.² Words like *kuśala* (grass-cutter, expert), *pravīṇa* (good at playing on the *vīṇa* instrument, expert), *dvirepha* (having two 'r's', the *bhramara* or the bee), etc. come under this group.

Etymology versus Popular Usage

Etymology was a popular subject in ancient India. Even the Vedic sages were very much interested in the derivation of popular words. Thus, *sarpiḥ* (clarified butter) is derived from *srp* (to spread) and means

¹ *Laghumañjūsā*, p. 105: *śaktis tridhā rūḍhir yogo yogarūḍhiś ca*.

² *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, 16:

*rūḍhaṃ ca lakṣakaṃ caiva yogarūḍhaṃ ca yaugikaṃ
tac caturdhā, parai rūḍhayaugikaṃ manyate 'dhikaṃ*.

‘that which spreads’, and *navanīta* (butter) is so called because ‘it is taken when it is fresh’.¹ The principle of ‘etymology by contraction’—each word being derived from two or more component words—was also resorted to by them. In the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*² the word *hṛdaya* (heart) is derived from three different roots, *hṛ*, *dā* and *i*. *Śākaṭāyana*³ derived the word *satya* (truth) from the two roots *as* and *i*. Yāska objects to this kind of derivation.⁴

‘In India the concept of verbal rather than nominal roots is strongly embedded in grammatical thought.’⁵ The etymologists as well as the grammarian *Śākaṭāyana* held that all nouns are derived from verbal roots.⁶ On the other hand, *Gārgya* who was an etymologist, and some grammarians considered this view to be too sweeping, and admitted the possibility of some original nouns which cannot be traced to a verb.⁷ Yāska supports *Gārgya*,⁸ but generally subscribes to the verbal derivation

¹ Durga’s commentary on the *Nirukta*, I. 14: ‘*yad asarpat tat sarpir*’ *iti mantrō*, ‘*yan navam eva nītam abhavad*’ *iti mantrah*.

² *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, XIV. 8. 4. 1: *tad etat tryakṣaram hṛdayam iti. hṛ ity ekam akṣaram. abhiharaty asmai. dā ity ekam akṣaram. dadāty asmai. iam ity ekam akṣaram. eti svargam lokam ya evam veda iti*.

³ *Nirukta*, I. 13.

⁴ *ibid*.

⁵ W. S. Allen, ‘The Origin and Development of Language’, *TPS*, 1948.

⁶ *Nirukta*, I. 12: *nāmāny ākhyātājānīti śākaṭāyano nairuktasamayaś ca; Mbh*, II, p. 138: *nāma ca dhātūjam āha nirukte vyākaraṇe śākaṭasya ca tokam*.

⁷ *Nirukta*, I. 12: *na sarvāṇīti gārgyo vāiyākaraṇānām caike*.

⁸ *vide supra*.

of nouns. Patañjali also refers to this controversy.¹ Pāṇini seems to have considered the *uṇādi-s* as *avyutpanna-prātipadika-s* (underivable stems).² Nouns which can be regularly derived from verbal roots by the addition of suffixes form the subject matter of the *kṛdanta* section of his grammar; others which do not admit of such regular analysis are taken under the *uṇādi* class.

It is accepted by all schools of thought in India that the meaning current in popular usage is more authoritative than the etymological meaning. Pāṇini says that the authority of the *saṃjñā*, or the popular usage of words, must always supersede the authority of the meaning dependent on derivation.³ Kātyāyana says that the application of a word to an object rests mainly on the popular usage.⁴ Patañjali maintains that the usage of *śiṣṭa-s* or the educated people who actually speak the language is the final authority on the application of words.⁵ Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali frequently appeal to current usage as the final authority on the gender and meaning of words.⁶ The

¹ *Mbh*, II, p. 138.

² *Mbh*, III, p. 241: *prātipadikavijñānāc ca pāṇineḥ siddham. uṇādayo 'vyutpannāni prātipadikāni.*

³ Pāṇini, I. 2. 53: *tad aśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt.*

⁴ *Vārttika* on Pāṇini, I. 2. 71: *darśanaṃ hetuḥ.* He says that the application of a word to an object can also rest on the root-meaning underlying it.

⁵ *Mbh* on Pāṇini, VI. 3. 109: *śiṣṭāḥ śabdeṣu pramāṇam.*

⁶ *Mbh* on Pāṇini, I. 1. 21, I. 1. 65: *lokavijñānāt siddham.*

relation between words and their meanings is also established by popular usage.¹

It is of interest to note in this connection the clear distinction laid down by the Mīmāṃsaka-s between interpretation based on analysis or etymology (*yoga*) and interpretation based on conventionally established usage (*rūḍhi*). 'They taught that *rūḍhi* is always stronger than *yoga*; that is, one must always interpret a word in accordance with its conventional meaning when that can be determined.'² They never denied the importance of etymology in interpretation; but they said that it must always be overruled by conventional usage. This is known as the maxim of the *rathakāra*. In the interpretation of the Vedic text laying down that 'fire should be installed during the rains by the *rathakāra*', doubt arises about the meaning of the term *rathakāra*; etymologically it means the chariot-maker; but it was conventionally used in the sense of a man belonging to a particular mixed caste. Jaimini says³ that the conventional meaning should be taken in preference to the etymological one. This maxim is accepted by Nāgeśa in his *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*.⁴

¹ *Mbh*, I, p. 6: *siddhe sabdārthasambandhe lokataḥ* . . .

² F. Edgerton, 'Etymology and Interpretation', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 79, no. 4 (1938), pp. 705-14.

See also Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, pp. 314, 384.

³ *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, VI. 1. 50.

⁴ Under *Paribhāṣā* 108: *avayavaḥprasiddheḥ samudāyaprasiddhir baliyāsi*.

The Mīmāṃsaka-s, while discussing the relative importance of the six means of evidence ¹ in the treatment of injunctions of application (*vinīyoga-vidhi*), lay down the principle that *liṅga*, or the conventional meaning established by usage (same as *rūḍhi*) is a stronger evidence than *samākhyā* or the etymological meaning (*yōga*). It is of interest to note that *samākhyā* is given last in the list of six *pramāṇa-s* for subordinating the details of a sacrifice to the main *utpatti-vidhi*.

In interpreting ancient texts like the Veda-s, what should be done in the case of words that are not in use among the people of the land? Are we to depend on etymological interpretation, or should we take into consideration the meaning of such words in other languages? This problem has been discussed by Kumāṛila-bhaṭṭa in the *Tantravārttika*. He says that the well-established usage is more authoritative than that meaning which is newly assumed.² In the case of loan words we have to accept the meanings assigned to them in the foreign language itself, as that is also based on long usage. He criticizes the method, adopted by some scholars, of trying to derive such foreign loan words from Sanskrit roots;³ in the case of the Drāviḍa words ending in consonants, some Ārya-s consider

¹ They are *śruti* (direct statement), *liṅga* (word meaning), *vākya* (syntactic connection), *prakaraṇa* (context), *sthāna* (position or sequence) and *samākhyā* (etymological meaning). Of these, each preceding one is stronger than the succeeding ones.

² *Tantravārttika*, p. 227: *kālpanikyāḥ prasiddheś ca yā kṛtā sā baliyāsī*.

³ *ibid.*, p. 225 f.

them as Sanskrit words by adding the necessary vowel affixes: *cor* (rice), *atar* (road), *pāp* (snake), *māl* (woman), and *vair* (stomach) are taken to be the equivalents respectively of the Sanskrit words *coraḥ* (thief), *atarah* (difficult to cross), *pāpaḥ* (evil), *mālā* (garland) and *vairiḥ* (enemy). They try to explain the etymology by reference to the meanings attached to the Sanskrit words. Kumārilabhaṭṭa attacks such ridiculous attempts at arbitrary derivation of foreign words from Sanskrit roots. He says that the usage of the foreigners is as authoritative as that of the Ārya-s in all worldly affairs. In cases like *patroṇa* (a silk garment) and *vāravāṇa* (armour) where the articles are brought from the foreign country, how can we know the meaning, if the Mleccha-s (foreigners) do not point them out? ¹ When the same word-form is used by the Ārya-s and the Mleccha-s in different meanings, both are equally authoritative. Thus, *yava*, *vetasa* and *varāha* are used in the sense of barley, cane and boar respectively by the Ārya-s, and long pepper, black berry and crow by the Mleccha-s. ² Majority of usage is no criterion for determining the primary meaning of a word; for in the case of well-known homonyms like *akṣa*, all

¹ *Tantravārttika*, p. 228.

² This is following Śabara, see *bhāṣya*, p. 216: *ubhayathā padārthāvagamād vikalpaḥ*. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that the second set of meanings is no longer known.

cf. *Tantravārttika*, p. 218:

*naivocyante kvacid deśe yavaśrutya priyaṅgavaḥ
jambūṇa na vetasaṃ prāhur varāhaṃ nāpi vāyasam
adhyāroṇya vicāreṇa kiṃ mudhā khidyate manaḥ.*

the meanings are accepted as primary. The word *pīlu* means a kind of tree in Sanskrit, but it means an elephant to the Mleccha-s. While interpreting ancient texts, the use of the word in other contexts in the same text has to be taken into account.

In the case of the corrupt forms (*apabhraṃśa-s*), however, the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s do not consider them to be independent words acceptable as synonyms of the original words. The *apabhraṃśa-s* originate because of the discrepancy of the speaker,¹ but owing to long usage people may mistake them as correct words. The significance of such words is derived indirectly through their association with the correct forms. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that the corrupt forms of a word become capable of expressing the meaning only by manifesting the potentiality of the original word, through their similarity with it. The Naiyāyika-s too take the view that corrupt words indicate the meaning only indirectly by recalling the correct forms. But the grammarians say that there is expressive power even for the corrupt forms of words if they convey the meaning; thus in the case of languages like Marathi, derived from Sanskrit, the meaning of words is understood not indirectly through the correct Sanskrit forms.

The Primary Meaning of a Word: Different Views

The exact nature of the primary meaning of a word like 'cow' has been discussed almost by every

¹ VP, I. 149: Puṇyārāja thereon: *śabdaprakṛtiḥ apabhraṃśa itī saṃgrahakārokteḥ*.

school of Indian philosophy, and there are different theories about the primary signification of a word.¹

According to the Naiyāyika-s of the old school a word means the *vyakti* or the particular, the *ākṛti* or the generic shape or form and the *jāti* or the universal.² It denotes the particular, connotes the universal and also stands for the shape distinguishing the particular from dissimilar things. All these three factors are present in the sense of a word; in a given context one factor is predominant and the others are subordinate. If in actual usage only one of the factors seems evident, it is not because the other two factors are absent, but because they are not useful in the context.

Among modern Naiyāyika-s some hold that the primary meaning of a word is a particular as characterized by both the universal and the form.³ This is a development of the old view. According to some others the primary meaning is the particular as characterized by the universal only;⁴ the generic shape is part of the universal and need not be included separately.

¹ On this problem see: D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 259-72; Huparikar, *The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching*, pp. 410-27; P. C. Chakravarti, *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*, pp. 185 ff.; Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, pp. 145-8; Hiriyanna, 'Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana', *IHQ*, vol. 14, pp. 261 ff.; *Tantravārttika*, translation, pp. 363 ff.; *VP*, III, *Jāṭisamuddeśa* and *Vyaktisamuddeśa*; *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 271 ff.

² *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 2. 65: *vyaktyākṛtijāṭayas tu padārthaḥ*.

See also Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* on that.

³ *Śabdasaktiprakāśikā*, under verse 19.

⁴ *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, under v. 81: *jātimān śabdārthaḥ. śaktir jātyākṛtviśiṣṭavyaktau viśrāmyati*. See *Dinakarī* on that, holding

. According to the Sāṃkhya-s and some of the modern Naiyāyika-s the primary meaning of a word is the percept of the particular.¹ According to the Naiyāyika-s, the nominal suffix denotes the case-relation, gender and number; hence the meaning of the stem must be the particular, since it is only the particular that is capable of being qualified by gender and number. The meaning of a word is cognized only through its connection with a particular act, and each sentence would refer to some particular act. As Vātsyāyana says,² an attribute can be predicated of an object alone, not of a universal. It is only the particulars that become the objects of sense perception and of practical activity (*arthakriyākāritva*). Moreover, there are unique things like the sun and the moon and proper names which cannot have a universal.³

The Jaina philosophers hold⁴ that a word like 'cow' does not mean a particular cow; the word

jātivīṣiṣṭavyakti as the meaning. Jayantabhaṭṭa (*Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 297 f.) also takes *jātivīṣiṣṭavyakti* as the meaning of a word.

¹ *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 2. 59 and the *bhāṣya* thereon; *Vivaraṇa-prameyasamgraha*, p. 181; *Nyāyakośa*, p. 855: *vyaktāy eva śaktiḥ, na tu gotvādijātāv apīti navyā āhuḥ*.

See also *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 27.

² *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* II. 2. 59.

³ According to the Nyāya theory of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*, the cognition of plurality is simply by extension of the particular, and not by an abstraction of the particulars; after seeing a single instance of a thing, we come to know the plurality of it through the form of the knowledge it assumes. (See P. T. Raju, *Idealist Thought of India*, p. 421.)

⁴ *Vivaraṇa-prameyasamgraha*, p. 181; *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 2. 62.

applies to all animals having the general shape of a cow. So the primary meaning of a word is the *ākṛti* or the shape. This view is criticized¹ on the ground that there are cases where, in spite of the similarity of shape, there is no identity of meaning, as in the case of a clay cow. Moreover substances like gold remain the same in spite of any change in the shape it may assume.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s the primary meaning of a word is the universal which is the essential quality common to the particular instances of the class.² It is admitted that while cognition of the meaning brought about by the word pertains to the universal,³ all practical activity that follows the word pertains to the particular. But the primary relation of the word must be to the universal, for it would be impossible to understand the meaning of a word, say, 'cow' if it has to be understood with respect to all the particular

¹ *Nyāyabhāṣya* on II. 2. 63.

² The early Mīmāṃsaka-s, Jaimini, Śabara, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Prabhākara and Murāri, as well as the Vedāntin-s like Śaṅkara, use the term *ākṛti* in the sense of *jāti* or the universal. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says (*Ślokaṣvarttika*, *Ākṛti* section, v. 3): *jātim evākṛtim prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā*. Later writers use the term *jāti* itself for the universal.

³ The universal is the essential quality common to two or more instances of the class; to the Naiyāyika-s it is a separate category, real and eternal (*nityatve saty anekasamavetatvaṃ jātitvam*), but to the Mīmāṃsaka-s it is only the common essential characteristics existing in a group of particulars (*dravyagūṇakarmavṛttiḥ sāmānyadharmah*). To the former it is objectively real, but to the latter it is only an abstraction. See *Nyāyakosa*, p. 1009 f.

cows. Moreover, there will be confusion if the primary meaning of the word is taken to be the particular, for if the meaning of the word 'cow' is known with respect to a white cow, it will be difficult to understand that the word has reference to a black cow also. Kumārila-bhaṭṭa argues that when we hear a word like 'cow', before we can have the idea of any particular cow, it is the universal common attribute of 'cowness' that we comprehend. If the word meant the particulars, there would not be any uniform concept, since the particulars are found to have distinct qualities.¹

Besides, the problem is what is the primary meaning of a word. When it is held that primarily a word means the universal, it is also admitted that the particular meaning is known through *lakṣaṇā* or the secondary significative power of the word, based on the incompatibility of the isolated primary meanings with the intention of the speaker to give a unified sense. According to Prabhākara and Murārimisra, the particular is known from the universal because of the invariable connection between the two, and since the same cognition comprehends both the universal and the particular.

¹ *Tantravārttika* on *sūtra* I. 3. 33. See also *Śāstradīpikā*, 1. 3. 10:

*ānanyavyabhicārābhyām śaktyanekatvadoṣataḥ
saṁdehāc caramajñānāc citrabuddher abhāvataḥ
anvayavyatirekābhyām ekarūpapratiṭītaḥ
ākṛteḥ prathamam jñāne tasyā evābhidheyatā
vyaktyākṛtyor abhedāc ca vyavahāropayogitā
līngasaṁkhyādisaṁbandhaḥ sāmānādhikaranyadhiḥ
sarvaṁ samañjasaṁ hy etad vastvanekāntavādinah.*

According to the Advaita Vedāntin-s, though there is no absolute reality for the distinction between *vyakti* (particular) and *jāti* (universal), which are simply the concepts of the mind, from the point of view of phenomenal reality (*vyāvahārikasattā*) the Mīmāṃsā view, that the primary relation of the word is with the universal and not with the particular, is acceptable. The particular is also understood from the word, because the same cognition cognizes both the attribute and the substantive, the universal and the particular. Or we may take the view that the word primarily signifies the universal and secondarily (through *lakṣaṇā*) the particular.¹

According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s, even proper nouns are connotative; the knowledge of

¹ *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 17, 19: *katham tarhi gavādīpadād vyakter bhānam iti ced, jāter vyaktisamānasamvitsamvedyatvād iti brūmaḥ athavā vyakter lakṣaṇayāvagamah.*

The universal 'cowness' is the *upādhi* or substratum for all the particular cows, but it cannot exist without its *āśraya* or the thing which inheres in it; an attribute cannot exist without a substance; hence the particular object is implied by the universal. This is Prabhākara's view; the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view is that the particular is got from the universal through *lakṣaṇā*. See *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 932:

*jāter astitvanāstitve na ca kaścid vivakṣati
nityatvāl lakṣyamāṇyā vyaktes te hi viśeṣaṇe.*

('Nobody wants to refer to the existence or non-existence of the universal, since it is eternal; these two are the attributes of the particular got from the universal through *lakṣaṇā*.') This verse is wrongly attributed to Maṇḍanamiśra in *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Śakti-vāda, p. 587) and *Śabdasaktiprakāśikā* (p. 87).

the identity of the same person from birth to death through all the changing stages is explained on the basis of the common attribute.¹ Modern logicians in the West like Bradley² and Bosanquet³ agree that a proper name has a universal meaning as its connotation. As Wittgenstein says,⁴ a name 'signifies only what is an element of reality, what cannot be destroyed, what remains the same in all changes'.⁵

Among the grammarians Vyāḍi held⁶ that the meaning of the word is the particular which is the substantive, and not the universal which is the attribute. It is *dravya*, which stands for any particular of the class. Vājapyāyana, on the other hand, held⁷ the Mīmāṃsaka view that it is the *jāti*, the universal essential attribute, that is connoted by a word. Patañjali

¹ *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, section on Pāṇinīyadarśana.

² *Logic*, p. 59.

³ *Essentials of Logic*, pp. 91 ff.

⁴ *Philosophical Investigations*, § 59.

⁵ Both the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s believe that the significative power of the word resides in the particular and in the universal, though in different degrees; in the particular its existence is only latent (*svarūpasatī*), whereas in the universal it is expressed or known (*jñātā satī*). See *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 18: *yadvā gavādīpadānām vyaktau śaktiḥ svarūpasatī, na tu jñātā; jātau tu jñātā satī hetuḥ*.

⁶ Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* on Pāṇini, I. 2. 64: *dravyābhidhānam vyāḍiḥ*; Helārāja on *VP*, III. 1. 2: *vyāḍimate tu sarvasābdānām dravyam arthaḥ, tasyaiva sāksātkriyāsamanvayopapattēḥ*.

⁷ Helārāja, loc. cit.: *vājapyāyanācāryamatena sārvaśrīkī jātīpadārthavyavasthōpapadyate. Vārttika* on Pāṇini I. 2. 64: *ākṛtyābhidhānād vaikaṃ vibhaktau vājapyāyanāḥ*.

See also Hiriyanna, loc. cit.

says¹ that according to Pāṇini the meaning of a word is both the universal and the particular, since the *sūtra* I. 2. 58 (*jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām*) is based on the view that the word means the universal, while the *sūtra* I. 2. 64 (*sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau*) is on the assumption that a word means a particular. Helārāja also says² that according to the school of Pāṇini a word means both the universal and the particular.

Bhartṛhari discusses elaborately the various problems involved in these two views.³ Those who hold that the word meaning is the universal have to explain how in a sentence the universal can have any connection with the action which is the main constituent of the sentence. According to some, the concrete particular is known through its invariable association (*sāhacarya*) with the universal, even though it is not actually denoted by the word;⁴ thus the universal is only an *upalakṣaṇa* or the means for understanding the power of denotation; according to some others the particular is known on the basis of the intention of the speaker, through *lakṣaṇā*.⁵ Bhartṛhari says that every word, first of all means the class of that word; thus 'cow' means the universal of the words having the

¹ *Mbh*, I, p. 6: *kiṃ punar ākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ, āhosvid dravyam. ubhayam ity āha. katham jāyate. ubhayathā hy ācāryeṇa sūtrāṇi paṭhitāni*. See also *ibid.*, II, pp. 98 ff.

² Helārāja, loc. cit.: *pāṇinidarśane jātidravye śabdenābhidhiyete*.

³ *VP*, III. Jātisamuddeśa and Dravyasamuddeśa.

⁴ *VP*, III. 1. 3: *keṣāṃcit sāhacaryeṇa jātiḥ śaktyupalakṣaṇam*.

⁵ Helārāja on *VP*, III. 1. 3: *anyeṣāṃ punas tālparyeṇa*.

form, 'cow'; it is the universal of the 'form-meant'. Later it is superimposed on the universal of the 'thing-meant'.¹ Thus the word first gives the idea of its form and then that of its referent. The upholders of this view believe that even in the case of proper nouns it is the *jāti* that is meant by the word; they also accept a universal within another.²

Bhartrhari says that in all phenomenal entities there are two elements; *jāti* refers to the real element and *vyakti* to the unreal.³ The particulars suffer changes, whereas *jāti* remains constant. The *jāti* is the essence of things. It is the *sattā* or existence that abides in things that is denoted by *jāti*; all activity exhibited in the world can be considered as its manifestation. According to those who hold that the meaning of a word is *dravya* or substance, it is not necessarily any external concrete object that is to be meant, but the mental image produced in us of the object.⁴ The meaning is mental rather than physical. It is not even

¹ VP, III. 1. 6:

*svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate
tato 'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā.*

² Thus there is no non-connotative word to them. See Helārāja, on VP, III. 1. 11: *vaiyākaraṇānām jātiṣu api jātir aviruddhā. tathā cānvayirūpeṇābhidhīyamāno guṇo jātir eva, evaṃ kriyāpy abhedanābhidhīyamānā jātiḥ.*

³ VP, III. 1. 32: *satyaṃ yat tatra sā jātir asatyā vyaktayaḥ smṛtāḥ.*

⁴ VP, III. 1. 19:

*anupravṛttirūpām yām prakhyāyām ākṛtiṃ viduḥ
kecid vyāvṛttirūpām tu dravyatvena pracakṣate.*

Helārāja says: *vyāvṛttākārabuddhisamniveśitoṣād ākāro 'tra darśane dravyam iti prasaṅgād uktam.*

necessary that the mental picture should have a corresponding physical object in the world. This view is almost in keeping with that of the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism.

The grammarians who held *dravya* or substance to be the ultimate meaning of words also explained it as a reality which is the essence, the soul and the real nature of the thing. Thus whether the meaning of the word is the universal or the substance, it is something real and permanent.¹ The meaning of the word must be something permanent and real.

The Buddhist Theory of Apoha

Whereas the Realistic schools of the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s believe that words have direct reference to objective realities, the Buddhist logicians maintain that the essence of meaning is negative in character and that words have no direct reference to objective realities. According to the Buddhists² words deal directly with conceptual images which are purely subjective constructions of the mind (*vikalpa-s*), and therefore, there can be no real connection between words and the external objects. The meaning of a word is a conceptual image (*vikalpa*) whose essence is the negation of all its counter-correlates (*anyāpoha*); the word 'cow'

¹ Patañjali (*Mbh* on *sūtra*, V. I. 119) defines *dravya* as that which does not lose its essence when different qualities come to inhere in it: *yasya guṇāntareṣv api prādurbhavatsu tattvaṃ na vihanyate, tad dravyam*.

² Dīnāga: *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdāyonayaḥ* (quoted in Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, p. 405 n.).

does not actually mean the animal with dewlap, horns etc.; it means only the exclusion of all objects that are not the cow.

The Buddhists do not accept the view of the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s about the existence of a positive entity called the universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*). To them, only the particular at a time-point (*svalakṣaṇa*) is ultimately real. The so-called objective world is made up of a succession of such momentary particulars, like the still pictures of a cinema.¹ Strictly speaking, these momentary particulars produce mutually different results, but since they produce the same sensation, they all appear as identical. Dharmakīrti says that the sensation of sameness is produced by a repeated series of the same perception, and that the sameness of the particulars is the consequence of the fact that they produce the same sensation.² The relative differences of these particulars is not grasped, and hence man imputes sameness to them, by the common exclusion of all the others. The efficiency of the particulars is the basis of differentiation; all things which produce certain results are different from those that do not produce them.

To the Buddhist logicians, *pratyakṣa* or real perception is the unerring knowledge of the unique particular

¹ Bergson (*Creative Evolution*, London, 1928, p. 322) compares our cognitive apparatus with a cinematograph which reconstitutes a movement out of momentary stabilized snapshots.

² Dharmakīrti, quoted by Vācaspatimiśra in *NVTT*, p. 486:

*ekapratyavamarśasya hetuvād dhīr abhedinī
ekādhihetubhāvena vyaktinām apy abhinnatā.*

that is given directly by the senses; the name and the concept through which we generally interpret the particular are not to be included in perception, since it is the mind that supplies them. Indeterminate perception is the only *pratyakṣa* according to them. The Vaiyākaraṇa-s, on the other hand, consider that there is no knowledge without language and concepts; knowledge must always be determinate. The Naiyāyika-s distinguish between indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*) and determinate perception (*savikalpa pratyakṣa*); but they say that the indeterminate stage is not actually experienced, but is to be inferred. The Mimāṃsaka-s, however, accept both the stages of perception as valid means of knowledge; but to them indeterminate perception is only that unattended by verbal images, as in the case of children or the dumb. The Vedāntin-s also believe that it is possible to have different stages of perception before the fully developed perceptual judgment.¹

According to the Buddhists the conceptual image of a thing has no direct correspondence with the real external things which are mutually different; the apparent identity of the image is produced by the identical efficiency of the things. Just as different medicinal plants have the same febrifugal influence, even though they do not have the same form, so also the different things, like a black and a white cow, become the cause of the same repeated uniform image,

¹ See D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 31-94.

without the presence in them of any real universal.¹ These conceptual images which are actually unreal can, however, bring about purposeful action in daily life. Everyone experiences his own images, but the imaginative operations of different individuals agree with one another. It is like the visual experience of two persons suffering from the same eye disease, both seeing the moon double. Like the Vedāntin-s,² the Buddhists also believed³ that there are two kinds of truths, the practical or empirical truth and the supreme truth.

A word cannot signify a 'unique particular', since the 'particulars' are momentary entities and do not continue up to the time that conventional relation is apprehended. Even if verbal relation is supposed to exist in one particular at one instant, it cannot serve any other particulars, and the word 'cow' would mean only one cow at a particular time, and not others. Moreover, it is impossible for one to know the conventional relation of the word with all the particulars, past, present and future. Thus, there can be no comprehension of a verbal connection with regard to particulars either individually or collectively.⁴ As for the

¹ For a detailed discussion of the problem see Frauwallner's article in *WZKM*, vols. 39-42.

² *parā* and *aparā vidyā* in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, I. 1. 4.

³ *saṃvṛtisatya* and *paramārthasatya*. See Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamikakārikā*, XXIV. 8:

*dve satye saṃvṛtisatya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ.*

⁴ *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, p. 278: *na hy adṛṣṭeṣu atītānāgata-bhedabhīnneṣu samayaḥ sambhavaty atiprasaṅgāt.*

universal, it is only an intellectual fiction without any reality.

A word cannot denote a real positive thing, because only the momentary particular, the thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*), is ultimately real. The meaning of a word is primarily and naturally a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) and not an objective fact. The relation between the two is one of cause and effect;¹ the word produces the purely subjective concept, which is negative in nature, consisting as it does in the exclusion of other concepts to make it distinct. Hence, the meaning of a word has to be considered as the negation of the concept's counter-correlate, as the exclusion of everything other than the concept (*anyāpoha*).

When Dinnāga first promulgated this theory of Apoha establishing the negative essence of meaning in the fifth chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, he seems to have explained it in terms of pure negation without any positive reference. Many works on the subject are available in Tibetan translation;² but it is mainly from its representation by the opponents of Buddhism like Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Uddyotakara and Bhāmaha that we get some clear ideas about the original form of the theory of Apoha. They all criticize the theory on the assumption that it is a purely negative approach. In

¹ *Prameyakamalamārtanda*, p. 128 (b): *tatpratibimbakam ca śabdena anyamānatvāt kāryam eveti kāryakāraṇabhāva eva vācyaavācakabhāvaḥ*.

² Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, p. 404. The *Pramāṇavārttika* by Dharmakīrti deals with the subject in detail.

the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita suggests¹ that when Dīnāga denied the positive import of words, it was on the ground that from the logical point of view, words did not have any reference to a positive reality.

Some of the main arguments adduced by the Buddhists for assuming that the meaning of a word is essentially negative in nature are the following:

(a) Similarity between things absolutely dissimilar can be established only by the common exclusion of their counter-correlates. Different animals such as the cow, the horse, the buffalo and the elephant can be classed together as similar, only by taking them all as excluding something else; e.g., as 'non-lions'.² If the word 'cow' is to be used to mean different kinds of cows, the red, the black and the brown, it can be only by the negation of the non-cow. There can be no positive similarity between such different objects as the red and the black. The word 'cow', therefore, does not denote a positive object cow, but means only the negation of the non-cow.

(b) Anything that can be alternately affirmed and denied is necessarily of the nature of exclusion of

¹ v. 1097: *asambhavo vidher uktaḥ sāmānyāder asambhavāt śabdānām ca vikalpānām vastuto 'viśayatvataḥ*.

His name is also spelt as Śāntirakṣita.

² *NVTT*, p. 486: *atyantavilakṣaṇānām sālakṣaṇyam anyavyāvṛttikṛtam eva. yathā gavāśvamahīṣamātāṅgānām atyantavilakṣaṇānām api śiṃhavyāvṛtyā sālakṣaṇyam*.

See also Pārthasārathimīśra's commentary on the *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 556.

its counter-correlate.¹ In the case of every word we find an element common to both existence and non-existence; for a word like 'cow' can be connected either with 'is' or with 'is not'. If the meaning of the word were exclusively positive, it could not be connected with 'is not', as that would be a contradiction. Neither could it be connected with 'is', since that would be superfluous. Hence, the cognition of the common element must be attributed to some cause which is negative in nature; it must lie in the exclusion of all other things.

(c) The meaning of a word is directly experienced as something distinct, something whose essence consists in the negation of its counter-correlate. If the objects of determinate perception were not cognized directly as an exclusion of their counter-correlates, a man ordered to tie up a cow might proceed to tie up a horse, as he would not recognize the difference.²

Diñnāga seems to have carried out this negative approach to meaning even in the case of expressions like 'blue lotus'; here the term 'blue' is used to exclude all lotuses that are not blue, and the term 'lotus' to exclude all blue things that are not lotuses.³

¹ *ibid.*, p. 486: *yad bhāvābhāvasāmānyam tad anyavyāvṛttirūpam eva.*

² *ibid.*, p. 487: *anubhūyata eva vikalpaviśayo vyāvṛttirūpaḥ. tathā hi tadapratibhāsane gām badhāneti deśito 'śvam badhniyāt.*

³ *Prameyakamalamārtanda*, p. 126 (b): *diñnāgena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasamarthanārthaṁ 'nīlotpalādīśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān arthān āhuḥ' ity uktam.*

See also *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 301.

Thus the expression signifies the exclusion of the non-blue and the non-lotus. This view is quite similar to the theory of Vyāḍi, that the meaning of a sentence is not *samsarga* or the mutual association of the word meanings, but the mutual exclusion (*bheda*) of these.¹ Ratnakīrti says that in a sentence every word denotes a negation. Thus, in the sentence 'This road leads to Srughna', the word 'this' excludes all roads other than the one indicated, 'road' excludes footpaths, etc., 'leads to' shows that it is not a blind path, and 'Srughna' excludes all the other places.² The similarity between the Apoha theory and the theory of Vyāḍi is only in regard to the sentence meaning; as far as an isolated word is concerned, Vyāḍi holds that its meaning is 'any particular' (*dravya*), whereas to the Buddhist logicians, it is only a conceptual image without any positive reality in it.

In recent times de Saussure has advanced a similar linguistic theory in his *Cours de Linguistique Générale*. He says that in language there are only differences, without positive terms (*Dans la langue il n'y a que des différences . . . sans termes positifs*).³ Though we say that meanings correspond to concepts, we have to understand that these concepts are not positive in their content, but

¹ This is discussed in detail in the section on 'The Relation of Words in a Sentence'.

² *Apohasiddhi*, p. 5 f.

³ *Cours*, pp. 167-75; See also S. Varma, 'Analysis of Meaning in Indian Semantics', *Journal of the Dept. of Letters*, Calcutta University, 1926, p. 24; J. R. Firth, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

only differential. The function of a word is contextual elimination. Thus, the meaning of a word in a sentence will be modified, if a neighbouring term undergoes modification. After establishing the negative essence of meaning in the case of words, de Saussure says that the sign and the thing signified are negative only when taken separately, but their combination is a positive fact. This idea is also similar to the Buddhistic theory according to which the import of a sentence is positive,¹ even though the meanings of the individual words, taken separately, are negative.²

This Apoha theory of negative approach towards meaning has been vehemently criticized by scholars like Uddyotakara, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Bhāmaha and Udayana.³ The arguments adduced in favour of this theory are set aside as weak and unconvincing. Their reply to the Buddhists' arguments are the following:

(a) The sameness of reference in the cognition of different objects like the black cow and the red cow is to be explained by the assumption of a positive entity, the universal. Unless we assume such a universal, it is not possible to explain an expression like 'black cow',

¹ *Tattovasaṃgraha*, v. 923: *vākyārthaḥ pratibhālakṣaṇaḥ*. Also Kamalaśīla's commentary on the same: *vākyārthaḥ pratibhākyo'yam*.

² Prof. Firth suggests (loc. cit.) that 'it is just possible that he had learned something of Indian philosophy'.

³ Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārttika*, pp. 320-31; Kumārilabhaṭṭa, *Ślokovārttika*, Apoha section; Bhāmaha, *Bhāmahālakṣāra*; Udayana, *Āmatattvaviveka*, I.4.; Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 302-17; Prabhācandra, *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, pp. 125 ff.

for if 'cow' negates all non-cows, it will include all cows, black and white, and the term 'black cow' would be a contradiction. With the conception of a positive universal 'cowness' embracing all the cows, black and white, there will be no difficulty in such cases.¹

(b) If we assume the existence of a positive universal, there is no logical contradiction involved in connecting 'is' or 'is not' with a word. A universal is an eternal entity, but residing in an infinite number of particulars scattered in time and space, it can be alternately affirmed and denied; affirmation means the universal's connection with the particular in the present time, while negation means its connection with the individual in the past or future.²

(c) It is contrary to experience to suggest that a word denotes only the negation of the counter-correlate, and not any positive entity. When we hear a word, it is the positive idea that comes to our mind.³

Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that the negation of a thing positively unknown is impossible; so the meaning of the term 'non-cow' can be understood only if we know what 'cow' means. If the meaning of 'cow' depends

¹ *Slokavārttika*, p. 567.

² Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, vol. II, p. 421. See also *NVTT*, p. 487: *sā hi svarūpato nityāpi deśakālavikīrṇānantavyaktyāśrayatayā bhāvābhāvasādhārāṇi bhavaty astināstisaṃbandhayogyā. vartamānavyakti-saṃbandhitā hi jāter astitā, atītānāgatavyaktisaṃbandhitā ca nāstitā iti.*

³ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, v. 911:

vidhirūpāvasāyena matiḥ śābdī pravartate.

on that of 'non-cow' and the meaning of 'non-cow' depends on that of 'cow', there will be a vicious circle in the argument. And, if the meaning of the term 'cow' is already known, it is unnecessary to search for the meaning of 'non-cow'.¹

Bhāmaha criticizes the Apoha theory on the ground that a word can express only one meaning at one time. If the meaning of the word 'cow' is the negation of the non-cow, then it will be necessary to search for another word which gives the positive idea of the animal. The same word cannot give simultaneously two meanings, one positive and the other negative.²

Kumārila bhaṭṭa says³ that even negative expressions like 'non-brahmin' signify a positive entity. Negation can be of two kinds: absolute negation (*prasajya pratiśedha*) and specific negation (*paryudāsa*). Absolute negation would mean the negation of all reality and existence; if that were the meaning of words, then speech would be impossible, since all words would mean the same uniform absolute non-existence. If the

¹ *Śloka-vārttika*, Apoha section, vv. 83-4:

*siddhaś cāgaur apohyeta goniśedhātmakeś ca saḥ
tatra gaur eva vaktavyo nañā yaḥ pratiśidhyate.
sa ced agonivṛttyātmā bhaved anyonyasamśrayaḥ
siddhaś ced gaur apohārthaṃ vṛthāpohapṛakalpanā.*

² *Bhāmahālaṃkāra*, VI, vv. 17-18:

*yadi gaur ity ayaṃ śabdaḥ samartho 'nyanivartane
janako gavi gobuddher mṛgyatām aparo dhvaniḥ.
nanu jñānaphalāḥ śabdā na caikasya phaladvayam
apavāda vidhijñānaṃ phalam ekasya vaḥ katham?*

³ *Śloka-vārttika*, Apoha section, v. 30.

negation is merely specific negation, it means that the Buddhists are indirectly accepting a positive entity as the meaning of words; for specific negation is a positive entity; the word 'cow' will then mean something general and positive, which negates the non-cow. It is the same as the universal 'cowness' of the Mīmāṃsaka-s.¹

Again, if negation were the import of words, expressions like 'blue lotus' bearing the relation of attribute and substance will be impossible.² The co-existence of 'blue' and 'lotus' will be impossible, if the words 'blue' and 'lotus' do not denote positive entities.³ An attribute must always be a real, positive, entity.

Even if the theory of Apoha could explain some of the words referring to substantives, this theory will fail to explain the meaning of words like 'and' or 'thus'. Uddyotakara says that in the case of the word 'all' the negative explanation of the meaning fails completely, since nothing could possibly be excluded from 'all'.⁴

¹ *ibid.*, vv. 2 and 10:

*bhāvāntarātmako 'bhāvo yena sarvo vyavasthitah
tatrāśvādiniṣṛtyātmā bhāvaḥ ka iti kathyatām.
tasmāt sarveṣu yad rūpaṃ pratyekaṃ pariniṣṭhitam
gobuddhis tannimittā syād gotvād anyac ca nāsti tat.*

² *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa*, p. 127(a): *viśeṣanatvam apohasya ayuktam*. See also *Ślokaṣvārttika*, p. 596 f.

³ *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 334: *yasya cānyāpohaḥ śabdārthaḥ tenānilānutpalavyudāsau katham samānādhikaraṇāv iti vaktavyam*.

⁴ *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 332: *na hy asarvaṃ nāma kiṃcid asti, yat sarva-padena nivartyeta*.

With such criticisms from the realist Hindu philosophers, the later Buddhist scholars found it necessary to modify their conception of Apoha. Thus, in the *Tattvasamgraha* of Śāntarakṣita we find a slightly different approach to the problem. He admits that mere negation is not what is apprehended from a word. In fact, there is no affirmation without negation;¹ the affirmation of something is always concomitant with the exclusion of everything else. Śāntarakṣita says that Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Uddyotakara did not understand the real significance of the Apoha theory. There is nothing incongruous in a single word bringing about two notions, one positive and the other negative. The two notions are not brought about simultaneously; the positive meaning is known directly, and the negation or the exclusion of everything else is known through implication. From a negative statement like 'The fat boy does not eat by day', we understand the positive idea about his eating during night; similarly both the meanings are known from the word.² Śāntarakṣita is laying

Uddyotakara gives many subtle arguments against the Apoha theory. He asks: 'How can we understand the meaning of "two", if it excludes "one", since "two" is made up of adding "one" to another "one"?' (*dvyādiśabdānāṃ samuccaya-viśayatvād ekādīpratiṣedhe . . .*)

¹ *Tattvasamgraha*, v. 1020: *nānvayo 'vyatirekavān*. See also Kamalaśīla thereon: *na hi vijātyāvyāvṛttasya kasyacit saṃbhavo 'sti; tena ekasya śabdasya phaladvayam aviruddham eva*.

² *ibid.*: *divābhajanavākyāder ivāsyāpi phaladvayam*.

For Jinendrabuddhi's arguments in favour of the Apoha doctrine, see Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, pp. 461 ff.

stress on the fact that the words of our speech, although directly meaning a concept which is only a subjective construct without any objective reality, indirectly refer to the particular real thing also. This particular thing is also called a negation, since it is something unique in itself.¹

A slightly different interpretation of the Apoha theory is found in the *Apohasiddhi* of Ratnakīrti. He says that a word has both a positive and a negative signification.² He rejects Śāntarakṣita's view that a word conveys a positive meaning first, and a negative meaning later by logical implication.³ He also rejects the view that negation is the direct meaning and that the positive notion comes later.⁴ According to Ratnakīrti, the essence of meaning consists in affirmation qualified by the negation of all other things.⁵ This simultaneous cognition of the positive and negative elements of meaning is a matter of experience. Just as in the term *indīvara* (blue lotus) the element of 'blue' and the element of 'lotus' are cognized simultaneously,

¹ The meaning of the word is the image which seems identified with the object.

² For a detailed exposition of Ratnakīrti's views on Apoha, see Satkari Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, pp. 130 ff.; S. Varma, op. cit, pp. 25 ff.

³ *Apohasiddhi*, p. 3: *na hi vidhiṃ pratipadya kaścid arthāpattitah paścād apoham avagacchati.*

⁴ *ibid.*, *apohaṃ vā pratipadyānyāpoḍham.*

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 17 f.: *anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyaṛtto 'rtho vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpoḥaśabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ.*

so also in every word the two elements of the meaning are grasped simultaneously.¹

This interpretation of the Apoha theory is generally attributed to Ratnakīrti,² but it seems to have been put forward first by the Buddhist writer Jñānaśrī. Udayana says³ in his *Ātmatattvavivēka* that in order to explain the difficulty of mutual dependence of the arguments in favour of the Apoha theory resulting in a vicious circle—the concept of ‘cow’ depending on that of ‘non-cow’ and the concept of ‘non-cow’ depending on that of ‘cow’—Jñānaśrī put forward the view that both the positive and the negative concepts associated with the meaning of a word are felt simultaneously.

To the Buddhists the great importance of this Apoha theory ‘lies in the fact that it radically eliminates every attempt to maintain the reality of universals, whether as real entities, eternal and ubiquitous, residing in all attaining particulars, or as “meanings” having whatsoever objective reality.’⁴

An indirect influence of the Apoha theory may be found in the negative definitions adopted by the later Naiyāyika-s for logical precision. Thus, *vyāpti* or concomitance is defined not as a necessary connection of the cause with effect, but as the connection of the

¹ *ibid.*, p. 3 f.: *yathā nilotpale niveśitād indīvaraśabdān nilotpala-pratītau tatkāla eva nīlīmasphuraṇam anivāryam, tathā gośabdād api.*

² S. Varma, *op. cit.*, p. 25; S. Mookerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 132 f.

³ *Ātmatattvavivēka*, p. 118 f.: *tataḥ, pratīlāv itaretarāśrayatvam uktam saṅkete saṃcārya yat pariḥṛtaṃ jñānaśrīyā . . .*

⁴ Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, p. 404.

cause, with the counter-correlate of the absolute non-existence of the effect.¹

Prof. Siddheshwar Varma says² that 'while the Hindu and Jain writers on philosophy and semantics define meaning in terms of a relation, Buddhist philosophy defines meaning as negation'. It must be stated here that the Buddhist also considered the significative power of words as being based on the reciprocal relation of the word and the mental image produced.³ This mental image or *vikalpa* connoted by the word is, according to the Buddhists, not grounded in an objective reality. It is accepted by all that 'the connotation of a word is a concept, subjective in fact, though objective in reference'.⁴ The difference of opinion among the various schools of thought is mainly about the nature of this conceptual image. According to the Buddhists, the external reality is not presented in the conceptual knowledge; but a volitional urge towards the real things can be created by the conceptual images because of the similarity of the mental make-up of the human beings. Both the speaker and the listener have similar illusions; what they see and hear are really their own mental concepts, but both think that they are referring to the objective reality. Hence language is a convenient means of communication. Śāntarakṣita says that

¹ *hetusamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvāpratiyogi-ādhyasāmānādhikaraṇyam.*

² op. cit., p. 20.

³ *Diñnāga: vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ.*

(Quoted by Stcherbatsky, op. cit., II, 405 n.)

⁴ S. Mookerjee, op. cit., p. 137.

linguistic discourse is in fact similar to the conversation about the nature of the moon between two people, both suffering from the same ophthalmic disease and both seeing the moon double.¹ The same view is given by a modern writer, W. B. Pillsbury: 'We come then to the conclusion that meaning is practically everything. We always see the meaning as we look, think in meaning as we think, act in terms of meaning when we act. Apparently we are never conscious of anything but meaning.'² To the Buddhists this conceptual image has no real stuff in it, and is negative in content. They accept the reality only of the simple, non-conceptual cognition which is absolutely free from all verbal association; this kind of indeterminate knowledge may be experienced, but cannot be directly communicated by words, since it is beyond the reach of words or concepts.

Bhartrhari holds a similar view about the whole discourse being done in terms of our conceptual images and the words which symbolize them. But he denies emphatically the possibility of an indeterminate knowledge beyond the reach of words. He says³ that all knowledge is interpenetrated with words and that it is impossible to have a cognition which is free from word association.

¹ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, v. 1211:

*timiroṣahatākṣo hi yathā prāha śaśidvayaṃ
svasamāya tathā sarvā śābdī vyavahṛtir matā.*

² W. B. Pillsbury, 'Meaning and Image', *Psychological Review*, 1906, p. 156.

³ *VP*, I. 124:

*na so 'sti pratyayo loka yaḥ śābdānugamād ṛte
anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śābdena bhāṣate.*

CHAPTER

3

SPHOTA

THE THEORY OF LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS

SPHOṬA: THE THEORY OF LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS

THE theory of *sphoṭa* is one of the most important contributions of India to the central problem of semantics in general linguistics. It maintains that a word or a sentence is to be considered not as a concatenation made up of different sound units arranged in a particular order, but mainly as a single meaningful symbol.¹ The word or the sentence thus considered as a single meaningful symbol is called the *sphoṭa*. The articulated sounds used in linguistic discourse are merely the means by which the symbol is revealed; it is this symbol which is the meaning-bearer. It may also be called the word or the sentence considered from the semantic aspect. It is indivisible and has no time-order; the articulated sounds with the time-order are resorted to only as a means of revealing this symbol.

¹ 'Symbol' is an ambiguous term used by different scholars in different senses. (See W. M. Urban, *Language and Reality*, pp. 407, 411-14.) Here the term is used in the sense of a linguistic sign.

The term *sphoṭa* is derived from the root *sphuṭ* which means 'to burst', and it is defined in two ways.¹ In its linguistic sense it is normally defined as 'that from which the meaning bursts forth, i.e. shines forth, in other words the word-as-expressing-a meaning (*vācaka*)'. 'The *sphoṭa* is simply the linguistic sign in its aspect of meaning-bearer (*Bedeutungsträger*).'² Secondly it is defined as an entity which is manifested by the letters.

This *sphoṭa* theory was fully developed and systematized by the great grammarian-philosopher Bhāṭṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*; but some of the ideas underlying this theory can be found even in earlier grammatical and philosophical literature. There is no evidence, however, to show that Pāṇini knew anything similar to the *sphoṭa* theory, in spite of the fact that Haradatta³ and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa⁴ refer to the tradition ascribing this theory to sage Sphoṭāyana, mentioned as an authority by Pāṇini himself.⁵

¹ Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, *Sphoṭavāda*, p. 5; *sphuṭati prakāśate 'rtho 'smād iti sphoṭaḥ; vācaka iti yāvat*; Mādhava, *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (ed. Abhyankar), p. 300: *sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇair iti sphoṭo varṇābhivyāṅgyaḥ, sphuṭati sphuṭibhavaty asmād artha iti sphoṭo 'rthapratyāyakaḥ*.

² J. Brough, 'Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians', *TPS*, 1951, p. 33 f.

³ *Padamañjarī* under Pāṇini, VI. 1. 123: *sphoṭāyanāḥ sphoṭa-pratipādanāparo vaiyākaraṇācāryaḥ*.

⁴ *Sphoṭavāda*, p. 102:

*vaiyākaraṇanāgeśaḥ sphoṭāyanarṣer matam
pariṣkṛtyok'tavāms tatra priyatām jagadiśvarah.*

⁵ Pāṇini, VI. 1. 123: *avañ sphoṭāyanasya*.

According to Bhartṛhari, speech and thought are only two aspects of the same speech-principle.¹ A sentence is to be considered as 'a single undivided utterance'² and its meaning is 'an instantaneous flash of insight' (*pratibhā*).³ Thought has no structure; so also an utterance. The central idea underlying Bhartṛhari's linguistic theory is the view that the sentence is the fundamental linguistic fact, and that words are unreal abstractions from the sentence. The sentence-meaning is also to be grasped as a unity. The divisions into words and word-meanings are only useful means in the study of language, and have no reality in themselves.

According to Yāska, Audumbarāyaṇa held the view that only the sentence is really found in the minds of the speaker and the listener.⁴ Bhartṛhari says that Vārtākṣa also held the same view.⁵ This school of thought started by Audumbarāyaṇa may be considered as the forerunner of the *sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari.⁶

Betty Heimann suggests⁷ that the view of the early grammarians that a sentence must contain a verb (or

¹ VP, II. 31: *ekasyaivātmano bhedaḥ śabdārthāu aprthak sthitaḥ*. The interdependence of speech and mind (thought) is given in the *Aitareyaopaniṣad*: *vān me manasi pratiṣṭhitā, mano me vāci pratiṣṭhitam*. See also *Raghuvamśa*, I. 1: *vāgarthāu iva samprktau*.

² VP, II. 1: *eko 'navayavaḥ śabdah*.

³ *ibid.*, II. 119, 145.

⁴ *Nirukta*, I. 1: *indriyanityaṃ vacanam audumbarāyaṇaḥ*.

⁵ VP, II. 347.

⁶ See J. Brough, 'Audumbarāyaṇa's Theory of Language', *BSOAS*, XIV, pt. 1.

⁷ Betty Heimann, 'Sphoṭa and Artha', *A Volume of Studies Presented to Prof. P. V. Kane*, pp. 221 ff.

that the most important element in a sentence is the verb denoting action) foreshadows the *sphoṭa* doctrine, since the verb conveys by implication the whole sentence meaning.¹ The great grammarian Vyāḍi,² who is earlier than Kātyāyana and Patañjali, wrote a work on grammar, called the *Samgraha*, which might have contained some discussions about the *sphoṭa* theory; but the work is irretrievably lost to us, and nothing can be said definitely about it. It is in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali³ that the first mention of the term *sphoṭa* occurs.

Patañjali's View of the Sphoṭa

Patañjali⁴ distinguishes between two aspects of words, the *sphoṭa* and the *dhvani*; the former is the permanent element in the word and may be considered the essential word, whereas the latter is the actualized and ephemeral element and an attribute of the former.⁵ The *sphoṭa*, as described by Patañjali, may be a single letter (*varṇa*) or a fixed pattern of letters and is the

¹ *ibid.*, p. 222: 'This concept of a predeveloped immanent general potentiality centred in the verb itself gives room for the acceptance of other factors of complex potentialities such as is the *sphoṭa*.'

² Mentioned by Kātyāyana (under Pāṇini, I. 2. 64), Patañjali and later grammarians. Some of the verses in the *Vākyapadīya* are supposed to be quotations from Vyāḍi's lost work, the *Samgraha*.

³ *Mbh*, I, p. 181.

⁴ *ibid.*:

*dhvaniḥ sphoṭaś ca śabdānāṃ dhvanis tu khalu lakṣyate
alpo mahāṃś ca keṣāṃcid ubhayaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ.*

⁵ *ibid.*: *sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ.*

ibid., p. 3: *dvau śabdātmanau, nūyaḥ kāryaś ca.*

norm; it remains constant and is not affected by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. Even when pronounced by different speakers with different tempos, its linguistic value is the same. The absolute vowel-length and the individual peculiarities of the particular instances are of the *dhvani-s* and depend on the individuality of the speaker and the effort with which the words are uttered. The *sphoṭa* is permanent and unchanging and is manifested by the ephemeral *dhvani-s* uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener. These are respectively analogous to the *prākṛta-dhvani* and the *vaikṛta-dhvani* of the later grammarians.¹

This distinction is supposed to have been made by Vyāḍi. The following verse in the *Vākyapadīya* (I. 77) defining the two types of *dhvani-s* is considered by some commentators to be a quotation from Vyāḍi's famous work, the *Samgraha* :

*varṇasya grahaṇe hetuḥ prākṛto dhvanir isyate.
vṛttibhede nimittatvam vaikṛtaḥ pratipadyate.*

According to this verse the 'primary sound' or *prākṛta-dhvani* is defined as the cause of the perception of the letters and the 'modified sound' or the *vaikṛta-dhvani* is considered as the cause for the differences in speed of utterance (*vṛtti*).

This distinction between the virtual and permanent element in language and the ephemeral elements at the

¹ K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, 'The Doctrine of Sphota', *JGRI*, V, p. 121 f.; J. Brough, op. cit., pp. 32-7.

various instances of its actualization is known even to Kātyāyana, though he does not apply the terms *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* to them. In the discussion of the Pāṇini *sūtra* 'taparas tatkālasya',¹ he says² that the letters (*varṇa-s*) are fixed and that the styles of diction (*vr̥tti*) depend upon the speech habits of the speaker. It is while explaining this portion that Patañjali gives the term *sphoṭa* to the letter or the letters taken as a time-series pattern and the term *dhvani* to the actualized sound. This is illustrated with the analogy of a drum-beat. 'When a drum is struck, one drum-beat may travel twenty feet, another thirty, another forty; but the *sphoṭa* is precisely such and such a size, the increase in length is caused by the sound.'³

Thus it is clear that for Patañjali the *sphoṭa* is a unit of sound as an isolated letter, or a series of letters which can be analysed as a succession of sound-units; it has a normal and fixed size, and is entirely different from the *sphoṭa* of the later grammarians, which has no size or parts. Patañjali speaks of the *sphoṭa* of a single letter (*varṇa*) in discussing the *sūtra* 'kṛpo ro laḥ'.⁴ (In the root *kṛp-*, *r* is replaced by *l*); he says⁵ that 'in both cases (*r* and *l*) it is only the *sphoṭa* that is

¹ Pāṇini, I. 1. 70.

² *Mbh*, I, p. 181: *avasthitā varṇā vaktuś cīrācīravacanād vr̥ttayo viśiṣyante*. cf. also p. 355.

³ *ibid.*: *bherīm āhatya kaścīd viṃśatīpadāni gacchati, kaścīd triṃśat, kaścīd catvāriṃśat. sphoṭaś ca tāvān eva bhavati, dhvanikṛtā vṛddhiḥ*.

⁴ Pāṇini, VIII. 2. 18.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 26: *ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātram nirdiśyate, ra-śrutir la-śrutir bhavatīti*.

taught in the *sūtra*'. In other words, an *r*-sound is replaced by an *l*-sound.¹

It is true that later commentators like Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa try to read the fully developed *sphoṭa* theory into these statements of Patañjali, but a careful study of these passages shows that Patañjali's conception of the *sphoṭa* was entirely different from that of the later grammarians. To him the *sphoṭa* is not a single indivisible symbol considered as the meaning-bearer, but only the unchanging sound-unit, or a time-series pattern of such units.²

Patañjali seems to have been influenced very much by the theory of the Mīmāṃsaka-s about the permanent nature of the letters, or *varṇa*-s. They distinguished between the virtual and permanent sound-units, and the sounds produced and heard at the actual instances of their utterance. The latter are only the manifestations of the former. The rapid, medium and slow styles of diction³ are only for the manifesting agents and do not touch the nature of the letters. Śaṅkara says⁴ that when we hear the speech of someone known to us, we recognize not only what he says, but also who he is; but the latter information is conveyed only by the voice and not by the words and cannot, therefore, be considered as part of the meaning of the speech.

¹ J. Brough, op. cit., p. 37. Thus we get *l* for *r* as in *kalpita*, and *l* for *r* as in *klṛta*.

² See also K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, loc. cit.

³ *druta*, *madhyama* and *vilambita*.

⁴ Commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, I. 3. 28.

Even though the absolute speed of utterance and other peculiarities of speech are of the sound and not of the words, the difference between short and long vowels (in Sanskrit) has to be taken as linguistically significant. Kumārilabhaṭṭa refers to the view that the long vowels should not be considered as modifications of the short ones, but should be treated as different letters.¹

The Mīmāṃsā doctrine about the permanence of the letters is analogous to the modern theory of phonemes,² even though the full significance of the modern linguistic theory was not known to the ancient Indians. The distinction between the 'phonematic pattern' of the word, termed the *sphoṭa* by Patañjali, and the actual sounds or *dhvani*-s produced at the instances of their utterance may be compared to de Saussure's duality of *langue* and *parole*.³ The latter is the individual speech-activity and is ephemeral and contingent. The *langue*, on the contrary, is the social

¹ *Ślokaṭīkā*, Sphoṭavāda section, v. 45:

varṇāntaratvam evāhuḥ kecid dīrghapluṭādiṣu.

See also Ullmann, *The Principles of Semantics*, p. 27 f.

² On the modern theory of phonemes see W. F. Twaddell, *On Defining the Phoneme*; Firth, *Technique of Semantics*, pp. 54 ff.; D. Jones, *The Phoneme: Its Nature and Use*. cf. Edward Sapir, *Selected Writings*, p. 46 f.: 'The concept of the phoneme (a functionally significant unit in the rigidly defined pattern, or configuration of sounds peculiar to a language) as distinct from that of the "sound" or "phonetic element" as such (an objectively definable entity in the articulated and perceived totality of speech) is becoming more and more familiar to linguists.'

³ F. de Saussure, *Cours de Linguistique Générale*.

product of the faculty of speech and is relatively constant. The smallest acoustic units of *la parole* are the sounds, whereas the engrams in *la langue* (the residual traces left in the minds of members of the speech community) are the phonemes. The phoneme in a language remains the same even when uttered by different people at different speeds and intonations. The phonemes or the phonematic pattern with the normal time sequel is analogous to the *sphoṭa* of Patañjali, and the sounds of *la parole* to his *dhvani-s*.

Even though Patañjali's conception of the *sphoṭa* is different from that developed by Bhartṛhari in the *Vākyapadiya*, some of the fundamental problems in language perception that led to the assumption of that doctrine were not unknown to him. He was fully conscious of the importance of the semantic aspect of language. When the Mimāṃsaka¹ defines a word as the aggregate of the letters into which it could be analysed, Patañjali defines it as that which, when uttered, brings about the notion of the 'thing-meant'. In the beginning of the *Mahābhāṣya* he raises the question, what is the word 'cow'? The final answer he gives is:² It is that by means of which, when

¹ *Śābarabhāṣya* on *sūtra* I. 1. 5: *gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ? gākārau-kāravisarjanīyā iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ*. cf. Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, I. 3. 28: *varṇā eva tu śabda iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ*.

² *Mbh*, I, p. 1: *gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ? . . . yenoccāritena sāsṇālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇinām sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*.

cf. Maṇḍana, *Sphoṭasiddhi*, v. 3: *arthāvasāyāprasavanimittam śabda iṣyate*.

uttered, there arises an understanding of creatures with dewlap, tail, hump, hooves and horns. The commentators have made it clear that here the term 'uttered' (*uccārīta*) is used in the sense of 'revealed' or 'brought to light' (*abhivyakta*). Thus Patañjali lays special emphasis on the fact that a word is a word only when it has a meaning. This is something against the orthodox Mīmāṃsā view¹ that an aggregate of letters, when manifested, is a linguistic utterance, even when there is no meaning, or when the meaning is not understood. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that even the individual letters should be considered as a 'linguistic piece' (*śabda*) though they do not convey any meaning,² and that in the case of words also the idea of the *śabda* occurs to the hearer even before the meaning is understood.³

The problem of the perception of a temporal series is also discussed by Patañjali and Kātyāyana. When a word is uttered, the different sounds come one after another in the exact order in which they are uttered. There is not a single moment when all the sounds are perceived together. Then how is it possible that the word is grasped as a whole? In the discussion of the *Pāṇinisūtra*,⁴ '*paraḥ saṃnikarṣaḥ saṃhitā*', Kātyāyana raises the objection that it is impossible for the letters,

¹ *Śloka-vārttika*, Sphoṭavāda section, v. 5:-

*tasmāc chrotra-paricchinno yady arthaṃ gamayen na vā
sarvathā tasya śabdatvaṃ lokasiddhaṃ na hiyate.*

² *ibid.*, v. 7: *na vāpratyāyakatvāt syād ekavarṇeṣu aśabdatā.*

³ *ibid.*, v. 8: *na ca prāg arthavijñānāc chrotragrāhye na śabdadhīḥ.*

⁴ I. 4. 109.

which are destroyed as soon as they are produced, to be together and to have a sequence.¹ Taking the example of the word *gauḥ*, Patañjali says that the word cannot exist as a whole, since the letters come one after another. 'When the speech is in *g*, it cannot be in *au* and *h*; when it is in *au*, it cannot be in *g* and *h*; and when it is in *h*, it cannot be in *g* and *au*.'² 'Each letter requires a special effort to produce it, and it disappears as the effort is changed to produce the next letter.'³ The solution to the problem is not given with the help of the *sphoṭa* theory. Patañjali says that even though the letters cannot co-exist at the time of utterance, they can do so in the mind of the speaker as well as the listeners, and that the order of sequence of the letters is also to be grasped in the mind on the basis of the meaning.⁴ Thus it seems that according to Patañjali the unity of the word is partly due to the unity of meaning; the simultaneous grasping of the word is somehow effected in the mind, even though the letters that make it up are pronounced separately; the

¹ *Mbh*, I, p. 356: *paurvāparyam akālavapyapetaṃ saṃhitā cet pūrvāparābhāvād asaṃhitam. ekaikavarṇavartitvād vāca uccaritaḥ pradhvaṃsītvāc ca varṇānām.*

² *ibid.*: *gaur iti yāvad gākāre vāg vartate naukāre na viśarjanīye, yāvad aukāre na gākāre na viśarjanīye, yāvad viśarjanīye na gākāre naukāre.*

³ *ibid.*, p. 355: *yenaiva yatnenaiko varṇa uccāryate vicchinne varṇa upasaṃhṛtya tam anyam upādāya dvitīyaḥ prayujyate tathā tṛtīyas tathā caturthaḥ.*

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 356:

*buddhau kṛtvā sarvāś ceṣṭāḥ kartā dhīras tanvannītiḥ
śabdenārthān vācyān dṛṣṭvā buddhau kuryāt paurvāparyam.*

knowledge of the sequence of the order of the letter is also there. Patañjali does not discuss the problem as to how this is done.

The question as to whether or not the individual letters in a word have meaning is also discussed by Patañjali,¹ though he does not give any final answer, since according to him the answer depends on the point of view taken. On the one hand it may be said that letters are meaningful, since meaning can be understood from verbal roots, stems, suffixes and particles which consist of a single letter, and also since the substitution of a different letter can produce a difference to the meaning, while the absence of a letter may make it impossible to understand the meaning of a word. On the other hand it may also be said that letters are meaningless in themselves, since a meaning is not understood by the hearer from each letter separately. Here we find that Patañjali was conscious of the role of letters in building up the higher units which are full symbols with a meaning of their own; but it was left to Bhartṛhari to develop the theory of symbols in his *sphoṭa* doctrine. Patañjali did not consider the word as an indivisible and timeless symbol, apart from the letters that are revealed when the word is uttered. Of course, unlike the Mīmāṃsaka-s, he emphasized the importance of the meaning-bearing aspect of words;

¹ *Mbh*, I, p. 220: *arthavanto varṇā dhātuprātipadikapratyaya-nipātānām ekavarṇānām arthadarśanād, varṇavyatyaye cārthāntaragamanād, varṇānupalabdḥau cānarthagateḥ . . . anarthakās tu prativarṇam arthānupalabdheḥ . . .*

but he could not explain it fully. According to him the intelligent man could, somehow, grasp all the letters of the word together in the mind, along with the knowledge of their order of sequence.¹ The unity of the word is based mainly on the unity of the meaning.

Very little is known about the linguistic discussions in India during the period after Patañjali and before Bhartṛhari. From the many references to the various theories on many a linguistic problem mentioned in the *Vākyapadīya* it is certain that the period was one of active speculation. The *sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari is the culmination of many such attempts in the solution of the linguistic problems that were worrying scholars in the various philosophical schools. Śabara's *bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra-s*, Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyasūtra-s*, Vyāsa's *bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra-s*² and the discussions of the early Buddhist philosophers must have greatly influenced Bhartṛhari in moulding his views about the real nature of language.

The Nyāya philosophers held³ that *śabda* is linguistic utterance and is only a collection of sounds which are produced by the movements of the vocal

¹ Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that all schools of thought accept that along with the knowledge of sequence, the letters constituting the word must be comprehended in the mind as a whole. *Ślokovārttika*, *Sphoṭavāda* section, v. 113:

*sarveṣu caivam artheṣu mānaṣaṃ sarvavādinām
iṣṭaṃ samuccaya-jñānaṃ kramajñāneṣu tatsv apī.*

² There is difference of opinion about the identity of the author of the *Yogasūtra-s* with the grammarian Patañjali.

³ *Nyāyasūtra-s*, II. 2. 13-38; cf. J. Brough, op. cit., p. 38.

organs of the speaker. The sounds vanish as soon as they are produced and are, therefore, ephemeral. The Naiyāyika-s do not accept permanent letters as the Mīmāṃsaka-s do; instead, they explain the recognition of the letters, when uttered by different persons at different times, as due to the fact that they are particular instances of the same Universal; the idea of identity is only due to their similarity. According to them the meaning of a word is presented to the mind of the listener by the last sound aided by the memory impressions of the preceding sounds. Since the isolated sounds of a word cannot individually present its meaning, they must do so jointly. Since they come one after another into the mind, they are not perceived together as a whole. Each sound perceived leaves its impression behind, and the apprehension of the last sound, aided by the accumulated impressions of the preceding sounds, presents the meaning of the word.

This view is linguistically quite unsatisfactory. Even if we admit that the sense data are received as a series of atomic perceptions, we have again to assume that we remember, through the impressions, not only the various sounds, but also their order. If the sounds are also remembered in the same order in which they are uttered, how could they be simultaneously grasped? And how could these sounds be a meaning-bearing word? The sounds by themselves have no capacity to attach themselves directly to a meaning; so it is necessary to postulate a single entity as the meaning-bearer. To explain how meaning is understood from a word or

a sentence, it is necessary to assume that the word or the sentence is a single meaning-bearing unit. This is what the *sphoṭa* doctrine really does.¹

The Mīmāṃsaka-s who defined a word as the aggregate of the letters which make it up were also forced to accept a theory similar to that of the Naiyāyika-s. Śābara says² that the meaning is conveyed by the last letter aided by the impressions produced in the mind by the preceding letters. The main difference between the views held by the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s is that the former considered the letters to be ephemeral, whereas the latter believed that the letters are permanent. The impressions or *saṃskāra-s* are the traces left on the mind by experience and can produce the recollection, when needed, of what has been experienced. They are analogous to the 'engrams' in modern psychology. The *saṃskāra-s* of the individual letters in a word can produce only the recollection of the letters heard; they have no power to convey the meaning. So the Mīmāṃsaka-s have to assume a special power for these *saṃskāra-s* to convey the meaning also.³ Again, the order in which the letters are uttered is only for the act of utterance and

¹ cf. J. Brough, op. cit., p. 38.

² Śābarabhāṣya on sūtra I. 1. 5: *pūrvapūrvavarnajanitasamskāra-sahito 'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyaka ity adoṣaḥ*.

³ Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that there is no harm in assuming such an additional function to the *saṃskāra-s*. *Śloka-vārttika*, Sphoṭavāda section, v. 102:

*yady api smṛtihetutvaṃ saṃskārasya vyavasthitam
arthāntareṣu sāmānyam na tasya pratiśidhyate.*

not for the letters themselves, which, according to the Mimāṃsaka-s, are permanent. But unless we assume the order of sequence to these impressions, the process of understanding meaning cannot be explained.

The *Yogasūtra* speaks about the confusion among ordinary people of the spoken word, the 'thing-meant' and the concept formed in the mind, and explains it as due to the erroneous mutual superimposition of these: *śabdārthapratyayānām itaretarādhyāsāt saṃkaraḥ*. While explaining this passage, Vyāsa discusses¹ the problem connected with the auditory perception of speech. His explanation is almost on the lines of the *sphoṭa* theory, though Vyāsa does not use the term *sphoṭa* at all. He says that when a series of letters is uttered in the conventional order, the mind of the hearer grasps it as an indivisible unit having no time sequence. This unity, termed a word, is, in every case, brought to light by a single effort of the mind. It is the knowledge of the last letter that operates on the mind and makes it grasp the whole word as a single unit. It is indivisible, has no time sequence, and is not made up of separate letters. The minds of the members of the speech community are permeated by the use of speech to which no

¹ *Bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*, III. 17: *tad eteṣāṃ arthasaṃketāvaccinnānām upasaṃhṛtadhvanikramāṇāṃ ya eko buddhinirbhāsaḥ tad padam ekabuddhiviṣayam ekaprayatnākṣiptam abhāgam akramam avarṇam baudham antyavarṇapratyayavyāpāropasthāpitam paratra pratipipādayiṣayā varṇair evābhidhīyamānair uccāryamāṇaiḥ śrūyamāṇaiḥ ca śrotṛbhir anādivāgyavahāravāsanānuviddhayā lokabuddhyā siddhavat saṃpratipattyā pratiyate*. See also, Śaṅkara's commentary on this passage. *Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-bhāṣya-vivarṇam*, Madras Govt. Oriental Series, No. XCIV.

beginning can be assigned; hence the word is understood by people as something real in itself. Thus arises the common understanding of the word. Really this is due to an erroneous superimposition of the word, the object and the concept, and is based on memory.

Even among the ancient Indian grammarians who accepted the *sphoṭa* as the essential element in speech, there was difference of opinion about the real nature of the *sphoṭa*. In the *Vākyapadiya* Bhartṛhari refers to some of these earlier theories. According to one school of thought,¹ the *sphoṭa* consisted of the original articulated sounds produced by the contact of the different vocal organs with the various places of articulation. These sounds disappear as soon as they are produced, but they are the cause of producing other sounds which spread in all directions like the reflections of the original sounds. These subsequent sounds produced by the *sphoṭa* are called the *dhvani-s*. These move like waves,² becoming weaker and weaker as they go farther and farther from the *sphoṭa*.³ The absolute length and other individual peculiarities are only for the *dhvani-s*, though they seem to be for the *sphoṭa* itself. This is

¹ VP, I. 103:

*yah saṃyogavibhāgābhyāṃ karaṇair upajanyate
sa sphoṭaḥ, śabdajāḥ śabdā dhvanayo 'nyair udāhṛtāḥ.*

² Commentary on VP, I. 103: *viśiṣṭāntānavac ca śrotṛaṃ daśa-
digavasthitānām upagacchanti.*

³ cf. K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, 'Who are the Anitya-sphoṭa-
vādins?', *POC*, 1935, pp. 258 ff.

similar to the view held by Patañjali himself.¹ In fact the commentator of the *Vākyapadiya*, while explaining this view, gives the illustration of the drum and the stick found in the *Mahābhāṣya* itself.²

Another theory, slightly different from the previous one, is that both the *dhvani-s* and the *sphoṭa* are produced simultaneously. According to the previous theory the *sphoṭa* is produced first; but according to this theory there is no interval between the production of the *sphoṭa* and the *dhvani-s*. The *sphoṭa* is the central sound and may be compared to a flame; the *dhvani-s* are like the light spreading in all directions.³ Sometimes we hear the *dhvani-s* without recognizing the *sphoṭa*, just as we perceive the light even without seeing the flame. These two theories hold that the *sphoṭa* is produced by human effort and is ephemeral.

According to the third view mentioned in the *Vākyapadiya* regarding the nature of the *sphoṭa* and the *dhvani-s*, the former is the class and the latter are its members. Bhartṛhari says that according to some the *sphoṭa* is the class revealed by the various individual instances and the *dhvani-s* are the members of this class.⁴

¹ Patañjali is generally considered to have held the view that the *sphoṭa* is permanent; but the *Mahābhāṣya* passage could be explained as supporting this theory also.

² Commentary on *VP*, I. 104: *yathā bheridaṇḍābhighāṭajasya kāryapaṣaṃparā dūram anuṣatati*.

³ *VP*, I. 105: *dūrāt prabheva dipasya dhvanimātram tu lakṣyate*.

⁴ *VP*, I. 94:

*anekavyaktyabhivyāṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā
kaiścid; vyaktaya evāsyā dhvanitvena prakalpitāḥ.*

cf. J. Brough, op. cit., pp. 44 ff.

Many scholars have taken this theory as that of Bhartṛhari himself. Even Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita quotes this verse in support of the view that Bhartṛhari accepted the Class-*sphoṭa* theory.¹ Here it is important to note that for Bhartṛhari the *sphoṭa* is the word or the sentence taken as a single meaningful unit; if he accepts the concept of the class, it will be a class whose members are themselves *sphoṭa*-s. The identification of *sphoṭa* with the class of *dhvani*-s, without any reference to the meaning-bearing aspect,² is entirely against Bhartṛhari's conception of *sphoṭa*.³

This third view about the *sphoṭa*, mentioned by Bhartṛhari, is analogous to the view expressed by Bertrand Russell. He says:⁴ 'The spoken word "dog" is not a single entity: it is a class of similar movements of the tongue, throat and larynx. Just as jumping is one class of bodily movements, and walking another, so the uttered word "dog" is a third class of bodily movements. The word "dog" is a universal, just as *dog* is a universal.'

¹ *Śabdakaustubha*, p. 11. Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita took the first line of the verse as a complete statement; but, as Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa has shown (*Sphoṭavāda*, p. 99), the word *kaiścit* is to be taken with the first line.

² Patañjali's statement (*Mbh*, I, p. 26) *ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātram nirdīśyate, ra-śrutir la-śrutir bhavatīti* is also taken to be in support of this theory of Class-*sphoṭa*.

³ J. Brough, loc. cit.

⁴ *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 24.

Referring to the *sphoṭa* theory of the Indian grammarians Prof. P. T. Raju says: ¹ 'This school believes in a sort of universal called *sphoṭa* for every word also like "cow", "house" and "man". For though these words are uttered by different persons at different times with different intonation, pitch, etc., they are recognized to be the same, and though the syllables of the word are uttered in succession, they are comprehended together; and both facts can be explained by postulating a unitary word-universal called *sphoṭa*.' This is only the third view about the nature of the *sphoṭa* referred to by Bhartṛhari, and should not be taken to be the final view accepted by Bhartṛhari and the later grammarians.

Bhartṛhari's Discussion about the Nature of the Sphoṭa

Bhartṛhari begins the discussion on the *sphoṭa* theory with the observation that words or sentences can be considered under two aspects, as sound-patterns or as meaning-bearing symbols. He says that in meaningful language, linguists recognize two entities, both of which may be called words: one is the underlying cause of the articulated sounds, while the other is attached to the meaning: ²

*dvāv upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ
eko nimittaṃ śabdānāṃ aparca 'rthe prayujyate.*

¹ 'The Universal in the Western and the Indian Philosophy', Radhakrishnan, *Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of His Sixtieth Birthday*, p. 394.

² VP, I. 44.

The former is the sound-pattern which is the external facet of the language symbol, while the latter is the semantic facet which expresses the meaning. Janus-like, words have two faces: the external face looks at the sounds (*dhvani*), while the internal face looks at the meaning (*artha*). The underlying cause of the articulated sounds (*śabdānāṃ nimittam*) is the sound-pattern which underlies instances of the utterance of the word; this abstract sound-pattern with the time-sequence still attached to it is called *prākṛta-dhvani* and is the external aspect of the language. The internal aspect, which is directly attached to the meaning is the *sphoṭa* which is the partless, integral linguistic symbol.¹

This fundamental dichotomy between form and content in language is mentioned by Pāṇini himself in the *sūtra*:² *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā*, 'A word (in a grammatical rule) which is not a technical term denotes its own form'. On this *sūtra* Kātyāyana says:³ *śabda-pūrvako hy arthe saṃpratyayas, tasmād arthanivṛttiḥ*. 'The

¹ The term *upādānaśabda* stands for the speech-unit in language. It is only the linguist who recognizes these two aspects in it, for 'sound and signification, form and function, are inseparable in the life of language'. The underlying cause of the articulated sounds is the *prākṛta-dhvani* (which is the cause of *vaikṛta-dhvani*). The internal aspect which is attached to meaning is the *sphoṭa*. Some explain the former as the *sphoṭa* and the latter as the *dhvani* (G. N. Bhattacharya, 'A Study in the Dialectics of Sphoṭa', *Journal of the Dept. of Letters*, Calcutta University, 1937, p. 13; Suryanarayana Sukla's commentary on the verse). See also the explanation of the passage by Prof. J. Brough, loc. cit.

² Pāṇini, I. 1. 68.

³ *Mbh*, I, p. 176.

understanding of the thing-meant is preceded by that of the word; hence in a grammatical context, the question of the thing-meant does not arise.' A word can signify its own form, as well as the thing meant by it. One is the name and the other is the thing-named. Bhartrhari says ¹ that every word, first of all, expresses its own class, thereafter it is fictionally superimposed on the form of the class of things. In grammatical discussions where the thing-meant is irrelevant, it is only the form that is signified by a word (which is not a technical term). Thus, by the rule ² ' *āgni* (fire) has the suffix *eya* ' (*agner dhak*), it is only to the form of the word that the suffix is added, and not to the fire or even to words synonymous to it.

Bhartrhari says: 'Just as a technical term like *vrddhi*, while linked to its own form, is also attached to what is named by it, namely, the speech-entities symbolized by *ādaic* (i.e., *ā*, *ai*, and *au*), so likewise this word *agni* (in the *sūtra*), which linked to the word *agni* (in everyday use, i.e. the meaning "fire") is also attached to the sound *agni*, which in this context has the word *agni* as the thing-expressed. The word which is uttered in ordinary usage must certainly not be the one which partakes of the operation (of adding the suffix). But in conveying this other sense, its power (to convey the

¹ VP, III. 1. 6:

*svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate
tato 'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā.*

For a discussion of the problem, see Brough, loc. cit.

² Pāṇini, IV. 2. 33.

normal sense) is not impeded.¹ Bhartṛhari emphasizes again and again the fact that a word has a double power; it can convey an idea of the form of an expression as well as its content. He explains the problem by means of various illustrations. Language is similar to light and consciousness in so far as it can reveal itself and also reveal other things. Just as consciousness can be conscious of itself, while being conscious of other things,² and just as a light can reveal itself while revealing other objects,³ so also every word has the power of referring to itself as well as to the external things symbolized by it.

The Buddhists also accept⁴ this twofold power of words to express their own identity as well as the things symbolized by them; but this character is cognized only when they become the subject of conventional relation, and not at the time of perception. It is only in the determinate knowledge that follows a perception that the relation between word and meaning is understood. At the time of perception of the sounds of the words, it is only the sound that is known; the expressive power does not belong to the sound at that time.

¹ VP, I. 59-61. See the translation by J. Brough, op. cit., p. 29.

² VP, I. 50:

*ātmarūpaṃ yathā jñāne jñeyarūpaṃ ca dṛśyate
arharūpaṃ tathā śabde svarūpaṃ ca prakāśate.*

³ VP, I. 55:

*grāhyatvaṃ grāhakatvaṃ ca dve śakti tejaso yathā
tathaiva sarvaśabdānāṃ ete prthag iva sthite.*

⁴ Satkari Mookerjee, op. cit., p. 296 ff.

The grammarians too accept that words will have to be taken as referring to themselves until the relation between the word and the meaning is known. Thus, Patañjali says that when we do not hear a word properly, we ask, 'What did you say?', thereby indicating that we have not understood the form of the word.¹

Bhartrhari's analysis envisages three aspects of the language situation: ² (1) the *vaikṛta-dhvani*, the individual instance of the utterance in purely phonetic terms. It is the actual sounds spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener. It includes all the various differences in intonation, tempo, pitch, etc. depending on the individual speakers. (2) The *prākṛta-dhvani*, the phonological structure, the sound-pattern of the norm; or, from another point of view, the name of the class of which the various instances are members. This is indicated by the *vaikṛta-dhvani*. All the non-linguistic personal variations are eliminated at this stage. Both the speaker and the listener are conscious of the normal phonological pattern alone. The time-sequence is still present in this. The *prākṛta-dhvani* may be considered as the acoustic image of the normal expression, or the expression in the mind, keeping the time-order with it. (3) The *śphoṭa*, the integral linguistic symbol, which is the unit of meaning, but which cannot be pronounced or written. This is manifested by the *prākṛta-dhvani*. In fact it is the *prākṛta-dhvani* considered as an integral, meaning-bearing, linguistic sign.

¹ *Mbh*, I, p. 176; *VP*, I, 57; J. Brough, op. cit., p. 31.

² J. Brough, op. cit., p. 40.

The *spṛhota* as explained by Bhartṛhari is something analogous to the linguistic sign, which in the terminology of de Saussure¹ has two facets: the *signifiant* and the *signifié*, that which means and that which is meant. In the Indian philosophy these two are called, respectively, *śabda* and *arthā*. W. M. Urban has shown² beyond any shadow of doubt the existence of a bi-polar relation between the *signifiant* and the *signifié*. The glossematic school of linguistics under Prof. Hjelmslev also accepts this parallelism between the plane of content and that of expression in language. Prof. Hjelmslev says:³ 'The sign is a two-sided entity, with a Janus-like perspective in two directions, and with effect in two respects: "outwards" toward the expression-substance and "inwards" toward the content-substance.' 'The sign is, then—paradoxical as it may seem—a sign for content-substance and a sign for an expression-substance.' Explaining this view, André Martinet says:⁴ 'According to the glossematicians language has recourse to two different types of substance for its two planes. On the plane of expression the substance may be phonic and therefore perceptible to the auditory organ; (but it is also commonly graphic and therefore usually perceptible and any other perceptible object could be used, although may not be quite so conveniently, for

¹ *Cours*, pp. 98 ff.

² *Language and Reality*, pp. 66, 115.

³ *Prolegomena to a Theory of Meaning*, p. 36.

⁴ 'Structural Linguistics', *Anthropology Today*, edited by A. L. Kroeber, Chicago, 1953, p. 582.

the same purpose). On the plane of content the substance is of a mental, semantic nature.'

The modern linguist considers the linguistic sign as a functional term, based on the relationship between the *signifiant* and the *signifié*, the *śabda* and the *artha*. But to Bhartṛhari this *śphoṭa* is an independent entity which is revealed by the *prākṛta-dhvani*. And it is this *śphoṭa* or the linguistic sign (*le signe* of de Saussure) which conveys the sense.

The distinction between the actual sounds of speech uttered during each occurrence of the speech (*vaikṛta-dhvani*) and the engrams left behind by them in *la langue* or the phonematic pattern or the acoustic images (*images acoustiques*, *prākṛta-dhvani*) is accepted by the modern linguists also.¹

Bhartṛhari emphasizes the fundamental truth that, strictly speaking, words are psychical entities (*śabdo buddhisthaḥ*)² which reveal themselves through the articulate sounds. As A. H. Gardiner says,³ 'it is only inaccurately, though by a sort of necessary inaccuracy, that the name of "words" is given to the articulate sounds which pass between speaker and listener'. 'As words exist in the possession of every individual (of a linguistic community), they are psychical entities, comprising on the one hand an area of meaning, and on the other hand the image of a particular sound susceptible of being physically reproduced whenever

¹ *Cours*, pp. 97-103, 141-69.

² *VP*, I. 46: *śabdo 'pi buddhisthaḥ śrutinām kāraṇam prthak*.

³ Gardiner, *Speech and Language*, p. 69.

wanted.¹ Even earlier thinkers in India had recognized the fact that the word is something more than the audible sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener; Vyāsa, in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* states clearly that the word is to be grasped in the mind, though it is brought together by the sounds.² Even the Mīmāṃsaka-s who considered the word as an aggregate of the permanent letters (*varṇa-s*) in a fixed order recognized that it is much more than the articulate sounds.

De Saussure also emphasized³ the fact that both the aspects of the *sign*, the *signifiant* and the *signifié*, are mental: the former is the acoustic image or the psychological entity which belongs to *la langue*, and the latter is the idea (*idée*). The Indian grammarians too maintain the subjectivity of both the word and the meaning (*śabda* and *artha*). Nāgeśabhaṭṭa says⁴ in the *Laghumañjūṣā* that in reality the meaning is only subjective and the word is also subjective.

The concept of *sphoṭa* is something more than what is generally implied by the term *linguistic sign*. The relationship between the word and the meaning is an essential factor for the *sphoṭa* concept as for the *sign*. There is no *sphoṭa* without meaning; it is the

¹ *ibid.*, p. 70.

² *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, under *sūtra* III. 17: *padam punar nādānu-saṃhārabuddhinirgrāhyam*.

³ *Cours*, p. 98 f.

⁴ *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 45; S. Varma, 'Analysis of Meaning in Indian Semantics', p. 14. See also Kaiyaṭa on Pāṇini, V. 2. 94.

meaning-bearing nature of an expression that makes it a *sphoṭa* (when considered as a whole apart from its parts which are irrelevant). In fact the *sphoṭa* is the *signifiant* taken as a timeless and indivisible symbol denoting a meaning. The time-order of the *signifiant* is merely a means for revealing the timeless and partless *sphoṭa*.

Even though the *sphoṭa* is an integral symbol which is indivisible and timeless, it can be revealed only by means of the sound in a time-series pattern. The fact that the sound is produced serially is no argument for considering the *sphoṭa* to have a time sequence. The individual sounds of the letters that we hear in the course of revealing the *sphoṭa* seem to be present in the *sphoṭa* itself only because of our incapacity to hear the symbol apart from the sounds.

How the Sphoṭa is Comprehended

The *sphoṭa*—the word or the sentence located in the minds (of the speaker and the listener) and taken as an integral symbol—is revealed by the sounds produced in a fixed order. The sounds are only the manifesting agencies and have no function other than that of revealing the symbol. Each sound helps in manifesting this *sphoṭa*, the first one vaguely, the next one more clearly and so on, until the last one, aided by the impressions of the preceding perceptions, reveals it clearly and distinctly. It is one and the same *sphoṭa* that is revealed by each one of these letters. Bhartṛhari says¹ that

¹ VP, I. 85: *nāḍair āhitabījāyām antyena dhvaninā saha
āvṛttiparipākāyām buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate.*

‘with the last sound, the word is grasped in the mind (of the hearer) where the seed has been sown by the sounds, and which has been brought to ripeness by the telling over in order (*āvṛtti*) of the sounds’.¹ This *sphoṭa* is one and indivisible; the sounds uttered to reveal this *sphoṭa* cannot be considered as parts of the essential word or *sphoṭa*, but only as diacritical marks to reveal the identity of the whole word. The process of revelation of the word by the sounds is from the indeterminate stage to the determinate stage; it begins from complete ignorance, passes through partial knowledge and ends in complete knowledge.

The process of comprehension of the *sphoṭa* is illustrated by the grammarians by means of various analogies. It is like a jeweller examining a precious stone by looking at it steadily for some time to enable him to determine its real value. He has a series of perceptions: the first one gives him a general knowledge of the gem; each subsequent perception helps in revealing the real nature of the gem, until the last perception, aided by the impressions of the previous ones, helps him to grasp the real value of the gem completely and clearly.² Bhartṛhari has given another analogy; it is that of a student trying to learn a verse by heart by

¹ J. Brough, op. cit., p. 39.

² *Sphoṭasiddhi*, p. 131: *yathā ratna-parīkṣiṇaḥ parīkṣamāṇasya prathamasaṁmadhigamānupākhyātam anupākhyeyarūpapratyayopāhitasaṁskārārūpāhitaviśeṣāyām buddhau krameṇa carama cetasi cakāsti ratnatattvam*. See also Vācaspatimiśra (*Tattvabindu*, p. 20 f.) for the same analogy.

reading it repeatedly.¹ It is the last reading, aided by the impressions left behind by the previous readings, that helps the student to know the verse fully.

Even though each letter causes a vague cognition of the indivisible *sphoṭa*, the letter also figures in the cognition. It is the cognition of the whole that is significant and therefore important. The whole taken as an integral symbol is something different from the parts that constitute it, and the parts may be considered as irrelevant and illusory. It is not the existence of the cognition of the parts that is denied, for we do undoubtedly cognize the individual letters; it is their significance that is in question.² The *sphoṭa* is the object of cognition; but it is in the form of the letters that this cognition takes place. This is an instance of a series of errors leading finally to the truth. Even invalid cognitions can sometimes lead one to a valid knowledge; a false hypothesis can be of help in getting at the truth. Bhartṛhari explains it by means of some examples.³ Sometimes a tree may appear as an elephant when seen from a long distance, or a rope be mistaken for a snake in a place without sufficient light; but close and careful observation will ultimately reveal

¹ VP, I. 83:

*yathānuvākaḥ śloko vā soḍhatvam upagacchati
āvṛtīyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛttiḥ nirūpyate.*

² S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, 'Vācaspati's Criticism of the Sphoṭa Theory', *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, 1932, pp. 311-14.

³ VP, I. 90-1 and the commentary thereon. See also K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, 'The Doctrine of Sphoṭa', *JGRI*, vol. V, pt. 1, pp. 121 ff.

its real identity. In the final cognition the object and the form become one. This correct cognition can take place without any change in the circumstances. Standing in the same place and looking steadily at the object we get the correct cognition of the tree or the rope. So also in language the real object of utterance is the *sphoṭa*, though the form is that of the letters themselves.¹

Even though each letter in the word or sentence has the capacity of revealing the same indivisible *sphoṭa*, every one of them is necessary, since the complete and distinct manifestation of the word is effected only with the perception of the last letter. Hence the subsequent letters in the word are not at all superfluous. According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, when a word is uttered, the individual sounds reveal only the permanent letters or the sound-units (which are analogous to the phonemes of modern linguists), and nothing more than these; these act as a stimulus to produce the reaction of recognition of the meaning. But according to the grammarians it is the whole indivisible word that is revealed by the sounds, or by the letters indicated by the sounds. The function of the letters in revealing the integral *sphoṭa* is based on their 'value' in differentiating one word from another. Thus, while uttering the word *gauḥ*, the function of the letter *g* is to distinguish the word from all other words that do not begin with the letter *g*. This essential nature of the function of letters in the building up of a word is noticed by Vyāsa in his

¹ See also *Tattvabindu*, p. 21, for a similar analogy.

Yogasūtra-bhāṣya.¹ He says: 'The power of speech has its function in the utterance of the various sounds and the ear has for its object only the series of sounds. It is the mind of the listener that grasps the sounds as a significant unit at the end of the final sound. As the individual sounds cannot co-exist, they do not naturally aid one another. One by one they come into being, and vanish without touching the word; so none of them can be considered to have attained the form of a unit-word. On the other hand, each one of these letters may be said to have the essence of the word and the potential capacity to express almost everything, in so far as, by association with other letters, in various combinations, it can form different words. Though a universe of meanings can thus be attached to a single letter, this potential capacity is limited by convention on account of the order of sequence in which the letters are uttered. Thus, the potential capacity of the letters *g*, *au* and *ḥ* is restricted to the object having dewlap, horn, etc. when they follow one another in the particular sequence, *gauḥ*.² Of course, Vyāsa was not fully

¹ *Yogabhāṣya* on *sūtra* III. 17:

*tatra vāg varṇeṣu evārthavati. śrotram ca dhvani-pariṇāmamātra-
viśayam. padam punar nādānusamhārabuddhinirgrāhyam iti. varṇā eka-
samayāsambhavitvāt paranirānugrahāt mānas te padam asaṃspṛśyānupa-
sthāpyāvīrbhūtās tirobhūtās ceti pratyekam apadasvarūpā ucyante.*

² *ibid.*: *varṇaḥ punar ekaikaḥ padātmā sarvābhidhānaśakti-pracitaḥ
sahakāri-varṇāntara-pratīyogitvād vaiśvarūpyam ivāpannaḥ. pūrvāś cotta-
reṇa uttaraś ca pūrvēṇa viśeṣe 'vasthāpita ity evaṃ bahavo varṇāḥ kramā-
nurodhino 'rthasaṃketenāvachchinnā iyanta ete sarvābhidhānaśakti-parivṛttā
gākāraukāra-viśarjanīyāḥ sāsṇādīmantam artham dyotayantīti.*

conscious of the *sphoṭa* doctrine as developed by Bhartrhari and Maṇḍanamiśra; that is why he is trying to explain the function of the letters in conveying the meaning of the word. But a similar argument will explain how the individual letters reveal the word-symbol or *sphoṭa*.

This is what we find in the *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* of Śeṣakṛṣṇa,¹ where a reasonable explanation, on the basis of Vyāsa's remarks, is given about the function of the individual letters in revealing the integral word. He says that when a man utters the sound *ka* with the intention of saying *kamalam* (a lotus), we know that he is trying to utter a word beginning with *ka*. Thus, the whole word is vaguely suggested by the first syllable itself, for it gives a clue to the identity of the word. When he utters the next syllable *ma*, we have another clue and the word can more clearly be guessed, since it narrows the field. All the words that do not begin with *kama* are now excluded. Still the word is not quite clear, for we do not know whether he is going to say *kamalam* or *kamanam*. when the last sound *lam* is also uttered, the word is known fully and clearly. Thus, the function of the letters in a word is to build up the higher unit; they have no meaning of their own; their value consists in differentiating one word from another.

¹ *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*, p. 10: *tathā hi kamalam ity ukte kakārama-kārānubhave 'pi kiṃ kamalīyaḥ sphoṭaḥ kamanīyo veti samdeho nāpagacchati tāvad yāvan na caramo lo no vānubhūyate. tasmād īśattvaṃ samdigdhatvaṃ nīścitatvaṃ eva sphuṭataratvaṃ.* (Quoted by K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, op. cit., p. 136.)

This conception of the function of the letters in the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* is analogous to the Apoha theory of the Buddhists;¹ for the value of each letter in the word is its being different from all the other possible letters. It may also be compared to the view of some modern linguists that the significance of the phonemes—the smallest significant units in a language—lies in their differentiation value. Bhartṛhari's statement that the individual letters in a word or sentence have no direct connection with the meaning, but are merely concerned with the manifestation of the linguistic sign or the *sphoṭa* which is the real meaning-bearer, is quite in keeping with the claim of modern linguists that the basic assumptions that underlie phonemics can be stated without any mention of mind and meaning, and that the structural analysis of a language need not necessarily involve considerations of meaning.

The *sphoṭa* is not an imperceptible entity² assumed by the grammarian to explain how a temporal series of sound-patterns can express a unitary sense; it is something which is actually perceived in speech situations. The very fact that a word or sentence is cognized gradually from the vague indeterminate stage to the clear determinate stage shows that it is through

¹ The Apoha doctrine is discussed above; see pp. 78-94.

² D. M. Datta's statement (*The Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 250) that, 'In reality, however, corresponding to every word perceived, there is an unperceived, partless symbol which directly presents the meaning' does not seem to be accurate, for the *sphoṭa* is the perceived word itself, taken as a partless symbol.

perception that this cognition takes place; for, as Maṇḍanamisra points out,¹ it is only in perceptive cognition that a gradual process from the indistinct to the distinct, through increasing degrees of clarity, is possible; in the case of other means of cognition we have either a clear knowledge, or no knowledge at all.

In fact one of the arguments adduced by the grammarians in favour of the *sphoṭa* theory is the experience that people have in actual speech situations about the word or the sentence as a single entity. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa says that the justification for the existence of the *sphoṭa* and for its unity is the realization 'This is one word, one sentence'.² In the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* also it is stated that the acceptance of the *sphoṭa* is based on direct perception itself, since it is a common experience that a word like 'cow' is a unique entity, apart from the different letters we seem to hear in it.³ The same idea is stressed in the *Sphoṭasiddhi*⁴ and the *Tattvabindu*.⁵ Jayantabhaṭṭa also mentions⁶ the grammarians'

¹ *Sphoṭasiddhi*, verse 23:

*pratyakṣajñānaniyatā vyaktāvyaktābhāsītā
mānāntareṣu grahaṇam athavā naiva hi grahaḥ.*

(There is no vagueness in non-perceptual knowledge.)

² *Mahābhāṣyapradīpodyota*, vol. I, p. 11: *idam ekaṃ padam ekaṃ vākyam iti pratyayaḥ sphoṭasatve tadekatve ca pramāṇam.*

³ *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p. 299: *pratyakṣam evātra pramāṇam, gaur ity ekaṃ padam iti nānāvārṇātiriktaikapadāvagateḥ sārvaśāstrīnatoṭ.*

⁴ *Sphoṭasiddhi*, p. 171: *sphoṭātmā tu pratyakṣavedanīyaḥ.*

⁵ *Tattvabindu*, p. 23: *sārvaśāstrīnam api padam iti vākyam iti caika-viśayānubhavam.*

⁶ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 371: *śraut্রে pratyaye pratibhāsamānaḥ.*

view that the *sphoṭa* is cognized through direct auditory perception.¹ In the discussion of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, Śaṃkara presents the grammarian as saying, 'I do not postulate a new entity called *sphoṭa*; I know it through perception.'² Even the critics of the *sphoṭa* doctrine do not deny the common experience of the word or the sentence as a unique entity; they only try to explain it in a different way.

Thus, it is argued by Vācaspatimiśra in the *Tattva-bindu*³ that the unitariness that is commonly experienced regarding the word or the sentence is based on some limitation (*upādhi*) like that of the experiences of an army or a forest, and that it need not be real. Two such extraneous adjuncts which produce the notion of unitariness are given: being the content of a single cognition, and being the cause of the cognition of one idea.⁴ The critics of the *sphoṭa* doctrine base their arguments mainly on these two points.

¹ G. N. Bhattacharyya 'A Study in the Dialectics of Sphoṭa', pp. 44, 68) criticizes Jayantabhaṭṭa for misinterpreting the grammarian's view. 'We do not subscribe to Jayanta's views when he says that *sphoṭa* is perceived by the auditory organ'; his argument that the *sphoṭa* is known through mental perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) is based on a passage in the *Tattvabindu*, p. 16; but from its commentary by Parameśvara, it is clear that the term *mānasa-pratyakṣa* in the passage refers to *prayatnabheda* and not to *sphoṭa*. See also Nāgeśa, *Uddyota* on *Mahābhāṣya* *pradīpa*, p. 66 (Nirnaya Sagar Press ed.): *vastutas tu sphoṭa eva śrotragrāhyaḥ*.

² *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on I. 3. 28: *na kalpayāmy ahaṃ sphoṭaṃ pratyakṣaṃ eva tv enam avagacchāmi*.

³ *Tattvabindu*, pp. 50 ff.

⁴ *ekaviññānaviśayatā* and *ekābhidheyapratyayahetutā*.

Śaṅkara criticizes the *sphoṭa* doctrine on the ground that the apprehension of a temporal or spatial series can be explained as due to the synthesizing activity¹ of the mind. He holds that 'though a series cannot be apprehended as a whole through perception, we have, after all the members of a series have been perceived one by one, a memory of all the members combined together. We have in experience, in all cases of temporal and spatial series, the knowledge of wholes which preserve the internal relation obtaining among their component members.'² We have to accept it on the basis of such an experience. Śaṅkara says: 'That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of a word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, and not anything else.'³ He illustrates this point with various analogies. 'The ideas which we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same cognitional act.'⁴ The particular order of sequence determines the nature of the word; just as ants produce the idea of a row only

¹ Śaṅkara calls it *samastapratyavamarśinī buddhi* or the intellect having the power of holding together the separate memories into one whole. The same is mentioned by Vācaspatimiśra as the *ekaviññānaviṣayatā*.

² D. M. Datta, op. cit., p. 253; see also *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, on *sūtra* I. 3. 28.

³ Thibaut's translation of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 209.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 209.

when they march one after the other, so the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they follow one another in a certain order.

The *sphoṭa* theory itself presupposes something like this as the means of revealing the *sphoṭa*, namely a comprehensive cognition of the letters in their proper order. The theory has to accept that the intellect has the power to interpret a series of sense-data as a finished Gestalt. Śaṅkara and the Mīmāṃsaka-s do not explain how simultaneity and succession are compatible in the same act of the mind; the Naiyāyika-s who consider that the synthesis of the letters is based on memory (*samūhālambanasmṛti*) are also at a loss to explain this problem. Their difficulty is mainly due to the fact that to them the present is an instant. The modern psychologists have shown that even the present has a duration of its own and extends both backward into the past and forward into the future.¹ Thus, there is a simultaneous perception of all the letters of a word, though these are successively heard by us. So also in visual perception, things are cognized as wholes. The *sphoṭa* theory is quite in keeping with the modern Gestalt psychology which believes in the primacy of Gestalten. The earlier methods proceeded from the elements to the whole, from the sounds to the words, from

¹ S. C. Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 365; James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 608-10. This is only another way of describing the problem, and does not explain it fully. See also M. Hiriyanna, 'An Indian View of Present Time', *Indian Philosophical Studies*, vol. I.

words to sentences and finally to the meaning of discourse as a whole; but the present tendency among psychologists is the exact opposite, namely, from meaning as Gestalt to the sentence and words as elements.¹ The *sphoṭa* is the sentence or word considered as a linguistic sign, and perceived as a Gestalt *ab initio*.

The second argument advanced by the Mīmāṃsaka-s against the *sphoṭa* theory is that the unity of the word or sentence is based on the unity of the meaning, and that, therefore, no new *sphoṭa* need be assumed to explain this unity (*ekābhidheyapratyayahetutā*). The grammarians reply² that this objection involves the fallacy of interdependence, since the conception of the word as a unitary entity depends on its conveying a single idea and the meaning depends on the word.³ The Mīmāṃsaka-s argue that there is no interdependence since the conception of the word is based on that of the meaning, but not *vice versa*.⁴ We learn the meaning of words and sentences from their use in actual speech contexts; and so much of the sound-pattern in a fixed order which is found applied to a particular sense is taken to be a word having that meaning. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says⁵

¹ W. M. Urban, *Language and Reality*, p. 63.

² *Tattvabīndu*, p. 51.

³ *ibid*: *parasparāśrayaprasaktir durvārā. na khalu aviditapadarūpā-vadhīr artham avatī.*

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 53: *na hi padāvadhāraṇādhīnaḥ sambandhabodhaḥ; kiṃ tu tadadhīnaṃ padajñānam.*

⁵ *Slokavārttika*, *Sphoṭa* section, v. 69:

*yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratīpādane
varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathaiṣāvabodhakāḥ.*

that the meaning of a word is determined by usage and as such, those letters uttered in a particular order of sequence by one individual, which has expressed the sense to us when we have first learned the word from our elders will express the same sense at all future times. Hence, it is argued that there is no necessity for postulating the *sphoṭa*. The grammarian's point of view is that even though the meaning is learned from their function in actual usage, we do experience the word or the sentence as a unitary entity, as a whole, and not as an aggregate of the various letters comprising it. And there is no reason to consider this experience as false.

Classification of the Sphoṭa

The later grammarians like Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita¹ and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa enumerate eight different varieties of the *sphoṭa*. The fundamental argument in all these cases is meaningfulness (*vācakatva*). Thus, we may consider either the letter or the word or the sentence as the meaning-bearing unit, and we get respectively the *varṇa-sphoṭa*, the *padasphoṭa* or the *vākyasphoṭa*. Here we again come across the philosophical controversy as to whether *śabda* is permanent or transient (*nitya* or *kārya*).

If we take the Naiyāyika view that *śabda* is transient being produced each time of its utterance, we have to assume the concept of the *class* to explain language behaviour. The letter, the word or the sentence has to be considered as a class denoting the class of objects meant. Both Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita¹ and

¹ *Śabdakaustubha*, pp. 10 ff.

Koṇḍabhaṭṭa¹ say that according to Bopadeva, the denoter (*vācaka*) should be of the nature of a universal, just like the denoted (*vācya*).² Every word or sentence uttered in actual speech is an instance of the class of such words or sentences. This is similar to the mode of view put forward by Kaplan and Copilowish who define a sign (including a linguistic sign) as 'a class of sign-vehicles such that there exists one law of interpretation'.³ Bertrand Russell also says:⁴ 'The word "dog" is a universal, just as *dog* is a universal. We say, loosely, that we can utter the same word "dog" on two occasions, but in fact we utter two examples of the same species. There is thus no difference of status between *dog* and the word "dog": each is general and exists only in instances.' By synthesizing the *sphoṭa* theory with the Naiyāyika view about the universal, we get the three kinds of *sphoṭa*-s: *varṇajātisphoṭa*, *padajātisphoṭa* and *vākya-jātisphoṭa*.

If, on the other hand, we take the Mīmāṃsāka view that *śabda* is permanent, the word or sentence will have to be considered as a permanent pattern of the letters in a fixed order. Each instance of its occurrence is only a case of revealing or manifesting the permanent sound-pattern. The semantic unit is taken to be one and the same in all cases of its occurrence. If the

¹ *Sphoṭavāda*, *passim*; See also *Laghumañjūṣā*, Sphoṭa section.

² G. N. Bhattacharyya, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

³ *Mind*, Oct. 1939, p. 480; discussed by Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 184 and by J. Brough, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁴ *op. cit.*, p. 24.

sphoṭa theory is synthesized with the Mimāṃsaka view, we get the three types of *sphoṭa*-s: *varṇavyaktisphoṭa*, *padavyaktisphoṭa* and *vākyavyaktisphoṭa*.

Again, the *padasphoṭa* and the *vākyasphoṭa*, taken as semantic units built of smaller such units which are themselves meaningful, are different from *padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa* considered as indivisible symbols denoting the meaning of the whole without any reference to the parts. The former are the *sakhaṇḍasphoṭa*-s and the latter are *akhaṇḍasphoṭa*-s. This division does not apply to the *varṇasphoṭa*, as it cannot be further divided. Thus, the eight subdivisions of *sphoṭa* are:

1. *varṇasphoṭa*
2. *padasphoṭa*
3. *vākyasphoṭa*
4. *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*
5. *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*
6. *varṇajātisphoṭa*
7. *padajātisphoṭa*
8. *vākyajātisphoṭa*

Bhartṛhari seems to have held the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, the indivisible sentence *sphoṭa* of the *vyakti* type, as the real *sphoṭa*.¹

According to the later grammarians, *varṇasphoṭa* is justified on the grounds that a meaning is understood from roots and suffixes having one letter only. Patañjali himself has stated that from one point of view the

¹ J. Brough, op. cit., p. 45.

individual letters may be considered to have meaning, since roots, suffixes and particles of a single letter are meaningful.¹

Sometimes it is impossible to discriminate how much of the word refers to the thing-meant, and how much to the case relationship (e.g. *rāmeṇa* 'by Rāma'). The Naiyāyika-s explain this difficulty by saying that it is the *sthānin* or the original permanent suffix that should be considered as the meaning-bearer. But the grammarians assert that it is not the *sthānin*, but the substitute or *ādeśa* that carries the meaning. They rightly point out the fact that the *sthānin* is an artificial entity invented by the grammarians to explain the formation of the various words in a simple way, and that they have no reality of their own, since they could be different in different systems of grammar.² The people who speak the language are concerned only with the *ādeśa*, and the meaning is understood from that. Hence the meaning has to be ascribed to the word as a whole, and therefore the *padasphoṭa* has to be assumed.

Similar consideration of the *saṃdhi*-forms such as *dadhīdam* (*dadhi idam*=this is curd) makes it necessary to postulate the *vākyasphoṭa*.³ All these various

¹ *Mbh*, I, 220.

² G. N. Bhattacharyya, op. cit., pp. 91 ff.; *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, pp. 574 ff.

³ Koṇḍabhaṭṭa gives the example *hare 'va* for *hare ava* (Hari, protect!). *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, v. 64: *hare 'vetyādi dṛṣtvā tu vākya-sphoṭam viniścinu*. The special power found in compound words to

considerations are based on the conception of the sentence being made up of smaller meaning-bearing units, the words, the roots and the suffixes.

Strictly speaking the linguist can accept only the undivided sentence as the unit of meaning. As Bhartṛhari says,¹ in actual speech situations, there are no letters in the word, and no words in the sentence. 'The analysis into letters and the distribution of meanings between stem and suffix, or between the words in the sentence—these proceedings, as Nāgeśa says,² are the occupation of grammarians.'³

The great importance of the *sphoṭa* doctrine for the theory of language-symbolism is not fully appreciated by modern linguists mainly because of the fact that it has been subjected to a great deal of unnecessary mystification. Bhartṛhari himself developed a monistic doctrine of philosophy taking the transcendental Speech-essence as the first principle of the universe. This metaphysical doctrine of the appearance of the transcendental Speech-essence as the empirical world of names and things, was confused by later writers with the main linguistic theory itself, as a result of which it was generally assumed that the *sphoṭa* is something mystical. Even many of the modern writers on the

convey a unified sense is also explained by *vākyasphoṭa*. (See the section on compound words in the chapter on *Lakṣaṇā*.)

¹ VP, I. 73: *pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣv avayavā na ca vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana.*

² *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 6: *tat tad arthavibhāgaṃ śāstramātraviśayam.*

³ J. Brough, op. cit., p. 43 f.

subject have not distinguished the purely linguistic theory from the metaphysical superstructure erected on its basis.

Keith describes ¹ the *sphoṭa* as a 'mysterious entity, a sort of hypostatization of sound, of which action sounds are manifestations'. Similarly, Dr. S. K. De considers ² the *sphoṭa* as a 'somewhat mystical conception' and explains it as the 'sound of a word as a whole', 'the sounds or something corresponding to them . . . blended indistinguishably into a uniform whole'. O. Strauss ³ takes the *sphoṭa* as the transcendental word. A. Foucher ⁴ takes it as '*La mystérieuse et fulgurante relation* ⁵ *qui éclate entre le son et le sens, entre le mot et l'idée.*' This mystical element brought into the discussion of the *sphoṭa* is partly responsible for the neglect of the theory by modern linguists.

Another reason for the confusion about the real nature of the *sphoṭa* is the mistranslation of the Sanskrit word *śabda* as 'sound'. Even in India the term *śabda* was interpreted differently by different schools of philosophy. Many of the heated discussions about the essential nature of the *śabda*, found in the various philosophical works, are mainly due to the equivocal nature

¹ *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 387.

² *Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics*, II, p. 180.

³ 'Altindische Spekulatione über die Sprache und ihre Probleme', *ZDMG*, 1927.

⁴ *Le Compendium des Topiques—Tarkasaṅgraha d'Annambhaṭṭa*, Introduction, p. xix.

⁵ The *sphoṭa* is not a relation, but the word itself. See Brough, op. cit., *TPS*, 1951, p. 42.

of the term itself. To the Naiyāyika, *śabda* is the physical sound, articulate (*varṇa*) or inarticulate (*dhvani*), and is a product of the conjunction or disjunction of two bodies; it can also be produced from another sound, like one wave from another. They consider *śabda* to be ephemeral, since the sound is destroyed as soon as it is produced. The recognition of the articulate sound is based on the knowledge of the class. To the Mīmāṃsaka-s on the other hand, *śabda* is the *varṇa* or the unit of speech, eternal and ubiquitous, which is only revealed or manifested by the spoken articulate sounds; it is not produced, it is only revealed. The Mīmāṃsaka's conception of the *varṇa* is something analogous to the modern linguist's conception of the phoneme. The ready recognition we have of the letters as the same cannot be due to similarity or even due to their being instances of the same class.¹ To Bhartṛhari and the Vaiyākaraṇa-s it is not the letter (*varṇa*) that is to be taken as the unit of language, but the expression with the meaning attached to it should be taken as a single indivisible unit of speech; this symbol is the *śabda*. The sounds produced at the time of utterance, as well as the permanent letters (*varṇa-s*) revealed by the utterance, are only the means of revealing the *śabda*. This essential *śabda* is the *spṛṣṭa*, according to Bhartṛhari.

¹ Stcherbatsky (*Buddhist Logic*, I. p. 23) refers to this view of the Mīmāṃsaka-s as an 'absurd idea'. He seems to overlook the fact that the unit of speech is necessarily something permanent and ubiquitous, and is not identical with the sounds used to reveal it.

To translate *śabda* as sound in the discussions of the grammarian's theory of the *sphoṭa* is highly misleading. Thus, for example, Mādhava's definition of the *sphoṭa* in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (*varṇātirikto varṇābhivyāṅgyo 'rthapratyāyako nityaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭa iti tadvido vadanti*) will be quite clear, if translated as 'The abiding speech-unit which is the conveyor of meaning, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, is called the *sphoṭa* by the grammarians'. But it is quite confusing in Cowell's translation: 'And . . . (say the wise in these matters) . . . this *sphoṭa* is an eternal sound distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning.'¹ Monier-Williams defines² the *sphoṭa* as 'sound (considered as eternal, indivisible and creative)', 'the eternal and imperceptible element of sounds and words and the real vehicle of the idea which bursts or flashes on the mind when a sound is uttered'. It must be noted that the *sphoṭa* is not a hypostatization of sound; the Indian grammarians use the term in the sense of the essential word or expression and attach great importance to its meaning-bearing aspect, as much as to its phonetic aspect. To them *śabda* is such only if it conveys a meaning.

George Thibaut says that the *sphoṭa* is a 'grammatical fiction in so far as it is apprehended by us as

¹ *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, translated by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, p. 211. See also J. Brough, op. cit., p. 41.

² *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 1270.

a whole'.¹ Bhartṛhari's reply to this criticism would be that only the *sphoṭa* is real; the separate sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener (or the various letters of the alphabet written by the writer and seen by the reader) are only the means by which the linguistic symbol is revealed, and are irrelevant, if taken by themselves. The criticism that the *sphoṭa* is an imperceptible entity is rejected by the grammarian; in fact, one of the main arguments in favour of the *sphoṭa* theory itself is the direct perception of the unity of the word or the sentence.²

Many modern scholars have tried to identify the *sphoṭa* with the 'idea' or 'notion' expressed by the combination of the letters. Thus, Garbe writes:³ 'It will be seen that a true thought is here presented, though obscurely expressed. This obscurity, however, will not appear strange to anyone who considers that here for the first time a difficult problem is touched which since then has occupied many minds; for that "supersensible word" is, of course, no other than the idea which is expressed by the combination of the letters.' P. V. Pathak, in the *Heyapakṣa of Yoga*,⁴ gives the same view that 'one can go to the length of identifying the *sphoṭa* with the meaning of the word', and says that 'the *sphoṭa* theory, at its worst, is only a hypostatization of a

¹ *Vedāntasūtras*, with Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*, English translation, p. 204 n.

² *vide supra*.

³ *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, article on 'Yoga'.

⁴ p. 84.

psychological process of perception'. Deussen is also inclined to identify the *sphoṭa* with 'notion'.¹

This view does not seem to give full credit to the symbolic nature of the *sphoṭa*, for the discussions of the grammarians on the *sphoṭa* theory make it clear that the *sphoṭa* is not the idea or the meaning, but it is that indivisible symbol which brings to light the idea of the thing-meant. The *sphoṭa* is generally referred to as the *vācaka* or the *abhidhāyaka*, indicating that it is that which expresses the meaning.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says ² that 'the *sphoṭa* is the indivisible idea with its dual form of *śabda*, word and *artha*, meaning'. It is true that Bhartṛhari is a pure monist who believed that, when looked at from the philosophical point of view, both the word and the meaning are only the different aspects of one and the same indivisible essence of thought;³ but from the empirical point of view they have to be distinguished and the *sphoṭa*, in its linguistic sense, has to be taken as the indivisible symbol expressing the meaning. The word or sentence is really a psychic entity which is an indivisible unit, the symbol which carries the meaning, but which can be revealed or physically reproduced whenever wanted.⁴

¹ See George Thibaut, *Vedāntasūtra-s*, p. 204 n. Thibaut criticizes this view strongly.

² *The Principal Upaniṣads*, 1953, p. 674.

³ *VP*, II. 31: *ekasyaivātmano bhedaḥ śabdārthāu aprthak sthitaḥ*.

⁴ Gardiner, *op. cit.*, p. 69 f.

Bhartrhari's Philosophy

To Bhartrhari the linguistic theory of *sphota* is part of his monistic and idealistic metaphysical theory according to which the transcendental speech-essence (*śabda-tattva*) is the First Principle of the universe. The *Vākyapadīya*, his monumental work on the philosophy of language, begins with the statement that the whole phenomenon of material existence is only an appearance (*vivarta*) of the speech principle which is identical with the ultimate Reality, Brahman.¹ The entire world of things whose individuality consists only in names and forms (*nāma* and *rūpa*) has its source in this speech-essence. Symbol and meaning are only two aspects of the same principle. In fact it is the same speech-essence which appears in the form of various ideas or meanings on the one hand, and their symbols—words and sentences—on the other hand, and thus constitutes the entire phenomenal world. This speech-essence, which is the ultimate Reality and is of the nature of consciousness, has neither beginning nor end and is unchanging; but on the basis of its various powers such as Time, which, though in essence identical with it, seem to be different, the phenomenal world appears as evolutionary and pluralistic.² The *śabda-tattva* is not limited by time; the eternal timeless appears as changing owing to the working of the time factor. Time is an inherent power of the Absolute and

¹ VP, I. 1: *anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yad akṣaram vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ.*

² VP, I. 2: *ekam eva yad āmnātam bhinnam śaktivyapāśrayāt abhaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ prthaktveneva vartate.*

exerts its influence in bringing about the powers of *śabda-tattva*.

According to Bhartṛhari the speech-principle has three stages in the course of its manifestation, namely *paśyanti*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*.¹ *Paśyanti* is the supreme Reality, Śabdabrahman, and has been identified with *pratibhā*, the flash of insight or the principle of consciousness.² The Pratyabhijñā school of philosophy accepted four different stages in the manifestation of the Śabdabrahman, adding a fourth stage called *parā* which is identical with the *paśyanti* stage in Bhartṛhari's system.³ Later grammarians have been influenced by this four-fold classification of the Pratyabhijñā school and have tried to interpret Bhartṛhari's views accordingly;⁴ but to Bhartṛhari there is no stage higher than the *paśyanti*.⁵ The complete utterance or the *vākyasphoṭa* indicates this

¹ VP, I. 144: *vaikhariyā madhyamāyās ca paśyantiyās caitad adbhutam anekatīrthabhedāyās trayyā vācaḥ param padam*.

² Vṛṣabhadeva's commentary on VP, I. 14: *pratibhām iti—yeyam samastāśabdārthakāraṇabhūtā buddhiḥ, yām paśyantiy āhuḥ, yataḥ śabdāḥ prānavṛttim anupatanti, tām anuparaiti anugacchati*. Somānandanātha says in the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* (II. 2) that *paśyanti* is the Absolute of the grammarians:

*ity āhus te param brahma yad anādi tathākṣaram
tad akṣaram śabdarūpaṁ sā paśyanti parā hi vāk*.

See also Kṣemarāja, *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*, p. 18: *śabdabrahmamayaṁ paśyantirūpaṁ ātmatattvam iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ*.

³ Bhartṛhari holds Śabdabrahman to be independent and self-subsistent, while the later Āgama-s make it a power subordinate to the substance with which it is identical. (See Gopinatha Kaviraja, *ABORI*, 1924, p. 114.)

⁴ *Laghumañjūṣā*, pp. 171 ff.; commentary on VP, I. 14.

⁵ For details see Gaurinath Sastri, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, chs. I-V.

principle of consciousness, *paśyanti* or *pratibhā*. There is no real distinction between speech and thought at this stage.

The next stage in the manifestation of the speech-principle is called *madhyamā*, or the intermediate, since it lies between *paśyanti* and *vaikharī*. This is the utterance in its phonological structure, the sound pattern of the norm. It is psychological in its nature and can be comprehended by the intellect.¹ All the elements linguistically relevant to the sentence are present in a latent form at this stage. The same meaning will be conveyed and the same *sphoṭa* will be revealed by different forms of *madhyamā*, depending on the language adopted. This corresponds to *prākṛta-dhvani*. The last stage in the manifestation of speech is *vaikharī* or the actual sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener; this is the same as *vaikṛta-dhvani*. At this stage all the individual peculiarities of the speaker are present in the utterance along with the linguistically relevant parts.

The linguistic instinct in man is on the same level with the instinct in animals. It is this instinct or *pratibhā* that prompts living beings to act. What makes the cuckoo sing in spring? Who teaches the spider to weave its web, or the birds to build their nests?² It is the same instinct that prompts man also. Every activity is based on this instinctive urge.

¹ Commentary on VP, I. 144: *madhyamā tv antaḥsaṃniveśinī parigrhītakrameva buddhimātropādānā sūkṣmā prāṇavṛtṭyanugatā.*

² VP, II. 151:

svaravṛtṭim vikurute madhau puṃskokilasya kaḥ?
jantvādayaḥ kulāyādikaraṇe kena śikṣitāḥ?

CHAPTER

4

CONDITIONS OF KNOWING THE
MEANING OF A SENTENCE

AKĀṆKṢĀ, YOGYATĀ, SAMNIDHI AND TĀTPARYAJĪĀNA

ĀKĀṆKṢĀ, YOGYATĀ, SAMNIDHI AND TĀTPARYAÑĀNA

NEXT to the Sphoṭa theory of linguistic symbols advocated by Bhartṛhari stressing the importance of taking the sentence or complete utterance as an integral and indivisible symbol conveying its meaning in a flash, the most important contribution of ancient India to general linguistics is the concept of *ākāṅkṣā*. The Mīmāṃsaka school brought forward this concept to explain, from the analytical and associationist standpoint, how syntactic unity is effected among the various isolated words which comprise the sentence. If the word is taken as an autonomous unit of sound and sense, it is necessary to point out the cementing factors which unite the different words, with their individual meanings, when they form a single sentence. The Mīmāṃsaka-s first enunciated, and the other schools of thought later accepted with slight modifications, the three factors of phonetic contiguity or *saṃnidhi*, logical consistency or *yogyatā*, and syntactic expectancy or *ākāṅkṣā* among the parts of a sentence as constituting the bases of syntactic unity. Of these three, *ākāṅkṣā* is all-comprehensive and the most important.

The simple definition of a sentence as a collection of words is found as early as in the *Bṛhaddevatā*; ¹ but it is in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra-s* of Jaimini that we first come across the real definition of a sentence: ² A group of words serving a single purpose forms a sentence, if on analysis the separate words are found to have *ākāṅkṣā*³ or mutual expectancy. This principle was enunciated by the Mīmāṃsaka-s in dealing with the prose passages of the *Yajurveda*, where it was sometimes found difficult to ascertain how far a certain sentence extended. This principle of syntactic unit is that 'so long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, which, on being separated, are found to be wanting and incapable of effecting the said purpose, they form one "Syntactical Unit—one complete *Yajus-mantra*"'.⁴ Śābara also explains this *sūtra* as referring to the Vedic *mantra-s* only, and the term *arthaikatva* is interpreted in the sense of 'serving a single purpose'.⁵

It was felt that this principle was capable of a much more extended application; and in the *Vākya-padīya* we find Bhartṛhari referring to this as one of the well-known definitions of a sentence.⁶ Kumārilabhaṭṭa

¹ *Bṛhaddevatā*, II. 117: *padasaṃghātajam vākyam*.

² *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, II. 1. 46: *arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt*.

³ The term *ākāṅkṣā* is not used as a technical word here, unlike in later Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya works.

⁴ Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, p. 189.

⁵ *Śābarabhāṣya*, vol. I, p. 447: *ekaprayojanatvād upapannam*.

⁶ *VP*, II. 4: *sākāṅkṣāvayavam bhede parānākāṅkṣaśabdakam karma-pradhānam guṇavad ekārtham vākyaṃ iṣyate*.

was also conscious that it could be applied to ordinary sentences as well. He says: ¹ 'It must be concluded that those words on hearing which we are clearly cognizant of a single idea must be regarded as one sentence . . . — either ordinary or of the *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*.' This explanation is by taking *arthaikatva* in the *sūtra* in the sense of a single idea. Kumārilabhaṭṭa rejects it, following the interpretation of the passage given by Śabara. Among his followers, Pārthasārathimiśra favours the *Bhāṣya* view and takes *artha* in the sense of purpose,² whereas Someśvarabhaṭṭa in the *Nyāyasudhā* takes the term in the sense of meaning to admit a wider scope of the principle.³

Prabhākara says ⁴ that *artha* in the *sūtra* stands for meaning as well as purpose, both being interrelated; but since in the *Śabarabhāṣya* the unity of purpose is emphasized as the more important, Prabhākara also explains it that way, and says ⁴ that the words of a sentence must be related to the purpose which is the most important factor in a sentence.

The next *sūtra* of Jaimini ⁵ lays down the principle of *vākyabheda* or 'syntactic split'. 'When the sentences are independent of one another (each sentence having no requirement or expectation of words outside itself to

¹ *Tantravārttika*, translation, p. 586 f.; Gāṅganātha Jha, op. cit., p. 190.

² Gāṅganātha Jha, op. cit., p. 190 f.

³ *ibid.*, p. 191; *Nyāyasudhā*, pp. 681 ff.

⁴ Gāṅganātha Jha, loc. cit.

⁵ *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, II. 1. 47: *sameṣu vākyabhedaḥ*.

complete its meaning), they should be treated as distinct sentences.' Thus *ākāṅkṣā*, or syntactic expectancy, among the words is accepted as an essential condition for a sentence.

The Mīmāṃsā type of definition laying stress on the necessity of *ākāṅkṣā*, or mutual expectancy, among words in a sentence in order to bring about the unity of idea, or of purpose, appears also in the *Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra*.¹ There a sentence is described as that which is *nirākāṅkṣa*, that is to say, something which has no requirement or expectation of words outside itself to complete its meaning. The condition about the unity of purpose or of idea is not mentioned there. A similar definition is found in the *Satyāṣāḍhaśrautasūtra*.² It has been suggested that the Śrautasūtra definitions are based on the Mīmāṃsā definition.³

The condition about *ākāṅkṣā*, or the mutual expectancy, among words in a sentence is generally believed to have been promulgated first by the Mīmāṃsaka-s; but the necessity for interdependence of words to give a unified sense, as in a compound word or a sentence, was recognized even earlier by the grammarians. Pāṇini himself says⁴ that words can form a compound word only if they have *sāmarthya* or capacity; this term

¹ *Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra*, I. 3. 2; J. Brough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', *TPS*, 1953, p. 162.

² Anandasrama Sanskrit Series 53, part 1, p. 38.

³ D. V. Garge, *Citations in Śabara-bhāṣya*, p. 51.

⁴ Pāṇini, II. 1. 1: *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*.

sāmarthya has been variously interpreted by commentators; according to some it is *vyapekṣā* or mutual connection pertaining to the meaning,¹ in which sense it is similar to the condition of *ākāṅkṣā* given by the Mīmāṃsaka-s; according to some others *sāmarthya* is to be explained as *ekārthibhāva*, or unification of meaning;² that is to say, the different words with different meanings are made to signify a unified sense. This latter view may be compared to the condition of *arthaikatva* given by Jaimini (when explained as unity of sense). Pāṇini discusses compound words, whereas Jaimini deals with the sentence, still the conditions referred to seem to be similar.³ Patañjali explains these two views as mutually exclusive, and accepts the *ekārthibhāva* point of view as the correct one; according to this the members of a compound word give up their individual meanings and acquire a special signification; but according to the other view, the individual members retain their own meanings, but they are mutually related. According to Haradatta⁴ both *vyapekṣā* and *ekārthibhāva* are necessary in a compound word, since in the absence of mutual connection of meanings, words are not allowed

¹ *Mbh*, p. 365: *parasparavyapekṣāṃ sāmarthyam eke. kā punaḥ śabdāyor vyapekṣā? na brūmaḥ śabdāyor iti. kim tarhi? arthayoḥ.*

² *Vārttika* under Pāṇini, II. 1. 1: *prthagarthānām ekārthibhāvaḥ samarthavacanam.* See also the *Bhāṣya* on it.

³ Strictly speaking, *sāmarthya* is the capacity of the words for mutual association, *vyapekṣā* is their interdependence, and *ākāṅkṣā* is the need one has for the other for completing the sense.

⁴ See P. C. Chakravarti, *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 293. Also *Padamañjarī*, under Pāṇini II. 1. 1.

to form a compound. But others like Kaiyaṭa give¹ these two as the conditions for a sentence and a compound word respectively.

The knowledge of the syntactic unity of a sentence is mainly on the basis of the *ākāṅkṣā*, or the mutual expectancy, of the words. To this primary condition were later added two more, *yogyatā* or consistency of sense, and *āsatti* or *saṃnidhi* which stands for the contiguity of the words. These three conditions for the understanding of the correlation of the words in a sentence were first promulgated by the Mīmāṃsaka-s,² and later taken up by all the other systems of thought with slight changes; and, the normal statement of the conditions for *śābdabodha*, or the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, is that it must possess *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *āsatti*.³ To these some have later added a fourth condition, namely, the knowledge of *tātparya*, the

¹ *Mahābhāṣya*pradīpa, under Pāṇini II. 1. 1: *iha vyapekṣāyām samāso na bhavati, ekārthibhāve vākyam neti*.

² Kumārilabhaṭṭa, *Tantravārttika*, vol. I, p. 455:

*ākāṅkṣā saṃnidhānam ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam
saṃbandhakāraṇatvena kṛtaṃ nānantaraśrutiḥ.*

(Mutual expectancy, proximity and congruity constitute the grounds of relationship; mere immediate sequence is not a ground of relationship).

³ Faddegon refers (*The Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 61) to the use of the terms *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi* by Kumārilabhaṭṭa in the *Śloka-vārttika*, and says that the terms are not used there in the exact sense in which they are used by later writers. He seems to have missed the reference to the terms in the *Tantravārttika* given above. The term *ākāṅkṣā* is used even by Pāṇini, though not in a technical sense (VIII. 2. 96 and 104).

intention of the speaker or the general purport of the sentence. Of these the greatest linguistic importance has to be given to *ākānksā*.

*Ākānksā*¹ consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word; literally it is the desire on the part of the listeners to know the other words or their meaning to complete the sense. A word is said to have *ākānksā* for another, if it cannot, without the latter, produce knowledge of its inter-connection in an utterance. In every language certain words necessarily require certain other words to complete the sense. Thus a noun in the nominative case requires a verb to convey a complete meaning; a verb like 'bring' has expectancy for a word denoting some object.² A string of words such as 'cow, horse, man, elephant'³ does not convey a complete sense, as there is no connection between them owing to lack of *ākānksā*.

The Mimāṃsaka-s are not quite clear in distinguishing between syntactic expectancy and psychological expectancy. and Bhartṛhari actually criticizes their definition of a sentence on the ground that its *ākānksā* would imply that a passage of several grammatical

¹ Derived from the root *kānks*, 'to desire'.

² *Tarkasamgraha*, p. 30: *padasya padāntaravyatirekaprayuktānvayānanubhāvakatvam ākānksā*; *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 3: *tatra padārthānām parasparajijñāsāviśayatvayogyatvam ākānksā, kriyāśravaṇe kāraṇasya, kāra-kaśravaṇe kriyāyāḥ, karaṇaśravaṇe itikartavyatāyās ca jijñāsāviśayatvāt*.

³ 'gaur aśvaḥ puruṣo hasti'. Or even a string of words like 'daśa dāḍimāni ṣaḍ apūpāḥ kuṇḍam ajājinam palalapiṇḍaḥ adharorukam etat kumāryāḥ sphaiyakṛtasya pītā pratiśṇaḥ'. (*Mbh*, I, pp. 1 and 38)

‘sentences’ would have to be considered as one sentence.¹ Śālikanātha, the follower of Prabhākara, says that *ākāṅkṣā*, being the curiosity on the part of the listeners has been explained by some on the basis of invariable association; thus an action implies an agent, a place, an instrument and so on, and similarly, an agent or an instrument naturally implies an action to complete its sense. This view is criticized on the ground that there is no end to the curiosities aroused in the minds of the listeners through such associations.² Only those that are essential for the accomplishment of the intended purpose need be taken as the requirements; the omission by the speaker of the particular nature of the instrument, place, etc. for the action recommended shows that he is indifferent about it. Thus, ‘Bring the cow’ is a complete sentence, even though the instrument is not mentioned; ‘with a stick’ is added, if that is intended, otherwise it is implied that the listener is to bring the cow by some means or other. Thus the scope of *ākāṅkṣā* depends on the intention of the speaker. Even though the sentence ‘Bring the cow’ is complete and has no *ākāṅkṣā* outside itself, if the phrase ‘with a stick’ is added, that new phrase is in need of the verb for syntactic completeness,

¹ VP, II. 3. See J. Brough, op. cit., p. 163.

² *Vākyārthamātrikāvṛtti*, p. 5: *kā punar iyaṁ ākāṅkṣā? pratipattur jijñāsā. Kiṃnibandhanā punar asau? avinābhāvanibandhaneti kecit. kriyā hi kārakāvinābhāvinīti tāṃ pratītya kārakam jijñāsate. evaṃ kārakam api buddhvā kriyām iti. tad ayuktam iti māṇyante. jijñāsā tathā tadīya-janakatat-kriyātat-kārakāntarādijijñāsām apy āpadyate.*

and hence 'Bring the cow with a stick' becomes a single sentence. In the case of an elliptical sentence like '—the door', that word itself requires some verb for syntactic completeness.

According to the Advaita Vedāntin-s, however, there is *ākāṅkṣā* between words, not only when one actually implies the other, but also when it may possibly imply it. Thus there are two kinds of *ākāṅkṣā*: *utthit-ākāṅkṣā* or actual and natural expectancy of one word for the other to make a complete sense, and *utthāpy-ākāṅkṣā* or potential expectancy which could be roused if necessary.¹ For example in the sentence 'Bring the cow', one may ask the question 'What kind of cow?', and hence the word 'cow' may possibly imply adjectives like 'white' or 'old'; there is no limit to the possibilities of such potential expectancies. According to this view the *ākāṅkṣā* that exists between words in a sentence must be mutual and not one-sided; in some cases the expectancy in one direction may be direct and natural, while in the other direction it is only potential; thus in the sentence 'Bring the white cow' the word 'cow' has only a potential expectancy towards the adjective 'white', whereas the adjective 'white' has a direct and natural expectancy for the substantive 'cow'.

The Mīmāṃsaka-s explain *ākāṅkṣā* not only on the basis of the syntactic incompleteness of the sentence,

¹ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 113; S. C. Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 367; *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 4-7.

but also on the basis of the psychological incompleteness of the idea.¹ They are concerned with the interpretation of the Vedic injunctions; but the two schools of Mīmāṃsā, the Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa, differ in their views as to what an injunction really means. According to the Prābhākara school, every Vedic injunction is to be considered as a command (*niyoga*); the person who is enjoined to do something has to do it, not because it will bring about some beneficial result, but simply because it is the command.² The law is to be obeyed because it is the law, not because of the fear of punishment or the expectation of reward. The action may bring about some fruit, but there is no expectancy for it. A command is not a tempting offer. Hence according to the Prābhākara school the three essential psychological *ākāṅkṣā*-s are for *viṣaya* or the act enjoined, for *niyojya* or the person who is enjoined to do it and for *karana* or the means of doing it. Thus in the passage *viśvajitā yajeta* (The Viśvajit sacrifice is to be performed) there is no mention of the *niyojya* or the functionary; therefore to complete the meaning we take the word *svargakāmaḥ* (one who is desirous of heaven) as understood.³

¹ *Vākyaarthamāṭrkāvṛtti*, p. 7:

*anvitasyaḥbhidhānārtham uktārthaghaṭanāya vā
pratīyogini jijnāsā yā sākāṅkṣeti gīyate.*

abhidhānāparyavasānam abhidheyāparyavasānam ca jijnāsodayanibandhanam.

² C. Kunhan Raja, 'In Defence of Mīmāṃsā', *ALB*, 1952, p. 178 f.; Introduction to *Brhatī* (Madras University Sanskrit Series, 3), p. 24; *Nyāyaratnamālā*, ch. III.

³ The well-known line in the *Bhagavadgītā* denouncing the expectation of the results while doing one's duties (*karman्य evādhikāraṣte*

But according to the Bhāṭṭa school the content of an injunction is the realization that the action enjoined is productive of some beneficial result. Kumārila says that not even a fool will act without a purpose.¹ The *ākāṅkṣā* of the Vedic injunction is for the *itikartavyatā* or the act enjoined, for the *sādhana* or *karaṇa* or the means, and for the *phala* or the fruit of the action. There is no special *ākāṅkṣā* for the person who is to do it; anyone interested in the fruit will do it. Thus in the sentence *viśvajitā yajeta* the additional word *svargakāmaḥ* is to satisfy the *ākāṅkṣā* regarding the fruit of action. In this way the two schools of Mīmāṃsā give two different sets of *ākāṅkṣā* according to the difference in the interpretation of the psychological factors involved in an injunction.

An extension of this psychological expectancy is found in the Mīmāṃsā definition of a *mahāvākya* (compound sentence) on the basis of the mutual expectancy of the sentences or clauses that comprise it. It is this interdependence of sentences that makes up a *prakaraṇa* or topic. Among the sentences in a particular *prakaraṇa*, one is the principal (*aṅgin*) and the others are *aṅga-s* subordinate to it. The general rule is that the principal clause and the subordinate clauses which are mutually connected together by expectancy, consistency and proximity form a *mahāvākya*, when they serve a

mā phaleṣu kadācana) seems to imply this view of Prabhākara. Kumārila-bhaṭṭa rejects this theory of action without the expectation of any result.

¹ *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 653: *prayojanam anuddiśya na mando 'pi pravartate*.

single purpose.¹ Thus there is sentence unity in the following: 'He shall sacrifice; heaven is the reward; a goat is the oblation; Agni is the deity.' Here all the sentences have the same purpose, namely, the performance of the sacrifice. This syntactic unity or *ekavākyatā* is based on a twofold relation: that of a word to a sentence (*padaikavākyatā*) and that of a sentence to another sentence (*vākyaikavākyatā*). According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s only injunctive sentences have direct significance; the others are *arthavāda*-s,² i.e. corroborative and eulogistic sentences, and are subordinate. The *arthavāda*-s can indicate their meaning only as syntactically connected with the injunctive sentences. The relation of an *arthavāda* to an injunction is that of a word to a sentence to which it forms a part. This is called *padaikavākyatā*. But when sentences which are complete in respect of their own meanings again combine on the basis of their relationship, one being principal and the others subordinate, they form a syntactic unity; this is called *vākyaikavākyatā*.³

¹ *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 442; *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, III. 7. 4:—*tad vākyam hi tadarthatvāt*.

² *Arthavāda* is of three kinds: (i) *guṇavāda* or figurative statement, (ii) *anuvāda* which reiterates what is already known and, (iii) *bhūtārthavāda* or a statement of a fact which is not already known and which is not contradictory to known facts. See Madhusūdanasarasvatī, *Prasthānabheda* (Anandasrama ed.), p. 3.

³ Kumārilabhāṭṭa, *Tantravārttika*, p. 366:

*svārthabodhe samāptānām aṅgāṅgitvādyapekṣayā
vākyānām ekavākyatvaṃ punaḥ samhatya jāyate.*

The *ākānksā* or the expectancy that holds between words in a sentence is a grammatical one, and not merely psychological. It is only the need for the syntactic completeness of the sentence. The Naiyāyika-s later made a clear distinction between the psychological *ākānksā* and the grammatical *ākānksā*. They have defined *ākānksā* as a kind of syntactic need which one word has for another in a sentence in order to convey the interrelation of the words.¹ It is the *ākānksā* that leads to the knowledge of the syntactic relation of words in a sentence. The Naiyāyika-s consider that even in the case of a word there should be mutual expectancy between the root or the stem on the one hand and the verbal or nominal suffix on the other.

Nāgeśa, the great grammarian, says ² that *ākānksā* is the desire on the part of the listeners on hearing a word in a sentence to know the idea which can be related to its meaning in order to get a complete sense; thus the expectancy is on the part of the listeners, and not on the part of words or their meanings. It is only

The Vedāntin-s also accept this view. See *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* IV. 35-6; Huparikar, *The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching*, pp. 443 ff. Among literary critics Viśvanātha defines the *mahāvākya* as a collection of connected sentences. (*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 1: *vākyaocayo mahāvākya*.)

¹ *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 30; *Kusumāñjali* defines it as *padārtha-saṃsargāvagamaprāgabhāvaḥ*. (*Nyāyakośa*, p. 113.)

² *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*, Ākānksā section, p. 33f.: *sā caikapadārthajñāne tadarthānvayayogyārthasya yaj jñānam tadviśayecchā; asyānvayy arthaḥ ka ity evaṃrūpā puruṣaṇiṣṭhaiva, tathāpi tasyāḥ svaviśaye 'rthe āropaḥ*.

in a figurative sense that this expectancy is attributed to the words and their meanings.

Yogyatā

Yogyatā is the logical compatibility or consistency of the words in a sentence for mutual association.¹ Really it involves a judgment on the sense or nonsense of a sentence. When the meaning of a sentence is not contradicted by experience, there is *yogyatā* or consistency between its constituent words. Śālikanātha says² that *yogyatā* demands the words in a sentence to have competence for mutual connection, and that this competence is to be known from experience. In the sentence 'He wets it with water' (*payasā siñcati*), there is *yogyatā* or consistency of meaning, since wetting is generally done with a liquid like water, and there is nothing incompatible between the idea of wetting and that of water. But a sentence like 'He wets it with fire' (*agninā siñcati*) has no *yogyatā* or compatibility, since the idea of wetting is something incongruous with that of fire.

There is difference of opinion about the exact function of *yogyatā* in the comprehension of meaning from a sentence.³ Some Naiyāyika-s hold that a decisive knowledge of *yogyatā* is a pre-requisite for verbal

¹ *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 30: *arthābādho yogyatā*; *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*, p. 36: *parasparānvayaprāyojakadharmavattvam*; *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, vol. III, Śabda section, p. 262: *bādhakapramāvirahaḥ* (*Nyāyakośa*, p. 675).

² *Vākyārthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 9: *kiṃ punar idaṃ yogyatvaṃ nāma? yat sambandhārhatvam. sambandhārham iti katham jñāyate? sambandhitvena dṛṣṭavāt.*

³ Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 257

cognition; others argue that since a decisive knowledge of incompatibility prevents verbal cognition, what is required is only the absence of such a counteracting agent.¹ According to the former view it is a positive condition, whereas according to the latter it is only the absence of an impediment in verbal cognition.

It is necessary to distinguish between inconceivable combinations like 'the circular square' and the conceivable combinations which are against our experience such as 'the rabbit's horn'. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says² that incompatibility with the actual facts does not prevent verbal comprehension, but only the validity of the knowledge. Wittgenstein also says³ that what is conceivable is also possible. Strictly speaking it is the inconceivability of the mutual association of the word-meanings that renders the whole sentence nonsensical; it is not the lack of correlation with the actual facts, but the impossibility of connecting the word-meanings that stands in the way of verbal comprehension. The other condition is not for mere verbal knowledge, but only for a valid judgement.

Sometimes the lack of *yogyatā* may be only apparent and could be explained away by resorting to the

¹ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 676: *bādhaniścayābhāvo yogyatā iti navyā āhuḥ*.

² *Vārttika*, quoted in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, p. 168:

*atyantāsaty api hy arthe jñānaṃ śabdaḥ karoti hi
abādhāt tu pramāṃ atra svataḥprāmāṇyāniścalām.*

See also *Ślokavārttika*, p. 46.

³ *Philosophical Investigations*, 282: 'But the fairy tale only invents what is not the case: it does not talk nonsense.'

metaphorical meaning of a word in the sentence; if the incompatibility is thus removed and *yogyatā* is understood, there is no difficulty in comprehending the meaning of the sentence. The apparent incompatibility of the expressed sense is an essential condition for *lakṣaṇā* or transfer.¹

Samnidhi

Samnidhi or *āsatti* is generally explained as the condition that the words in a sentence should be contiguous in time.² This contiguity or proximity is the uninterrupted utterance or unbroken apprehension of words when they are in juxtaposition. Words uttered at long intervals cannot produce the knowledge of any interrelation among them, even if there be *ākāṅkṣā* and *yogyatā*. If the words are separated by the intervention of irrelevant words, then also the connection of the meaning cannot be understood.

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa distinguishes³ between *samnidhi* and mere immediate sequence of utterance (*anantaraśruti*). He explains *samnidhi* as the continuous moving about of the words or their meanings in the mind (*buddhau viparivṛttiḥ*).⁴ Śālikanātha also explains it in

¹ This is discussed in the chapter on *Lakṣaṇā*.

² *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 30: *padānām avilambenoccāraṇaṃ samnidhiḥ; Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 10: *āsattiś cāvyaavadhānena padajanyapadārthopasthitiḥ*.

³ *Tantravārttika*, p. 455:

*ākāṅkṣā samnidhānaṃ ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam
saṃbandhakāraṇatvena klptaṃ nānantaraśrutiḥ.*

⁴ *ibid.*

the same way.¹ According to the Bhāṭṭa school the lack of *saṃnidhi* is of two kinds: not being uttered together and not being signified by words.² No syntactic relation is possible in the case of the words 'bring . . . the cow' uttered at different times. And a sentence such as 'Tie up the cow' cannot have syntactic affinity with the word 'horse', even though the horse is seen in front as requiring to be tied up.³ Thus they hold that syntactic relation is possible only for what have been comprehended through words.⁴

The Prābhākara school, on the other hand, believes⁵ that *saṃnidhi* is only the contiguity of cognition of the sense and not necessarily of words actually uttered. Thus in the case of elliptical sentences the syntactic relation is known by supplying the necessary meaning; the Bhāṭṭa school rejects this view and insists that even in elliptical sentences the syntactic relation is known only by supplying the missing words themselves.⁶

According to the Prābhākara school, again, *saṃnidhi* does not mean simultaneous mental comprehension of

¹ *Vākyaṛthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 8.

² *Mānameyodaya*, p. 99 f.: *saṃnikhitatvābhāvāt śabdabodhitatvābhāvāt ca dvedhā saṃnidhyabhāvo bhavati*.

³ *ibid.*: p. 100: 'gām badhāna' ity atra bandhanāpekṣasya dṛṣya-mānasyāśvasya śabdābodhitatvād evānavayaḥ.

⁴ *ibid.*, *śabdapratipannānām evānvaya itī niyamaḥ siddhaḥ*.

⁵ *Vākyaṛthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 9:

*saṃnidhiḥ śabdajanmaiva vyutpattau nopalakṣaṇam
adhyāhṛtenāpy arthena loke saṃbandhadarśanāt.*

⁶ *Mānameyodaya*, p. 101: *śabdādhyāhāra eva syād ity evaṃ mādṛśām matam*. This point is explained in detail in the section on elliptical sentences, pp. 169 ff.

the words; as in the case of *ākāṅkṣā* it works step by step in the order of sequence in which they are cognized.¹ The mutual connection of the meanings of words is comprehended step by step along with the knowledge of *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*. In the sentence 'Bring the cow, which is white, with a stick' (*gām ānaya śuklām daṇḍena*), first the word 'cow' is known as related to the verb 'bring'; then this connected sense is related to the meaning of the next word 'white' and later with that of the next. This is on the basis of the *anvitābhīdhāna* theory. Some of the Naiyāyika-s also seem to favour this view.²

According to the early Naiyāyika-s, however, the recollection of the meanings of words is simultaneous. Like perception, recollection is also transient and, therefore, it is impossible to recollect the meanings of individual words one by one and then have a collective cognition. The method of simultaneous comprehension is explained on the analogy of 'the pigeons on the threshing floor';³ just as pigeons, young and old, come down together to pick up grains, so also in a

¹ *Vākyārthamāṭṛkāvṛtti*, p. 9: *ākāṅkṣāvac ca saṃnidhāv api saṃnidhāpakakramenaiva kramo veditavyaḥ*.

² *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 306:

*yad yad ākāṅkṣitaṃ yogyam saṃnidhānam prapadyate,
tena tenānvitaḥ svārthaḥ padair evāvagamyaṭe.*

(See also *Vākyārthamāṭṛkāvṛtti*, p. 5.

³ It is called *khalekapotanyāya*. See *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 305:

*vṛddhā yuvānaḥ śiśavaḥ kapotāḥ khale yathāmi yugapat patanti
tathaiva sarve yugapat padārthāḥ paraspareṇānvayino bhavanti.*

sentence the meanings of words become interrelated simultaneously.

The Navya-Nyāya school defines *āsatti* or *saṁnidhi* as an immediate recollection of the meanings of words through their expressive power or *lakṣaṇā*;¹ even if the words are separated, as it sometimes happens in a verse, there is *āsatti*, if the meanings of the words are recollected without any interruption. This *āsatti* itself is the cause of verbal comprehension, not the knowledge of *āsatti* as the early Naiyāyika-s believed.² This recollection is explained as collective cognition (*samūhā-lambanajñāna*). The perception of each word leaves its impression on the mind, and when the last word is uttered, its last letter acts as a stimulus, and a collective recollection follows. It is a single cognition arising out of the contact of the senses with a collection of objects.³

Elliptical Sentences

In the case of an elliptical sentence where the intended meaning is understood from the context even though some of the words necessary for syntactic completeness are not actually expressed, what is the process of verbal comprehension? Do we have to supply the omitted words before we can get the meaning of

¹ *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, quoted in *Nyāyakośa*, p. 135: *ṛtityā padajanyapadārthopasthitih*.

² *ibid.*: *sā ca svarūpasatī śābdabodhahetuḥ, na tu jñātā*.

³ Huparikar, *The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching*, pp. 436 ff.

the sentence, or do we supply the general meaning from the context and understand the sentence?

The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsaka-s holds that it is easier to supply the necessary meaning than to presume the missing words as implied.¹ The presence of the word can be taken as implied only after understanding the meaning to be supplied in the context; when that meaning is known, it is unnecessary to presume the existence of the words, since we are interested in the meanings, and not in the words. Moreover, the presence of a word is not essential for the recollection of its meaning.² Therefore, the Prābhākara-s argue that in all such cases it is the omitted meaning, not the actual word, that is to be supplied. This is known as the *arthādhyāhāra* view.

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa and his followers reject this view and maintain that in all such cases it is necessary to supply the omitted words themselves in order that we may have the verbal comprehension of meaning.³ In ordinary conversation when an incomplete sentence such as '—the door' is heard, we take along with it, as understood, some word like 'close' or 'open' to form

¹ *supra*, p. 167, n. 5; *Mānameyodaya*, p. 100: *gurus tu buddhisamnidhimātram eva samnidhiṃ manyate, na tu śabdasaṃnidhiṃ.*

² *Vākyaarthamātrikāvṛtti*, p. 8: *na ca vācyaṃ śabda evādhyāhriyate, sa cārtham upakalpayatīti, anupayogād apramāṇakatvāc ca.*

³ *Mānameyodaya*, p. 101:

*śabdasyaivānvayārhalvād dvāram āvriyatām iti
śabdādhyāhāra eva syād ity evaṃ māṇṣām matam.*

a syntactically complete sentence. So also in the Vedic injunction *viśvajitā yajeta* (the Viśvajit sacrifice is to be performed) we have to supply the word *svargakāmaḥ* (by one who desires heaven) in order to satisfy the expectancy and make it a complete sentence. Syntactic expectancy has to be satisfied by supplying the actual words missing.¹ Verbal comprehension is possible only from syntactically complete sentences, and therefore the view about the supplying of the meaning is not acceptable. There are different means of cognition such as perception and inference, by which meaning may be understood; thus the idea of a pot may be conveyed by just pointing to it.² Combinations of more than one means are also possible, as in the sentence 'Take *this*', and pointing to the object intended. Similarly one who sees a flash of white and hears the neighing and the noise of galloping may understand that a white horse is galloping, even without the cognition of the words expressing the idea;³ but this knowledge is arrived at either from inference or *arthāpatti* (postulation or immediate inference from negative concomitance) and is not, therefore, verbal. The Vedāntin-s and the Naiyāyika-s also agree with the Bhāṭṭa view of supplying the omitted words.

¹ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 113: *śābdī hy ākāṅkṣā śabdenaiva prapūryate*.

² Huparikar, op. cit., p. 441.

³ *Ślokavārttika*, p. 947:

*paśyataḥ śvetimārūpaṃ heṣāśabdaṃ ca śṛnvataḥ
kḥuranispeṣaśabdaṃ ca śveto 'śvo dhāvatīti dhīḥ.*

(*padādhyāhāra*) in the case of incomplete sentences in order to have verbal comprehension.¹

According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s it is through *arthāpatti* that we cognize the omitted word or idea in such cases. Etymologically *arthāpatti* means the postulation (*āpatti*) of a fact (*artha*); it is the process by which we get the knowledge of a fact that explains what is otherwise unaccountable.² Śābara says that it is the postulation of some fact, when what is seen or heard is otherwise inexplicable.³ Thus on seeing that Devadatta, who is known to be alive, is not at home, his presence outside is presumed; on hearing that Devadatta who is fat does not eat during day-time, it is presumed that he eats at night. In such cases the postulation of a fact is necessary to explain two known facts that are apparently contradictory. Śābara refers to two types of *arthāpatti*: *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* or postulation from what is seen, and *śrūtārthāpatti* or postulation from what is heard.

According to the Prābhākara school,⁴ *arthāpatti* consists in the postulation of a fact and not of a word,

¹ *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, IV. 11: *śrūta-padārthasthale tatta'padādhyāhārah;* *Siddhānta-muktāvali*, p. 308: *yatra dvāram ity uktam tatra pidhehi'yādī-padasya jñānād eva bodhaḥ, na tu pidhānādirūpārthajñānāt.*

² *Mānameyodaya*, p. 118: *anyathānupapatyā yad upapādakakalpanam tad arthāpattiḥ.*

³ *Śābarabhāṣya* p. 83: *arthāpattir api dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārīho 'nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā.*

⁴ *Vākyaarthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 8f.: *na ca dvāram itī yatrādhyāhāras tatrāpy āvriyatām samvriyatām itī vā kalpayitum arthāpatteḥ prabhaviṣṇutā, sāmānyakalpanāmātrahetutvāt.*

and hence even in the case of elliptical sentences, it is only the general meaning that can be cognized through it. But Kumārilabhaṭṭa explains *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* as postulation from what is experienced, and gives a new interpretation for *śrutārthāpatti*:¹ it is the postulation of the omitted words to make out the syntactic relation in the case of elliptical sentences. The Prābhākara school does not accept such an interpretation for *śrutārthāpatti*.

The Vedāntin-s follow the Bhāṭṭa school in their view about elliptical sentences.² The Naiyāyika-s also agree with them in emphasizing the necessity of supplying the actual words in the case of incomplete sentences in order to have verbal comprehension;³ but they do not accept *arthāpatti* as a separate means of cognition; instead they include it under inference based on an invariable concomitance between the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle term (*anumāna* of the *kevalavyatirekin* type).⁴

Incomplete sentences are of two kinds: the normal elliptical sentence where the syntactic expectancy is not fully satisfied, and the syntactically complete sentence

¹ *Mānameyodaya*, p. 129:

*yatra tv aparipūrṇasya vākyaśānvayasiddhaye
śabdo 'dhyāhriyate tatra śrutārthāpattir isyate.*

See also *Śloka-vārttika*, section on *Arthāpatti*.

² *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, IV. 11: *aśrutapadārthasthale tattatpadādhyāhāraḥ.*

³ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 16 f: *naiyāyikāḥ śabdādhyāhāra eva svikriyate, na tv arthādhyāhāraḥ.* Also *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 308 f.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 79: *atra naiyāyikāḥ—arthāpattir na pramāṇāntaram,, kiṃ tu vyatirekavyāptyā anumāne 'ntarbhāvād iti.*

where the psychological expectancy is not fully satisfied.¹ Bhoja in his *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* distinguishes these two types clearly; he calls the former *adhyāhāra* and the latter *vākyaśeṣa*.² Both are incomplete sentences leaving something to be understood; in *adhyāhāra* the sentence is syntactically incomplete and requires the postulation of the necessary word as understood, whereas in *vākyaśeṣa* it is the idea that is incomplete. Owing to the purposive nature of speech, it is held that the ultimate meaning of every sentence is to influence some action. Even in cases where it is not actually expressed, it has to be understood as implied. Thus the sentence 'The road is full of thieves' means 'Do not go that way' and the sentence 'There are crocodiles in that pond' means that one should not bathe in it. These ideas are understood through *vākyaśeṣa*.³

Bhoja seems to be striking a middle path between the two extreme views adopted by the two schools of *Mīmāṃsā*. In the case of elliptical sentences it is better to supply the actual words to remove the syntactic expectancy; but it is too much to assume that further ideas suggested or implied by the sentence have to be

¹ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 79: *śrutārthāpattiś ca dvividhā, abhidhānānupapattir abhihitānupapattiś ca*.

² V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, p. 177. See the quotation there from Bhoja: *śabdākāṅkṣānivartako 'dhyāhārah, arthākāṅkṣānivartako vākyaśeṣaḥ*.

³ *ibid.*: *sarvavākyaṇām vidhiniṣedhaparyavasāyivāt sākṣāt tadaśrutāo api tadupakalpanam vākyaśeṣaḥ, . . . sacoraḥ panthā ity ukte na gantavyam grāhāḥ sarity asyām ity ukte na snātavyam iti vākyaśeṣo bhavati*.

arrived at through the postulation of the actual words expressing them.

Bhartṛhari discusses the problem of the elliptical sentences in the second chapter of the *Vākyapadīya*.¹ He has no difficulty in explaining them at all, for from his point of view there is no elliptical sentence at all. If what appears to be part of a sentence is capable of conveying a complete sense in the particular context in which it is used, that is also to be considered as a complete sentence. The sentence is an indivisible unit, and the division into words, stems and suffixes is only an artificial means of analysing the language. The meaning of an utterance is that which is conveyed to the listeners by uttering it; there is no other definition of meaning.² Even a noun is a sentence, if it implies the verb and gives a complete idea; similarly a verb is a sentence if it gives a complete idea. If Devadatta is known by Deva or Datta, all the three should be considered as different names for the same person; so also if by uttering 'tree' the idea of the sentence 'The tree exists' is understood, the two expressions are to be considered as two different sentences. The shorter one cannot be taken as part of the longer one.

A similar view about the nature of elliptical sentences is given by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigation*: 'The sentence is "elliptical", not because it

¹ VP, II. 326 ff.

² *ibid.*, v. 328:

*yasmimś tūccarite śabde yadā yo 'rthaḥ pratiyate
tam āhur arthaṁ tasyaiva nānyad arthasya lakṣaṇam.*

leaves out something that we think when we utter it, but because it is shortened—in comparison with a particular paradigm of our grammar.’¹

Tātparyajñāna

According to some of the later Naiyāyika-s a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker is an essential factor in all cases of verbal comprehension. But they did not take the extreme view held by Schiller² that the meaning of any utterance is the notion actually present in the mind of the speaker; but, like Sir A. Gardiner,³ they considered that ‘the meaning of any sentence is what the speaker intends to be understood from it by the listener’. It is possible for the same sign to belong to different psychological contexts; a word may mean different things in different cases. Even the same thing can be examined from different angles without exhausting its characters; but from the linguistic point of view we are only concerned with so much of the thing as is required to elucidate what the speaker intended the listener to understand.⁴

Some of the Naiyāyika-s who give great importance to the speaker’s intention in fixing the meaning of an utterance maintain that even in ordinary sentences like

¹ § 20.

² F. W. Thomas, ‘Parts of Speech’, *TPS*, 1949, p. 130 n.

³ ‘The Definition of the Word and the Sentence’, *British Journal of Psychology*, p. 361.

⁴ A. Gardiner, *The Theory of Speech and Language*, p. 52. He discusses the problem under ‘Depth of Intention’.

‘Bring the pot’ (*ghaṭam ānaya*), it is the intention of the speaker that gives the meaning of ‘pot’ to the word *pot*; they say that if the intention of the speaker were otherwise, the word could, through *lakṣaṇā*, or the secondary significative power, indicate even a piece of cloth.¹ They also hold that it is the incompatibility of the expressed sense with the intention of the speaker that prompts the listener to interpret a passage by resorting to *lakṣaṇā*; thus, they say that in the sentence ‘The village is on the Ganges’ (*gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*) it is the intention of the speaker that gives the meaning ‘the bank of the Ganges’ to the word ‘Ganges’, and that if the intention of the speaker had been otherwise, the word ‘village’ could mean even a fish.² This view ignores completely the status of language as an objective instrument of communication,³ or, as F. W. Thomas rightly points out,⁴ the speaker’s intention and the normal signification have to be clearly distinguished. Linguistic discourse is impossible without assuming normal signification for words independently of the intention of the speaker. Humpty Dumpty said: ⁴ ‘When *I* use a word, it means just what *I* choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’ If such a view is accepted, no one can understand what

¹ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 327: *pare tu ghaṭādisābdasthale ’pi ghaṭapadam kumbhaparam lakṣaṇayā paṭaparam veti samśaye ghaṭasābdabodhābhāvāt sarvatra tātparyaniścayaḥ kāraṇam ity āhuḥ.*

² See the chapter on *Lakṣaṇā*.

³ loc. cit.

⁴ Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*, ch. VI.

the other means when he says something. 'What I intended to refer to may be quite the other than what I did refer to, a fact which it is important to remember, if it is hoped to reach mutual comprehension.'¹

The Vedāntin-s reject this extreme view of the Naiyāyika-s regarding the importance of the speaker's intention in determining the meaning of an utterance. When a parrot or a gramophone repeats human expression, or when an illiterate Brahmin chants the Vedic hymns without understanding the meaning, the listeners can interpret them, even though there is no real intention on the part of the speaker in such cases.² The Naiyāyika-s say that the intention need not be that of the actual speaker, but could sometimes be traced to the original author of the statement.³ In the case of the Vedic sentences the Naiyāyika-s assume the intention of God.⁴ But according to the Vedāntin-s and the Mimāṃsaka-s the existence of God is not accepted by all people and should not therefore be brought into consideration in the explanation of linguistic phenomena. They maintain that every word has an inherent capacity to express its meaning, and even the sentence has a natural capacity to produce the cognition of a unified sense in the form of the

¹ Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 182.

² *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, IV. 38.

³ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 326: *prayuktā cābhisandhāpayitṛmātram na tu vaktāiva*.

⁴ Even in the case of the parrot the Naiyāyika-s assume the intention of God, and not that of the people whom it imitates; see *Nyāyakośa*, p. 326: *śukavākye bhagavadicchaiva gatiḥ*.

mutual association of the word-meanings.¹ The primary meaning of a word is a power innate in the word itself on the basis of the natural and permanent relation that exists between the word and the thing meant by it. The Mīmāṃsakas' habit of attending too exclusively to the 'revealed' texts of the Veda-s probably encouraged them to formulate a theory of verbal comprehension without any reference to the speaker at all. Even a sentence which is unintelligible to the speaker has an inherent capacity to convey its meaning. Thus the phrase 'the pot in the room' conveys the relation of the pot and the room without any help of the speaker's intention.

The Vedāntin-s admit, however, that the knowledge of the speaker's intention plays an important role in the comprehension of meaning in the case of ambiguous expressions. Thus in the case of equivocal expressions the meaning is restricted to one of the senses, in the absence of the speaker's intention to convey the other sense also.²

It is to be remembered that the difference in the views of the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s (as well as the Vedāntin-s who follow them) regarding the part played by the speaker's intention in determining the meaning of a sentence is ultimately due to the difference in their views as to the nature of the knowledge derived

¹ *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 38-43.

² See *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 41, where in the definition of *tātparyā* the qualification *tadanyapratīticchayānuccaritatvam* is added to *tatpratītijananayogyatvam*.

from language. According to the Naiyāyika-s, *śabda*, as a means of knowledge, is valid verbal testimony and it consists in the statement of a trustworthy person.¹ This is always based on the words of some trustworthy person, human or divine. But according to the Vedāntin-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s, verbal testimony has self-evident validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*); significant combination of words constitutes a sentence which conveys ideas, without any reference to the intention of the speaker.² Even in the case of word-meanings, the Mīmāṃsaka-s believe that the significative power is inherent in the words themselves, while the Naiyāyika-s hold that it is imported into the words by the will of God or of the speaker. The Naiyāyika-s give the name *tātparya* to the meaning intended by the speaker; but the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s use the term for the meaning conveyed by the capacity of the words themselves.

Even among the Naiyāyika-s there is much difference of opinion regarding the importance of the speaker's intention as a factor in the understanding of the meaning of a passage.³ Some of them believe that the speaker's intention need not be treated as a separate condition of verbal comprehension, since it could be included under *ākāṅkṣā* itself, for according to

¹ *Nyāyasūtra*, I. 1. 7: *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*.

² S. C. Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 345 ff., 381 ff.

³ *Nyāyakōśa*, p. 326 f.; Kuppuswami Sastri, op. cit., p. 257.

them, *ākāṅkṣā* is to be taken as the need one word has for another in order to convey the intended meanings of the speaker.¹ Thus, in the statement, '*ayam eti putro—rājñah—puruṣo 'pasāryatām*' (Here comes the son—of the king—the man should be removed), it is the knowledge of the speaker's intention that decides that the word '*rājñah*' (of the king) is to be construed with the word '*putra*' (son), and not with '*puruṣa*' (man), to satisfy its *ākāṅkṣā*.

According to some others the knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker is essential for verbal comprehension, only in cases of equivocal terms and ambiguous expressions. Thus, when a man is asked to bring *saindhava*, he has to infer from contextual factors the meaning intended by the speaker before understanding what he has to do, since the word '*saindhava*' means both 'salt' and 'horse'.² Nāgeśa, the grammarian, also accepts the importance of knowing the speaker's meaning in such equivocal expressions.³

Gaṅgeśopādhyāya and Viśvanātha hold that a knowledge of the *tātparya* is the fourth requisite, along with *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*, for verbal comprehension. According to these Naiyāyika-s *tātparya* is the

¹ *Tarkaprakāśa* quoted in *Nyāyakośa*, p. 327: *anye tu . . . ākāṅkṣāghaṭakatayaiva tātparyajñānam hetuḥ, na tu svāntaryeṇa ity āhuḥ.*

² *Nyāyakośa*, p. 327: *kecit tu saindhavam ānetyādau nānārthasthala eva tātparyasamśayādeḥ saṃbhavena tatra tyāśābdabodha eva tātparyaniścayo hetuḥ . . . ity āhuḥ*; see also *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 316.

³ *Laghumañjūsā*, p. 524: *nānārthapadaasthale padaviṣayo 'pi sa tathā. tadgrāhakaṃ ca prakaraṇādīkam.*

meaning intended by the speaker.¹ Other Naiyāyika-s consider that *tātparya* is an all-embracing factor and that it has an important part to play in the working of the first three factors, *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*.²

Even though what is in the mind of the speaker at the time of utterance is something subjective, and not capable of being put to an objective analysis, the idea intended to be conveyed to the listener by the speaker could be determined to a great extent with the help of contextual factors.³ The same sign may belong to different psychological contexts; but 'given the psychological context to which a sign belongs, the reference made by the interpretation is fixed also'.⁴ According to many of the ancient writers on the subject, it is the contextual factors that determine the meaning of an utterance,⁵ and, therefore, these should be considered

¹ S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 448; *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 315: *vaktur icchā tu tātparyam*.

² *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 303: *tātparyagarbhā cāsattiḥ*. See also Y. V. Athalye's notes on *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 343: 'Perhaps, this speaker's intention may be included in the second requisite, *yogyatā*.'

³ What is in the mind of the speaker at the time of utterance may be different from what is intended to be conveyed to the listener, especially in the case of successful lying. Again, what is intended to be conveyed may be quite different from what is actually conveyed by the utterance. The term *tātparya* is used by the Naiyāyika-s in the former sense, and by the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s in the latter sense. It is quite possible that what is actually understood by the listener is different from all these.

⁴ *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 195.

⁵ See the section on 'Contextual Factors', *supra*, pp. 48 ff.

as causes of verbal comprehension. But the Naiyāyika-s reject this view,¹ and maintain that the contextual factors are not helping directly in the understanding of speech, but only indirectly by showing the meaning intended by the speaker.

The importance of knowing the speaker's intention in the understanding of speech is recognized by almost all schools of Indian thought. The difference in their views is mainly based on the degree of emphasis laid on it. There is much truth in the view of the Naiyāyika-s that the meaning of an utterance is what the speaker intends the listener to understand; speech is mainly purposive in nature and can do its function only if the listener understands what is intended to be conveyed by it. But it is also true that for language to be an objective instrument of communication, it must be independent of the personal whims of the speaker; that is why the crude sentences of ordinary speech, whose nuances are commonly indicated by intonation and emphasis, become unsuitable for impersonal, rational logic.² The distinction between the 'locutional sentence form' which depends solely on words, and 'elocutional sentence form' which depends on intonation indicating the speaker's intention is also based on the relative strength between the normal meaning and the speaker's intention.³

¹ *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, p. 315: *na ca tātparyagrāhakāṇām prakaraṇā-dīnām śābdabodhe kāraṇatvam iti vācyaṃ*.

² F. W. Thomas, loc. cit.

³ A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 201. Cf. Humpty Dumpty's remark:

The Mīmāṃsaka-s use the term *tātparya* for the purport of a passage dealing with a topic, and refer to six *līnga-s* or indications by which it could be obtained objectively without any reference to the speaker or the author. These *līnga-s* are: (a) consistency in the meaning between introduction and conclusion (*upakramopasaṃhārau*), (b) repetition of the main topic (*abhyāsa*), (c) the novelty of the subject matter (*apūrvatā*), (d) the result intended (*phala*), (e) corroborative and eulogistic remarks as distinguished from the main theme (*arthavāda*), and (f) arguments in favour of the main topic (*upapatti*).¹

In the case of the sentence also the Mīmāṃsaka-s maintain that the *tātparya* or the real purport meant by it can be studied objectively without any reference to the intention of the speaker. Like the Naiyāyika-s, they also analysed a sentence into two parts, *uddeśya* and *vidheya*, which correspond roughly to the subject and predicate of Western logic.² The first part

‘The question is which is to be master [words or the speaker]—that’s all’ (*Through the Looking Glass*, ch. VI).

¹ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 714:

*upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāso ’pūrvatā phalam
arthavādopapatti ca līngaṃ tātparyanirṇaye.*

The Vedāntin-s also accept them. See also S. Suryanarayana Sastri, ‘A Note on Marks Determinative of Purport’, *Journal of the Madras University*, vol. II, p. 128 f.

² S. C. Chatterjee, op. cit., pp. 375 ff. In Sanskrit the copula is not considered as an essential part of the sentence. Modern writers in the West have also realized that the copula is only a formal element (cf. Bosanquet, *Logic*, vol. I, pp. 81 ff.; A. Gardiner, op. cit., pp. 218 ff.).

(subject)¹ contains a sense that is already existent and is known from other sources (*siddha*), while the other part consists of the meanings that are to be brought into existence (*sādhya*). These two parts are also called *bhūta* and *bhavya*, as well as *anuvādyā* and *vidheya*. The Mīmāṃsaka-s hold that the *tātparya* of a sentence is found only in the *vidheya* portion.² The *anuvādyā* (subject) is that which discloses to the listener what any utterance is about, and is not always indispensable; it is used in a sentence only to help the listener to understand the meaning clearly. From the speaker's standpoint it is enough if the *vidheya* alone is uttered; it is only that part that expresses something new. Thus, in an exclamatory sentence like 'Splendid!' it is only the *vidheya* that is given; the *uddeśya* or subject is to be understood by the listener from the context.³

Great interest attaches to the question whether the subject should come before the predicate or vice versa. Even though in Sanskrit the order of sequence of the words does not normally affect the literal meaning of the sentence, it is held by writers on Mīmāṃsā and literary criticism that the subject must come before the predicate.⁴ The violation of this rule is considered as

¹ *Nyāyakośa*, p. 34: *pramāṇāntarasiddhasya kiṃcid dharmāntaravidhānārtham punar upanyāsyatā*. Wegner calls it 'exposition' (Gardiner, op. cit., p. 265).

² *Kāvyaprakāśa*, V. 47: *yad eva vidheyam tatraiva tātparyam*.

³ A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 265 f.

⁴ This well-known rule is given in the old maxim: *anuvādyam anuktvā ca na vidheyam udīrayet*. This line is supposed to be from

a defect by the literary critics. This defect is called *avimṛṣṭavidheyāṃśa* or *vidheyāvimarśa*.¹ Even though it was considered as a defect, poets were fully conscious that a change in the normal order could heighten the emotional attitude towards the statement.

The Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s who take the sentence to be a concatenation of the individual words that comprise it have necessarily to depend on the power of *tātparya* to explain how a connected meaning is comprehended from a sentence. It is clear that according to this view the sentence expresses something over and above the meanings of the words which compose the sentence. A string of unconnected isolated senses given by the words cannot produce a unified meaning. Or in other words we may say that there are two elements in the sentence-meaning: the meaning of the individual words and the mutual connection of these. We know that the words give their own meanings; the problem is to find out where the element of the relation between the word-meanings comes. The whole is always something more than the sum of the parts; and the Association theory cannot satisfactorily explain from where the additional element comes. *Gestalt* psychologists refer to the Association

Kumārila, but is not found in the *Śloka-vārttika*; Hemacandra quotes it (*Kāvya-nusāsana*, p. 172). See also A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 276 f.

¹ *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, I. 2 and VII. 4. This defect is also explained as that where the predicate is not properly stressed, being made part of a compound. See *Vyaktiviveka*, II, p. 37 and *Kāvya-prakāśa*, VII. 51.

theory as a 'brick and mortar psychology' which explains only from where the bricks come, but not from where the mortar comes. Some Naiyāyika-s explain the problem by resorting to the function of *tātparya*.

Speech is purposive in nature. Learned people use words with the intention of conveying a connected sense. Hence from the use of words in juxtaposition (*samabhivvyāhāra*) it is assumed that the speaker has uttered them with the intention of conveying a connected sense; for the co-utterance would be of no avail, but for such an intention.¹ The *anvitābhidhāna* theory considers that the intention or *tātparya* makes the primary significative power (*abhidhā*) convey the additional significance of the sentence. But according to the *abhihitānvaya* theory, the power of *abhidhā* can give only the word-meanings; it is these word-meanings that convey the additional significance through the power of *lakṣaṇā* based on the strength of *tātparya*, along with the three factors *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṁnidhi*. This function of the sentence to convey the sentence-meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention is called *tātparyavṛtti*² by some early Naiyāyika-s and *saṁsargamaryādā* by the later Naiyāyika-s.³

¹ *Tattvabindu*, p. 131 f.: *pratipitsitam khalv etad iti pratipādayiṣyantaḥ padāny uccārayanti*; see also Kumārilabhattacha (quoted thereon): *viśiṣṭārthaprayuktā hi samabhivvyāhṛtir jane*.

² *Kāvyaprakāśa*, II: *padārthānām samanvaye tātpāryārtho viśeṣavapurapadārtho 'pi vākārthaḥ samullasatīty abhihitānvayavādinām matam*.

³ Kuppeśwami Sastri, op. cit., p. 257 f.; also *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, p. 22. For details see the section on 'Tātparya as a Separate Vṛtti'.

CHAPTER

5

THE COMPREHENSION OF THE
MEANING OF A SENTENCE

ANVITĀBHIDHĀNA AND ABHIHITĀNVAYA

ANVITĀBHIDHĀNA AND ABHIHITĀNVAYA

Relation of words in a Sentence : Bheda or Saṃsarga

IF every word has its own definite meaning, how is it possible for a sentence, which is only a collection of words, to have a unified meaning? The same problem arises in the case of compound words also. Two explanations are given to this question.¹ Vājapyāyana who, like the Mīmāṃsaka-s, held that the meaning of a word is the universal or the *jāti*, said that the meaning of a sentence is the *saṃsarga* or the mutual association of the word-meanings. In the case of a phrase like 'the white cow' (*gauḥ śuklā*), the word 'cow' connotes 'cowness' merely; the other word which is syntactically

¹ Regarding the two views about the import of sentences, see M. Hiriyanna, 'Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana', *IHQ*, vol. XIV, pp. 261 ff.; *Mbh.*, I, p. 364; Puṇyarāja on *VP*, II. 155; Helārāja on *VP*, III, Jāṭisamuddeśa, v. 5; Śabarabhāṣya on *sūtra* II. 1. 46; Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, *Tantravārttika*, p. 446 f.; Pārthasārathimīśra on *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 854 f.

connected with it indicates its association with the quality of whiteness. Thus, the sentence means the association of cowness and whiteness, and as that is one, the words constitute a syntactic unity.¹

Vyāḍi, on the other hand, held that the meaning of a word is any particular (*dravya*) of a class. It is a concrete thing rather than a quality. According to him the function of a word in a sentence is to distinguish the thing it means from all similar things.² Thus, a 'cow' means not so much 'what is characterized by cowness as what is distinguished from a horse. In a sentence words signify things not as having certain attributes, but rather as excluding some. Thus, in the case of the phrase 'the white cow', the word 'cow' can point to any concrete particular, which includes cows of all colours, white, black and so forth; therefore, the word 'white' does not indicate the connection of whiteness with the cow; it should be explained as negatively qualifying the cow, denying all colours other than whiteness to it. Similarly, the term 'white' can denote anything that is white, including white cows, white horses and so on; hence, the term 'cow' in the

¹ Helārāja, loc. cit.: *jātivādinā vājapyāyanasya tu mate samsargo vākyaṛthaḥ sāmānyānām samśleṣamātrārūpatvād vākyaṛthasya*. Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, op. cit., p. 447: *samsargo 'pi padārthānām anyonyenānu-rāñjanam . . . gotve śuklatvasamsargaḥ, śuklatve vā gotvasamsargaḥ*.

² Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, loc. cit.: *bhedo nāma padārthānām vyavacchedaḥ paraśparam . . . vyaktipadārthapakṣe sarvavyaktinām gavādīpa-denaivopāttatvād viśayaśabdaiḥ śuklādibhiḥ kṛṣṇādivyavacchedamātram vaktavyam*. Helārāja, loc. cit. *vyāḍimate bhedo vākyaṛthaḥ, pada-vācyānām dravyānām dravyāntaranivṛttitātparyeṇābhīdheyatvāt*.

phrase, means only the exclusion of all white things other than cows. In this view of Vyāḍi we find the early stage of the Apoha doctrine maintained by the Buddhists.¹ Kumārilabhaṭṭa also refers to this view, that the import of a sentence is *bheda* or the mutual exclusion of the word-meanings.²

Kaiyaṭa says³ that these two views are not mutually exclusive, since each view implies the other. In the discussion of the meaning of the term *sāmarthya*, which is given by Pāṇini as the condition that should exist between the members of a compound word, Patañjali says⁴ that, according to some, *sāmarthya* means either *saṃsarga* (mutual association) or *bheda* (exclusion). Even though Patañjali is discussing compound words, the principle involved is the same.

Anvitābhidhāna Theory of Verbal Comprehension

Prabhākara and his followers denied that words convey a meaning except in the context of a sentence, even though they regarded words as real and actual constituents of language. Each word has a definite

¹ This is discussed separately in the section on Apoha, *supra*, pp. 78 ff. Note that Diñnāga's theory about the import of sentences is the same. Thus, in the phrase 'the blue lotus', he also maintains that the term 'blue' means the exclusion of all lotuses that are not blue and the term 'lotus' means the exclusion of all blue things that are not lotuses.

² *Tantravārttika*, p. 447.

³ *Pradīpa* under *Vārttika* 2 on Pāṇini, II, 1. 1: *tatra bhedaḥ saṃsargāvinābhāvito'ād anumīyamānasasargah sāmarthyam, saṃsargo vā bhedāvinābhāvyanyumeyabhedaḥ.*

⁴ *Mbh.* I, p. 364: *āpara āha bhedasasargau vā sāmarthyam iti.*

meaning, but it is also clear that the purpose of the word is to serve as part of a sentence. On hearing the words of a sentence, we get a unitary sense which is the meaning of the sentence. The problem is whether this unitary sense arises directly from the collection of the words, or indirectly through the recollection of the meanings of the individual words that comprise it. The *anvitābhīdhāna* theory takes the former view, while the *abhihitānvaya* theory takes the latter.

The meaning of a sentence is made up of the individual word-meanings and their mutual relation. According to the *anvitābhīdhāna* theory, both the individual word-meanings and their mutual relation are conveyed by the words themselves; but according to the *abhihitānvaya* theory, the words convey only the individual word-meanings; the mutual relation is conveyed by the word-meanings, and not by the words. Among modern writers on linguistics, Wundt seems to represent the *anvitābhīdhāna* theory; for he says that 'in determining the nature of a sentence, no addition to what is expressed by the words should be assumed'.¹ Polemizing against this view, Paul maintains the *abhihitānvaya* view that such an assumption is usually necessary.² The commonplace statement in modern linguistics that the sentence is the unit of speech³ is comparable to the *anvitābhīdhāna* theory.

¹ A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 58.

² ibid.; see also Paul, *Prinzipien*, p. 130 n. 1. His leanings towards the *abhihitānvaya* theory are not quite clear.

³ A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 63.

The statement of procedure adopted by the followers of the *anvitābhidhāna* theory is quite similar to many modern statements. 'Thus a root or suffix is analysed out on the basis of a paradigm, and complete words are recognized on the basis of substitution in sentences.'¹ The Prābhākara-s who follow the *anvitābhidhāna* theory lay particular stress on the natural method by which children learn the meaning of words. It is by watching the usage and activity of elders in daily life that children come to know the significance of words.² One person, addressing another, says, 'Bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*); the latter thus addressed immediately brings the cow. A child, who hears the sentence uttered by the former and observes the action that follows, infers vaguely that the meaning of the sentence is a command to carry out the act of bringing the cow. At this stage what the child understands is only that the whole of that statement means the whole of what is signified. Later, the child hears one man saying to another, 'Bring the horse' (*aśvam ānaya*), and observes the latter bringing the horse. From this he again infers that the meaning of this sentence is a command to carry out the act of bringing the horse. By comparing the two sentences he understands that the term 'bring' (*ānaya*)

¹ J. Brough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', p. 165.

² *Vākyārthamāyrikāvṛtti*, p. 5; *Śloka-vārttika*, Sambandhākṣepa section, vv. 140-1; *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, Śabda section; *Kāvyaprakāśa*, V. See also the section on 'How Do We Learn the Meaning of Words?', *supra*, pp. 26 ff.

common to the two sentences must mean the command to bring, and that the terms 'cow' (*gām*) and 'horse' (*aśvam*) must refer to the two different animals. Thus by comparing the various sentences uttered by people and by observing the action produced, the child is able, by the mental process of exclusion and inclusion (*āvāṇa* and *udvāṇa* or *anvaya* and *vyatireka*) to have a general idea about the meaning of individual words. This process of substitution is natural and subconscious, rather than deliberate and conscious. Later, the child is able to understand the meanings of even new sentences containing the words he has already come across.¹

It is only the injunctive sentences that normally produce a visible reaction on the part of the listeners, and therefore, it is only from such sentences in the imperative (or potential) mood that the meanings of words can be naturally understood.² The Mīmāṃsaka's preoccupation with the injunctions of the Vedic texts with regard to religious duties led to the view that a typical sentence should be in the imperative mood, since the whole direct denotation of the Veda must, according to them, lie in enjoining something to be done. In cases where such an interpretation is not

¹ Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, p. 135 f.

² *ibid.*, p. 136; *Mānameyodaya*, p. 92. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s, reaction on the part of the listener is visible even in the case of indicative sentences. Thus, *putras te jātaḥ* (A son is born to you) may produce joy, and *kanyā te garbhīṇī* (Your unmarried daughter is *enceinte*) a shock of despair to a father.

possible, the comprehension of meaning must depend upon something indirectly connected with the injunction. The Vedāntin-s, on the other hand, held that the direct denotation of the important Vedic texts lies not in commanding something, but in pointing out some well-established facts; thus to them the importance lies in indicative sentences. The later Indian logic also deals with such indicative sentences. Prabhākara holds that even in the case of indicative sentences, the comprehension of the denotation of the words can be obtained only by observing the usage of elders, and that this can be known only from injunctive sentences.¹

If the meanings of words can be known only when they occur in injunctive sentences, it follows that every word must express its meaning only as related to the other factors of the injunction. The verb denoting the command to do the act is the principal word in a sentence, and the remaining words possess a meaning only in relation to the action. Thus, the Prābhākara-s hold that no word can be comprehended as having an independent meaning, when isolated from a sentence. The meaning of words is always understood only as related to something which has to be done (*kārya*). Prabhākara says ² that all usage is through the sentence and its meaning. According to him what is permanent is the relation that the sentence bears to its meaning.³

¹ Jha, loc. cit.

² *Bṛhatī*, p. 188: *vākyaārthena vyavahārah*.

³ *ibid.*, p. 135.

Commenting on that statement, Śālikanātha says: 'The word alone, by itself, never expresses any meaning; it is only the sentence that does it; as is clear from the fact that we learn the meaning of verbal expressions only from the usage of older people,—and this usage is only in the form of sentences; and every single word is understood only in so far as it is related to the other words in the sentence; hence it is established that what is expressive of the meaning is the sentence only, not any word alone by itself.'¹

The Prābhākara-s do not deny the existence of individual words and their isolated meanings; they only assert that it is impossible to comprehend the isolated meaning of a word apart from its relation in a sentence. Words certainly recall their senses separately; but they do not stop with that. Even though the listener knows the general meaning of the words, his experience tells him that the words are meaningful, only when they are connected in a sentence and not when isolated. The words themselves convey their meanings only as related to one another on the strength of the three well-known factors, *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*. The words convey not only their individual meanings, but also their syntactic relation. Thus, the sentence-meaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves.²

¹ *Rjuvimalā* on the same, p. 135. See Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, p. 137.

² *Vākyaṛthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 5:

*ākāṅkṣāsaṃnidhiprāptayogyāṛthāntarasamgatān
svāṛthān āhuḥ padānīti vyutpattiḥ saṃśritā mayā.*

The ancient Mīmāṃsaka-s seem to have held the *anvitābhidhāna* theory; *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, I. I. 25 gives tacit support to it, *tadbhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ, arthasya tannimittatvāt*.¹ But the *Śabarabhāṣya* passage explaining the comprehension of the sentence-meaning seems to go against this theory, when it says: ² *padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi, athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham gamayanti*. (The words perform the task of expressing their own individual meanings, and cease functioning when this task is finished; the word-meanings thus conveyed later produce the meaning of the sentence.) Prabhākara and his followers explain this passage as supporting their theory; according to them what is brought about by the meaning of a word is the notion of a qualified thing—the meaning of words as qualified by one another.³

Abhinavagupta refers to this theory as the *dirghavyāpāravāda*, since according to the *anvitābhidhāna* theory there is no limit to the extent of the meaning that an expression can convey.⁴ Just as the range of an arrow is not limited, but varies with the difference in the power with which it is discharged, so also the range of

¹ See also Jha, op. cit., p. 125.

² *Śabarabhāṣya* on *sūtra* I. I. 25.

³ See *Bṛhatī* on the passage. See also *Vākyārthamāṭrīkāvṛtti*, p. 21. In the *Nyāyaratnamālā*, *Vākyārthanirṇaya* section, this interpretation is criticized as unjust.

⁴ *Locana*, p. 18 f.: *yo 'py anvitābhidhānavādī yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha itī hṛdaye grhītvā śaravād abhidhāvāpāram eva dirghadīrgham icchati . . .*

abhidhā or the expressive power can be extended farther and farther. Not only the word-meaning, but also the syntactic relation is conveyed by the function of *abhidhā*. Bhartṛhari seems to refer to this idea when he says that according to some the meaning of an expression is just what it conveys, neither more nor less.¹ This theory is said to explain even the subtle implications and suggestions in literary language.²

According to the *anvitābhidhāna* theory the sentence has a unitary meaning of its own; the constituent words possess meaning only as they are related to this unitary sentence-meaning. Thus, in the sentence 'Bring the cow' (*gām ānāya*), the word 'cow' means not the isolated concept of cowness, but 'cow as related to the action of bringing'; so also the word 'bring' means the 'action of bringing in relation to the cow'. The words give their own meaning and their syntactic relation to the other words in the sentence, so that the sentence meaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves. Though there are many words, and therefore many meanings, the unity of the sentence-meaning is achieved through the unity of purpose.³

This theory has been strongly criticized by the Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Bhāṭṭa school. They argue⁴ that

¹ VP, II. 329.

² See the ch. *Vyañjanā*.

³ *Vākyaṛthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 2:

*bhūyāṃso yady api svārthāḥ padānāṃ te prthak prthak
prayojanatayā tv ekavākyaṛtham saṃpracakṣate.*

⁴ *Tattvabindu*, p. 93: *padāntarasya vaiyarthyam aśrutānvayabodhane.*

if it is held that the first word or any one word in its full sense means the unitary sense of the sentence itself, the other words in the sentence will be superfluous. This argument is similar to the one brought against the *sphota* theory also. Two possible explanations are that the subsequent words repeat the same sentence-meaning so as to make it clear, and that the other words are used to restrict the meaning indicated by the first word. Another objection is that this theory involves the fallacy of interdependence.¹ If one of the words, say the first, in a sentence is to convey its own meaning as well as its relation to the other words, the full meaning of the word can be comprehended only after understanding the other words; similarly, the meanings of the other words depend on this word. Thus, in the sentence *ukhāyām pacet* (cook in the pot), the word *ukhāyām* (in the pot) can convey its meaning and the relation to the other word only after knowing the meaning of the word *pacet* (cook); so also the meaning of *pacet* depends on that of *ukhāyām*.² If it is held that the individual word-meaning and its relation to the other words are not conveyed simultaneously, but gradually, the individual word-meaning being conveyed first, and the relation later, then there will be no fallacy of interdependence; but then this explanation will involve the unwarranted assumption of two separate functions for the primary power *abhidhā*.³

¹ *ibid.*, p. 93: *śrūtānvitābhidhāne tu vyaktam anyonyasamśrayam*.

² *ibid.*, p. 93 f.

³ *ibid.*, p. 94.

The *anvitābhīdhānavādin-s* argue that there is only one potency for words to express the meaning as related to the rest of the words. It is through recollection that we remember the meanings of words, and this is by rousing the mental impressions of previous experiences of the use of the words. It is a matter of experience that we never come across words except as related in a sentence; isolated words have no existence in everyday speech-activity (a one-word sentence is a sentence, not an isolated word). The word-meaning and the relation to the other words are known by *abhīdhā* itself.¹

The Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Bhāṭṭa school take objection to this view also.² They say that even though we observe words functioning only in different contexts of situations, in all of which they occur as related in a sentence, still we are able to understand the isolated meanings of the words separately also. Otherwise, a word learnt from its use in one context cannot be applied in another context. Moreover, the very principle of recognition is based on our capacity to recognize something isolated out of its context; we are able to recognize a person in a place and time different from those when we had met him previously.³ It may be observed here that even in such cases we

¹ *ibid.*, p. 94 f.: see also *Rjuvimalā* on *Brhātī*, p. 397: *vyādhāvyavahārayutpattāv eva, kevalena padārthena vyavahārābhāvād anvīta eva padārthe padānām vyutpattiḥ*.

² *Tattvabindu*, p. 95.

³ *ibid.*, pp. 116 ff.

recognize him only in some place and time, not as isolated from all situations.

Another objection raised against the *anvitābhidhāna* theory is that the meaning of a sentence can be known from the meanings of the words remembered, even though the words might have been forgotten. It is a matter of experience that in long sentences we forget the earlier words, but remember only their meanings, and even then we are able to have the meaning of the sentence.¹ The relation of the words in a sentence is not the same as that of the letters in a word; in the case of a word we do not understand the word, if we forget some of the letters.

Abhihitānvaya Theory of Verbal Comprehension

According to the *abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension upheld by the Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Bhāṭṭa school and by some of the Naiyāyika-s,² the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the individual items expressed by the words. The individual words have in themselves meanings which can be comprehended separately. On hearing a sentence, we have first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after the other; then we put together

¹ *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 153:

*pūrvabhāṣeṣu vākyasya viśmṛteṣv api dṛśyate
vākyārthāvagatīḥ puṃsām padārthasmṛtiśālinām.*

² *ibid.*, pp. 153 ff.; *Nyāyaratnamālā*, Vākyārthanirṇaya section; *Tattvabindu*, pp. 91-161; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 93 ff.; *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, Śabda section.

these meanings according to the three factors *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*, and we arrive at the meaning of the sentence.

Śabara seems to refer to this theory when he says:¹ *padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi, athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham gamayanti.* (In a sentence the words express their own meanings, and stop with that; the meanings of the words thus known convey the meaning of the sentence.)²

Kumārīlabhaṭṭa says³ that the meaning of a sentence is always conveyed by the meanings of words obtained from the words themselves. Unlike the words, the sentence does not have a meaning of its own independently. 'The meanings of words having been expressed by each word, independently of one another, it is solely from the connection among these word-meanings, that there follows the cognition of the meaning of the sentence . . .'⁴ The three factors *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi* constitute the grounds of relationship.⁵

¹ Śabarabhāṣya on sūtra I. 1. 25.

² The Prābhākara-s explain it differently, taking *ārtha* in the sense of syntactic relation (*anvaya*). See *Vākyārthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 22: *arthaśabdena bhāṣyakāro 'nvayam āha.*

³ *Tantravārttika*, p. 445: *padārthaiḥ padavijñātair vākyārthaḥ pratipādyate.*

⁴ *ibid.*: *prthagbhūtair eva padair itaretaranirapekṣaiḥ sveṣu padārthe-śūkteṣu tatsaṃsargād eva padavyāpārānapekṣo vākyārthapratyayo bhavati.* See Trans., p. 586 f.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 455:

ākāṅkṣā saṃnidhānam ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam saṃbandhakāraṇatvena kṛtām nānantaraśrutiḥ.

It may be noted here that this theory of *abhihitānvaya* is based on the views advocated by the great grammarian Vājapyāyana that the meaning of a sentence is the *saṃsarga* or the mutual association of the individual word-meanings expressed by the words.¹ Thus, it is one of the earliest theories about the nature of a sentence-meaning. The other theory, of Vyādi, that it is the mutual exclusion of the word-meanings was later developed into the Apoha theory.²

There are two different views about the nature of cognition produced by a word. It is by observing the use of words in actual contexts of situations that we learn their meanings; therefore, a word can indicate its meaning only by rousing the mental impressions of such contexts, and hence, the knowledge of the meaning of a word is only a kind of recollection. This is the view held by the *anvitābhidhāna* school of Prabhākara and also by some scholars of the *abhihitānvaya* school like Cidānanda, author of the *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*.³ Kumārila-bhaṭṭa himself refers to this view when he says that a word is nothing more than a reminder of the meaning.⁴

¹ See *supra* 'Relation of Words in a Sentence,' pp. 191 ff.

² By the Buddhist logicians. See above pp. 78 ff. on Apoha.

³ *Mānameyodaya*, p. 93: *śabdo 'pi saṃskārod bodhanadvāreṇaiva padārthaṃ bodhayatīti smaraṇam eva padārthajñānam iti cidānandaprabhṛtayaḥ; Nītitattvāvirbhāva*, p. 233:

⁴ *Ślokaṇvṛttika*, Śabda section, p. 432:

ṣ adam abhyadhikābhāvāt smarakān na viśiṣyate.

See also *Vṛttika*, quoted in *Vākyārthamāyṛkāṇṭhi*, p. 15:

*te 'pi naivāsmṛtā yasmād vākyārthaṃ gamayanti naḥ
tasmāt tatsmaraneṣv eva saṃhateṣu pramāṇatā.*

Vācaspatimiśra also says that, strictly speaking, the relation between the word and the meaning is that between the recollector and the recollected¹ and that the word produces the cognition of the meaning not directly and independently, but by rousing the mental impressions of the things previously known. But according to Pārthasārathimiśra and some other scholars, the meaning of a word is conveyed by the primary significative potency of the word (*abhidhā*).² It is a matter of experience that a word conveys its meaning directly and not by reminding us of the various contexts of situations in which the word was used; moreover, it is simpler to assume that the word conveys the meaning through its expressive power than to consider that it reminds us of our former experiences of situations when the word was used and thus gives us the idea of its meaning.³

Of these two views the former is based on the psychological analysis of the process of learning a language; for the use of language itself is a kind of

¹ *Tattvabindu*, p. 160: *vācyavācakatvaṃ ca pratyāyapratyāyakatvaṃ, tac ca vicāryamāṇaṃ smāryasmārakatvaṃ eva*. See also p. 159: *na ceyaṃ sāksād arthadhiyaṃ ādhatte, yena na tatsādhikā syāt, api tu saṃskārod bodhanakrameṇa*. See also *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, III. 17: *saṃketas tu padapadārthayor itaretarādhyaśarūpaḥ smṛtyātmakah*.

² *Mānameyodaya*, p. 93: *padaiḥ padārthabodhanaṃ śabdaśakti-janyatvād abhidhānam eveti pārthasārathimiśrādayaḥ*.

³ *Nyāyaratnamālā*, p. 107: *śabdānantaram arthapratyayadarśanāt tasyaiva tatra kāraṇatvaṃ kalpayitum yuktam, na tu śabdāt saṃskārod bodhas tataś cārthapratītiḥ iti yuktam; prapālyāṃ pramāṇābhāvāt. tasmād abhidhā-yakam eva padam, na smārakam*.

conditioned reflex; the experiments of Pavlov have demonstrated how such reflexes can be produced even in animals. When a context has affected us in the past, the recurrence of merely a part of the context will cause us to react in the way we reacted before.¹ We learn a language through the observation of various contexts of situation; the linguistic phrases uttered are associated with the contexts of situation; having experienced several such situations, we assume a kind of relationship between the utterances and the contexts. Meaning can be explained only in terms of a relationship of the utterance with the abstract context of situation.² The Mīmāṃsaka-s were fully conscious of this process; but to them the relation between a word and its meaning is something natural and permanent, and the experience of situations only reveals this natural relation. The primary significatory power of the word is based on this relation; when once this relation is known, the word can directly denote its meaning, says Pārthasārathimīśra.

When we hear a sentence, we have first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after another; then these word-meanings are related on

¹ Urban, *Language and Reality*, p. 102.

² The 'Context of Situation' theory is given by Malinowski in the Appendix to *The Meaning of Meaning* by Ogden and Richards. Prof. Firth has pushed the analysis of 'context' much farther in his dealings with 'formal scatter' and 'meaning by collocation'. See 'Modes of Meaning,' *Essays and Studies*; 'Technique of Semantics', *TPS*.

the basis of *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), *yogyatā* (consistency) and *saṃnidhi* (proximity), and we arrive at the unified meaning of the sentence as a whole. The expression of the individual word-meanings precedes the knowledge of the logical connection among them. The different isolated ideas expressed successively by the words are put together by the collective memory of the listener (*saṃhālambana-smṛti*). The individual word-meanings are remembered separately until all the words are heard; then there is a simultaneous cognition of the sentence-meaning in which all the word-meanings are properly related to one another on the basis of *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*.¹

The sentence-meaning is something more than the sum of the word-meanings. When the meanings of the different words in a sentence are related with one another on the basis of the *ākāṅkṣā*, etc. there arises some additional signification which is distinct from the totality of the word-meanings.² This unified sentence-meaning is referred to by different terms: *vākyārtha* (sentence-meaning), *saṃsarga* (association of the word-meanings) and *tātparyārtha* (the purport or the intention of the speaker). It is difficult to explain where this

¹ According to the *anvitābhidhāna* theory, on the other hand, each word, as it is being uttered, contributes to the meaning of the sentence which is revealed step by step, becoming clearer and clearer with the utterance of subsequent words.

² *Kāvya-prakāśa*, II: *ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsaṃnidhiḥ* *śāśāt* *padārthānām* *saṃvaye* *tātparyārtho* *viśeṣavapur* *apadārtho* 'pi *vākyārthaḥ* *saṃullasatīty* *abhihitānvayavādinām* *matam*.

special signification comes from. Some call it the power of the sentence to convey a connected sense (*vākyaśakti*), others call it *saṃsargamaryādā* or the law of association, and yet others postulate a power called *tātparyaśakti*, the power of the sentence to convey the intended sense in the form of a related and unified meaning.¹

‘How is this *saṃsarga* conveyed? It is mysterious and has not yet been satisfactorily explained. In sentences we have a juxtaposition of words and the element of the relation between the words is conveyed, we have to say, by suppression.’² This suggestion of the connection of the word-meanings is on the basis of the intention of the speaker and the incompatibility of the isolated word-meanings to convey the intended sense. Speech is normally resorted to with the intention of conveying a connected sense.

The individual words have exhausted their function by conveying their own isolated meanings; so they cannot be considered to be capable of performing another function, namely, that of conveying their mutual relations also, in order that the sentence-meaning may be understood. Moreover, the words cannot directly convey the mutual relation, since between the words

¹ VP, II. 42:

*saṃbandhe sati yat tv anyad ādhikyaṃ upajāyate
vākyaārtham eva taṃ prāhur anekapadasaṃśrayaṃ.*

See also Puṇyarāja’s commentary thereon: *padānāṃ paraśparānvaye padārthavaśād yad ādhikyaṃ saṃsargaḥ sa vākyaārthaḥ*; cf. *Mbh*, I, p. 462: *yad atrādhikyaṃ vākyaārthaḥ saḥ*.

² Kuppaswami Sastri, *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, p. 21.

and the sentence-meaning lie the word-meanings. So it is the word-meanings that convey the sentence-meaning, and this is in the form of their mutual relation. This is the view of the *abhihitānvayavādin-s*.¹ There is a slight difference between the Naiyāyika-s and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s regarding the way in which the mutual connection is conveyed. To the Naiyāyika-s the sentence-meaning is only the mutual relation of the word-meanings; but the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s explain that the sentence-meaning is always conveyed by the secondary power of words.² The two conditions of *lakṣaṇā*, namely the incompatibility of the expressed sense and the relation between the primary sense and the intended sense, apply here also. In a sentence the isolated words are by themselves unintelligible, since they refer to the generic form without any syntactic relation. This is against the purport of the sentence, which is to convey a unified sense. So the general sense of the words, through secondary implication, gives the particular senses consisting in mutual syntactic relation.

This does not mean that the sentence-meaning is not derived from the words. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that even though the letters of words convey the word-meanings directly, they do not stop with that; the mere knowledge of the word-meanings is of no use to

¹ *Mānameyodaya*, p. 93 f.

² Kumārilabhaṭṭa, quoted in *Tattvabindu*, p. 153:

vākyārtho lakṣyamāno hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ.

the hearer. The conveying of the individual senses by the words is indispensable for the cognition of the sentence-meaning, just like the production of fire by fuel is indispensable for the purpose of cooking.¹

The *abhihitānvaya* theory is supported by the following reasons: 'If the words of a sentence have no separate meanings of their own, then the classification of words into nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc. becomes meaningless. Further, in every case in which we are to understand the meaning of a sentence, we must first understand the meaning of its component words. Without a previous understanding of the words no one can understand the meaning of a sentence. Moreover, if the meaning of a sentence were quite independent of the meaning of its constituent words, then any sentence could convey any meaning. Lastly, when we understand the meaning of a new verse, we do so obviously on the basis of our knowledge of the words and their separate meanings. This cannot be explained by any understanding of the sentences, since they are new and unintelligible to us. So it is concluded that the meaning of a sentence is just the synthesis of the separate meanings of its words.'²

¹ *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 943 (also quoted in *Tattva-bindu*, p. 153):

*sākṣād yady api kurvanti padārthapratipādanam
varṇās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale.
vākya-rthamīlaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntarīyakam
pāke jvāleva kṣāṭhānām padārthapratipādanam.*

² S. C. Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 372.

The *anvitābhīdhāna* theory seems to be an advance on the *abhihitānvaya* theory.¹ The meaning of a sentence dominates the meanings of its words; both the speaker and the listener are concerned only with the sentence-meaning. We use words without fully understanding their exact meaning; that does not mean we are talking nonsense. 'It is obvious that knowing a language consists in using words appropriately and acting appropriately when they are heard. It is no more necessary to be able to say what a word means than it is for a cricketer to know the mathematical theory of impact and of projectiles.'² The ubiquitous importance of context as a deciding factor in determining the meaning of a word in a sentence points out the fact that the claim of words to have an independent meaning in isolation is very weak. The well-known statement by St. Augustine on the real nature of time applies to the meaning of words also: '*si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaeranti explicare velim nescio.*'³ It is 'something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it'.

Later writers in India tried to reconcile the two theories. Thus, Mukulabhaṭṭa, in the *Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā*, says that both the *anvitābhīdhāna* and the *abhihitānvaya*

¹ *ibid.*, p. 374 f.

² Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 26.

³ *Confessions*, quoted by Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, § 89. See also Frege's view that 'a word has meaning only as part of a sentence'. *ibid.*, § 49.

theories contain partial truth: looked at from the point of view of the words the *abhihitānvaya* theory seems to be preferable; but looked at from the point of view of the sentence, preference must be given to the *anvitābhidhāna* theory. Mukulabhaṭṭa accepts a combination of the two views and calls it the theory of *samuccaya*.¹

Tātparya as a Separate Vṛtti

Among the Ālaṃkārika-s it is Abhinavagupta who for the first time refers to *tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti* or function of words accepted by the *abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension to explain the syntactic unity of a sentence. Abhinavagupta speaks of four distinct functions of words: *abhidhā*, *tātparya*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*, and arranges them under four separate classes: ² *abhidhā* is the power of the words to signify the primary meaning; this primary meaning refers only to the universal and not to the particular. In a sentence the individual words by their primary function of *abhidhā* refer only

¹ *Abhid'āvṛttimātrkā*, p. 15: *anyeṣāṃ tu mate padānāṃ tattat-sānānyabhūto vācya 'rthaḥ, vākyasya tu parasparānvitāḥ padārthā itī padāpekṣayābhihitānvayaḥ, vākyāpekṣayā tv anvitābhidhānam. evaṃ caityaḥ . . . samuccaya itī.*

² *Locana*, p. 16 f.: *trayo hy atra vyāpārāḥ samvedyante—padārtheṣu sāmānyātmāsu abhidhāvvyāpārāḥ, sāmānyāpekṣayā arthāvagamaṇasaktir hy abhidhā. samayaś ca tāvaty eva, na viśeṣāṃśe, ānantyād vyabhicārāc caikasya. tato viśeṣarūpe vākyārthe tātparyasaktiḥ parasparānvite, 'sāmānyāny anyathāsiddher viśeṣaṃ gamayanti hi' itī nyāyāt bhaktir hi lakṣaṇāvvyāpārāḥ tṛtīyakakṣyāniveśī. caturthyāṃ tu kakṣyāyāṃ dhvananavyāpārāḥ.*

to the isolated word meanings. The syntactic relation of these is conveyed by the *tātparyasakti* of the words. The intention of the speaker, or the general purport of the utterance is obviously to give a unified purposeful sentence-meaning. Hence the words are considered to have a power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. This power is called *tātparyasakti*. *Lakṣaṇā* is the third power recognized according to this theory; it is accepted only when the primary meanings cannot be syntactically connected to give a meaning.¹ Abhinavagupta says that even according to this theory *vyañjanā* or suggestion will have to be accepted as the fourth function of words.

It may be noted here that even though Ānandavardhana refers to the importance of the speaker's intention in conveying the meaning of a passage, he never refers to *tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti* or *śakti* of words; in fact he says that in linguistic discourse there are only three functions or powers of words to be accepted: the primary, the secondary and the suggestive.²

Among the Ālaṃkārika-s, Bhoja has a unique way of treating *tātparya*.³ Used in the general sense of total meaning, Bhoja's *tātparya* is divided into three types:

¹ *ibid.*: *mukhyārthabādhāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyāḥ prakṛtiḥ. bādhā ca virodhapratītiḥ eva.*

² *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 194: *tad evaṃ śābde vyavahāre trayasḥ prakārāḥ—vācakatvaṃ guṇavṛttir vyañjakatvaṃ ca. tatra vyañjakatve yadā vyaṅgya-prādhānyam tadā dhvaniḥ. Ānandavardhana refers to vakyārthapadārthanyāya (vide infra, p. 216, n. 2) but does not call it tātparyavṛtti.*

³ Dr. V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, second ed., p. 19.

expressed, implied and suggested (*vācya*, *pratiyamāna* and *dhvanirūpa*). In a restricted sense the term is used as equivalent to the intended meaning or suggestion. These have nothing to do with the conveying of the syntactic relation of word-meanings. Regarding that, Bhoja accepts the position of the *anubhayavādin-s* who reject both the *abhihitānvaya* and the *anvitābhidhāna* theories and prefer a third view according to which words convey the sentence-meaning by their cumulative effect or *saṃhatyakāritā*.¹ This, we may note, is what the Naiyāyika scholar Jayanta advocates in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, where he attributes this cumulative effect or *saṃhatyakāritā* to the *tātparyaśakti* of words.²

Later, Dhanika, the commentator on Dhanamjaya's *Daśarūpaka*, advocates the theory that *dhvani* is included in *tātparya*.³ He says that it is not necessary to recognize a new function called *dhvani* and refutes the *ghaṭapradīpanyāya* advocated by Ānandavardhana to explain the relationship between the expressed and the suggested meanings, since the two senses are not entirely different as the pot and the lamp. The relation between Kāvya and Rasa is one of *vācyavācaka* or *lakṣyalakṣaka*. Dhanika says that there is no limitation of the term *tātparya* to the expressed sense; it can cover the whole

¹ *ibid.*, p. 21: *anubhayavādinah punar itthaṃ samarthayante. nānvitābhidhānaṃ na cābhihitānvayaḥ. kiṃ tarhi? samudītaiḥ padair eko vākyārthaḥ pratyāyyate. . . . nedam anvitābhidhānaṃ. kim tarhi? saṃhatyakāritā padānām ucyate.*

² *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 371 f.

³ Dr. V. Raghavan, *op. cit.*, first ed., p. 155; Dhanika, *Avāloka* on *Daśarūpaka*, p. 156 f.

range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense.¹

It may be noted that Dhanika's criticism is pointed to the statement of Ānandavardhana in the third Uddyota of *Dhvanyāloka* referring to the view that the relation between the expressed sense and the suggested sense is like that between the word-meaning and the sentence-meaning. Ānandavardhana refutes that view by saying that in the former case the relation is like that of the lamp and the object illuminated, while in the latter case it is like that of the pot and the mud with which it is made; the light shines itself while illuminating other objects; so also the suggestion of ideas is not by suppressing the expressed meaning.²

Following Abhinavagupta, later Ālaṃkārika-s like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha have referred to the *tātparyavṛtti* as a separate function for conveying the syntactic relationship among the various word-meanings according to the *Abhikhitānvaya* theory. In the *Kāvyaṭīkā* there are references to *tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti*³ and

¹ *ibid.*:

*etāvaty eva viśrāntis tātparyasyeti kimkṛtam
yāvatkāryaprasāritvāt tātparyam na tulādhr̥tam*

² *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 189 f.: *na ca padārthavākyaṛthanyāyo vācyavyaṅgyayoḥ . . . tair vākyaṛthapadārthayor ghaṭatadūpādānakāraṇanyāyo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ . . . vākye tadarthe vā pratīte padatadarthānām teṣām tadā vibhaktatrayopālambhe . . . na hi vyaṅgye pratiyamāne vācyabuddhir dūri-bhavati . . . ghaṭapradīpānyāyas tayor.*

³ *Kāvyaṭīkā*, II. 18: *taṭādau ye viśeṣāḥ pāvanatvādayas te cābhidhātātparyalakṣaṇābhyo vyāpārāntareṇa gamyāḥ. tacca vyaṅjanadhvananadyotanādīśabdavācyam avāśyam eṣilavyam.*

Mammaṭa has also explained its function in the second chapter of the text.¹

Viśvanātha in the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* repeats the same idea and refers to the *tātparyavṛtti* as being accepted by the *abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension.² He further states that it is the sentence as a whole that conveys the *tātparyārtha* or the sentence-meaning, and so the power of *tātparya* must rest with the sentence as a whole. Many of the later *Ālaṃkārika*-s have also referred to this function of *tātparya*, mainly on the basis of the statements of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa.³

It is well known that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s who followed Kumārilabhaṭṭa are staunch supporters of the *abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension; as a result of this whenever the term is found, there is a tendency among commentators to associate it exclusively with the Bhāṭṭa school, without waiting to inquire whether the theory explained is the same as that adopted by the Bhāṭṭa-s. Some of the ancient

¹ *ibid.*, II. 6: ' *tātparyārtho 'pi keṣucit' . ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsaṃnidhivaśād vakṣyamāṇasvarūpānām padārthānām parasparasamanwaye tātparyārtho viśeṣavapur apadārtho ' pi vāk्यārthaḥ samullasatīty abhihitānvayavādinām matam.*

² *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 20:

*tātparyākhyām vṛttim āhuḥ padārthānvayabodhane
tātparyārthaṃ tadārthaṃ ca vākyaṃ tadbodhakaṃ pare.*

abhidhāyā ekaikapadārthabodhanavīramād vāk्यārtharūpasya padārthānvayasya bodhikā tātparyam nāmā vṛttiḥ. tadārthaś ca tātparyārthaḥ. tadbodhakaṃ ca vākyaṃ ity abhihitānvayavādinām matam.

³ Kumārasvāmin's commentary on Vidyānātha's *Pralāba-rudriya*, Kāvya section.

commentators, and modern scholars following them, have thus associated *tātparyavṛtti* with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā.¹

But there is one difficulty in such an assumption which many of the scholars have not noticed. All the great authoritative writers on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā like Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, Vācaspatimiśra, Cidānanda and Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa have unequivocally stated that, according to the *abhihitānvaya* theory advocated by them, the syntactically unified sentence-meaning is to be conveyed through the secondary power *lakṣaṇā*.² Even critics like Śālikanātha who tried to

¹ (a) Commentary on *Kāvyaprakāśa* (II. 6) by Māṇikyacandra: *keṣucid abhihitānvayavādinibhaṭṭeṣu ity arthaḥ*.

(b) Same by Govinda Ṭhakkura: *keṣucin nyāyādinayeṣu, na tu mīmāṃsakamateṣu api*; on this, the subcommentary of Nāgeśa says: *ādinā bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakāḥ . . . mīmāṃsakamateṣu prābhākaramateṣu ity arthaḥ*.

(c) Same by Jhalakikara (*Bālabodhini*): *abhihitānvayavādinām iti . . . bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakānām ity arthaḥ*.

(d) P. V. Kane, *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Notes, p. 86; 'This view is held by that school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā which is called *Abhihitānvayavādin*.'

(e) K. C. Pandey, *Comparative Aesthetics*, I, p. 217: 'The followers of the Nyāya philosophy and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s maintain the additional power of the word, namely the *tātparyasakti*.'

(f) S. S. Sukthankar, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Notes p. 36: 'Acknowledged by some Mīmāṃsaka authorities to whom there is a separate *vṛtti* called *tātparya*.'

² (a) Kumārilabhaṭṭa quoted in *Tattvabindu*, p. 153 (and *Vāk-yārthamātyākāṛtti*, p. 13): *vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ*.

(b) Pārthasārathimiśra, *Nyāyaratnamālā*, p. 125:

padasavarūpābhihitaiḥ padārthaiḥ saṃlakṣyate 'sav iti siddham etat.

refute this theory have described it in that way.¹ Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa says that *tātparya* is not a separate factor in conveying the syntactic relationship of the word-meanings.²

It may be pointed out here that Jayantabhaṭṭa, the great Naiyāyika scholar of the tenth century A.D. who wrote the *Nyāyamañjarī*, was the first to bring forward the theory about *tātparya* being a separate *vṛtti*. The *Abhihitānvaya* theory is not the monopoly of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s; we have seen that the Association theory

(c) *Śāstradīpikā* p. 154: *padābhihitaiḥ padārthair lakṣaṇayā vākyārthaḥ pratipādyate*.

(d) Vācaspatimiśra, *Tattvabindu*, p. 131: *labhyate ca samabhi- vyāhāranyathānupapatyā padānām anvītiārthaparāṇām svābhidheyārtharūpa- samavetānvitāvasthāpratyāyanam lakṣaṇayā*.

(e) Cidānanda, *Nītitattvāvīrbhāva*, p. 232: *padārthā eva vākyār- thaṃ lakṣayanti*.

(f) Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, *Mānameyodaya*, p. 94: *vayaṃ tu padārthā lakṣaṇayaiva vākyārthaṃ bodhayantīti brūmaḥ*; see also *Tattvaprādīpikā* by Citsukha, p. 154: *padāni lakṣaṇayā padārthānām anyonyānvaya- pratipattiparāṇi*.

¹ (a) *Vākyārthamāṭrīkā*vṛtti, p. 12 f.: *vārttikakārapādās tu lakṣaṇikān sarvavākyān icchantāḥ padārthānām anwayāvabodhaśaktikalpanām nirākur- van[taḥ] anvītvastho hi padārtho 'bhīhito 'nvītvasthāṃ svasaṃbandhinīm lakṣayati* . . .

(b) Vardhamāna, commentary on *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p. 476: *nanv anwaye padānām tātparyam tannīrvāhikā ca vṛttiḥ. na ca svārthasaṃ- bandhini svānwaye tātparyāḥ lakṣaṇā, anwayaviśeṣaṇatayā padārthopasthiteś ca na vṛttidvayavirodha iti vācyaṃ*. Jayantabhaṭṭa, however, does not refer to *lakṣaṇā* in the context.

² *Mānameyodaya*, p. 101: *tasmād anwayasiddhau tātparyam na kvacit svayaṃ hetuḥ*.

of the grammarian Vājapyāyana, that *saṃsarga* is *vāk-yārtha*, is a kind of *abhihitānvaya* theory.¹ Bhartṛhari has also referred to such views.² Early Naiyāyika-s like Gautama and Vātsyāyana have not discussed the problem of the sentence; they discussed only the exact import of the words. Jayanta says that their silence is eloquent as it shows that they believed that the sentence is only a collection of words, and that the sentence-meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings.³ After discussing in detail the various theories about verbal comprehension held by various schools, Jayanta advocates a modified form of *abhihitānvaya* theory.⁴ The words express their isolated word-meanings by the power of *abhidhā*; they have another power, the *tātparyasakti*, which indicates the mutual relationship among the word-meanings. The function of this power is to reveal the meanings of the words contained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words in common and lasts till the independent judgment is produced.⁵

¹ *vide supra*, p. 191 f.

² *VP*, II. 41-2.

³ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 333: *vāk-yārthas tu na kvacid api sūtrakāra-bhāṣyā-kārābhyām sūcita iti cet, . . . yad ayam pṛthak padārthebhyo na vāk-yārtham upadiśati sma, tasmād ayam apyāśayaḥ padārthā eva vāk-yārtha iti.*

⁴ He does not call it *abhihitānvaya* *vāda*.

⁵ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 371 f: *padāny anvītaṃ pratyāyayanti, nānvītaṃ abhidadhati. nābhidhātṛi śaktir anvīta-viśayā, kiṃ tv anwayavyāptirekāvagataniṣkṛṣṭasvārthaviśayaiva, tātparyasaktis tu teṣāṃ anvītavagamaparyantā. . .*

*abhidhātṛi matā śaktiḥ padānāṃ svārthanīṣṭhataḥ
teṣāṃ tātparyasaktis tu saṃsargāvagamāvadhīḥ.*

It may be noted that this *tātparyaśakti* is the same as the *saṃsargamaryādā* accepted by the later Navya Nyāya school.¹ 'The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concepts (*padārthasaṃsarga*) and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of verbal judgment (*vākyārtha*) is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words (*saṃsargamaryādā*), and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words (*ābidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*).'²

What prompted Abhinavagupta to accept Jayanta's modified form of *abhihitānvaya* theory and not that of the real followers of the Bhāṭṭa school seems to be the fact that the Ālaṃkārika-s of the *dhvani* school could not accept *lakṣaṇā* to explain the syntactic relation among the word-meanings, since they accepted it only in cases of *anvayānupapatti* and not in cases of *tātparyānupapatti*.

Some of the discerning commentators of the Ālaṃkāra texts have already pointed out that the view about *tātparyavṛtti* being responsible for conveying the syntactic relation of the word-meaning does not refer to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka theory, but only to that of the ancient Naiyāyika-s who were also *abhihitānvayavādin*-s.³

¹ Gadādhara's *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 1: *śābdabodhe caikapadārthe 'para-padārthasaṃsargaḥ saṃsargamaryādayā bhāṣate*.

² S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, P. 258.

³ (a) Govinda Ṭhakkura, *Pradīpa*, loc. cit.: *nyāyādinayeṣu, na tu mīmāṃsakādiṣu api*. Nāgeśa twists the meaning of this passage in his subcommentary. *vide supra*, p. 218, n. 1 (b).

In the *Sudhāsāgara* commentary on the *Kāvya-prakāśa* Bhīmasena Dīkṣita explains this point in detail. He says¹ that for all practical purposes this *tātparyavṛtti* may be identified with the *lakṣaṇā* of the Mīmāṃsaka-s, and that it is the same as the *saṃsargamaryādā* of the later Navya Nyāya school.²

The distinction between *lakṣaṇā* and *tātparya* in this case is very subtle. Mere juxtaposition of isolated

(b) Haridāsa Siddhānta Vāgiśa, commentary on *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, II. 20: *pare prāñco naiyāyikāḥ. ata eva prācīnanaiyāyikā abhihitānvayavādināḥ, navyās tu imām eva tātparyavṛttiṃ saṃsargamaryādām ācakṣate.*

(c) Rāmacaraṇa Tarkavāgiśa Bhaṭṭācārya, commentary on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 20: *abhihitānām abhidhaya lakṣaṇayā vā padopasthāpitānām anvayabodhavādinām prācīnanaiyāyikānām matam.*

(d) *Nyāyakośa*, p. 798: *vākyārthabodhane tātparyākhyām vṛttiṃ aṅgicakrur abhihitānvayavādināḥ tārkiṇāḥ . . .*

¹ p. 44 f.: *keṣucin nyāyādinayeṣu, na tu mīmāṃsakādimateṣu api . . . tātparyasya vṛttitvaṃ tajjñānatvena prayojakatvāc chabdasambandhatvāc cākṣatam. anvaye lakṣaṇeti bhāṭṭamatam api tātparyasyaiva nāmāntaralakṣaṇatvena neyam. na tu prācīnalakṣaṇā, mukhyārthabādhābhāvāt . . . kecit tu, 'vastutas tu padārthasaktatvena jñātaṃ padam eva svārthasmaranadvārā ākāṅkṣādīsāciviyāt samabhivyāhṛtapadārthena saha svārthānvayaṃ bodhayati. tathaiva kāryakāraṇabhāvakalpanād iti kim anayā tātparyavṛtityā. iyaṃ eva saṃsargamaryādeti ghuṣyate' iti vadanti.*

² cf. Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, p. 220 f.: 'It is absolutely certain that Mammaṭa has misrepresented the theory of Kumārila which is called *abhihitānvayavāda*. Unfortunately he calls what is really the Nyāya theory by the name of the theory of *abhihitānvayavāda*. This error has persisted in all the subsequent writings of the Ālankārika-s. It is painful to remark that this celebrated authority on poetics did not have direct access to the work of Kumārila.' The *abhihitānvaya* theory has never been considered by any of the great Ālankārika-s exclusively as held by the Bhāṭṭa-s.

words, giving out a string of unconnected separate concepts, is of no use in linguistic discourse. It is certain that the co-utterance of words is with the intention of conveying a connected unified meaning.¹ It is this apparent contradiction between the juxtaposition of words in a sentence and their not being related to serve some purpose, that gives the power to the words to resort to *lakṣaṇā*, through inference of the *arthāpatti* type, and convey the syntactically related sentence-meaning. The speaker's intention, taken in a general sense, is at the back of resorting to *lakṣaṇā*. According to the Prābhākara-s, on the other hand, the *tātparya* makes the primary significatory power itself capable of conveying not only the individual word-meanings, but their mutual connection as well. Thus even when *tātparya* is not taken as a separate *vṛtti*, it could be referred to as the motive force conveying the syntactic relation; in fact Pārthasārathimiśra himself refers to the function of *tātparya*;² and Jayanta quotes Kumārila-bhaṭṭa in support of his theory that *tātparya* is a separate *vṛtti* of the words which conveys the syntactic relation of the word-meanings.³

¹ *Tattvabindu*, p. 132: *pratipitsitaṃ khalv etad iti pratipādayiṣyantaḥ padāny uccārayanti*. See also Kumārila-bhaṭṭa quoted therein:

viśiṣṭārthaprayuktā hi samabhiṣyāhṛtir jane.

² *Nyāyaratnākara* on *Ślokavārttika*, p. 909: *yady api abhidhāvya-pāraḥ padārtheṣv eva paryavasitaḥ, tathāpi tātparyavyāpṛter aparyavasitāyāḥ . . .*

³ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 372. He quotes the verse from *Ślokavārttika* giving the analogy that just as fuel effects cooking through the

Professor S. Kuppaswami Sastri says¹ that the *saṃsarga* or the mutual relation of the word-meanings is conveyed by a process of suggestion, and quotes Jespersen's view that 'suggestion is impression through suppression'.² A kind of suggestion has to be accepted by all schools of thought; the individual words give only their own individual isolated meanings, leaving the *saṃsarga* or the mutual relation of the meanings to be conveyed by suggestion.³ The Naiyāyika-s may call it *tātparyavṛtti* or *saṃsargamaryādā*, the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka-s may call it *lakṣaṇā*, and the Prābhākara-s may take it to be an extension of the primary power *abhidhā* itself. *Tātparya*, the speaker's intention or the general purport of the utterance, has to be accepted as a motivating factor in verbal comprehension; but there is no need to assume a separate function of words called *tātparyavṛtti*. That is why it has not been accepted as such by later writers.

Bharṭṭhari's Theory of Akhaṇḍavākyaśphoṭa

According to Bharṭṭhari words have no reality of their own. The entire sentence is to be taken as an indivisible, integral unit; and its meaning is also an instantaneous flash of insight (*pratibhā*), or intuition,

flame, words effect the unified sentence-meaning through their individual meanings. *vide supra*, p. 211, n. 1.

¹ *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, p. 22.

² Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 309.

³ That is why some writers like Dhanamjaya and Dhanika include *vyāñjanā* or suggestion under *tātparya* itself.

which has no parts. The indivisible sentence is analysed into words and again into roots and suffixes by the grammarians for facilitating easy study of the language; but these divisions should not be considered to have real existence, apart from the sentence. In language as we find it in the world there are only complete utterances which may be called sentences; we do not notice the words or the word-meanings or the letters in language in operation. Of course in language-material considered and described by the grammarians, they do have an existence; that is only based on grammatical analysis, and has no absolute reality. Even though the *sphoṭa* theory envisages different subdivisions of the *sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari accepts only the indivisible sentence-*sphoṭa* as the real unit of speech. The existence of words in language is on a par with the *avidyā* stage; ¹ words have only a pragmatic existence; they are useful units of language which build up the higher unit of speech, the sentence.

The sentence which is 'a single undivided utterance' conveys its meaning in a flash.² The sentence-meaning is not built up gradually on the basis of the word-meanings. It is grasped by the listener in an instantaneous flash of insight (*pratibhā*). This *pratibhā* is indivisible; and it is grasped in the mind. It is

¹ K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, 'Pratibhā as the Meaning of a Sentence', *POC*, 1940, pp. 326 ff.; Gopinatha Kaviraja, 'The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy', *ABORI*, 1924.

² Puṇyārāja on *VP*, II. 2: *sphoṭātmake vākye pratibhālakṣaṇe vākyārthe vākyavākyārthayor adhyāsarūpaḥ sambandhaḥ*.

because of the indivisibility of *pratibhā*, which is the meaning of a sentence, that the grammarians reject the *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* theories of verbal comprehension, in both of which the meanings of individual words have an absolute reality. According to Bhartṛhari the sentence-meaning is not only indivisible; it is also indefinable. Even when we have understood the meaning of a sentence, we cannot explain to another the nature of this understanding. He says: 'This (*pratibhā*) cannot in any way be explained to others in terms such as "It is this"; its existence is ratified only in the individual's experience of it, and the experiencer himself cannot describe it.'¹ Bhartṛhari identifies this *pratibhā* with the instinctive urge in animals which prompts them to act. The behaviour of animals is prompted by this instinctive urge of *pratibhā*; it is this that teaches the cuckoo to sing in spring, and the birds to build their nests.² It is the same kind of urge that results from a sentence. A sentence becomes productive of this urge, because of repeated usage.³

Śāntarakṣita quotes this view in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, and while explaining this, Kamalaśīla says⁴ that

¹ *VP*, II. 146.

*idaṃ tad iti sānyeṣām anākhyeyā kathamcana
pratyātmavṛttisiddhā sā kartrāpi na nirūpyate.*

Translated by J. Brough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', p. 171.

² *VP*, II. 151-2.

³ *VP*, II. 119: *abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ śabdaḥ sarvo 'paraiḥ smṛtaḥ.*

⁴ *Tattvasaṃgraha*, v. 892, and *Pañjikā* thereon.

by repeated usage words produce an intuition in the minds of the listeners, and that they do not actually denote any external object. This intuition is an insight leading to an action. If words had been 'directly grounded in an objective reality, there would have been no occasion for the conflicting interpretations of texts or contradictory expositions; and fictions and stories could not have been possible'.¹ A sentence produces an urge to do something, rather than creating an image of something in the mind; this urge varies with each individual and with each sentence. Puṇyarāja goes one step forward and says that even a man who does not know the exact meaning of words, feels an urge to do something, when he hears a sentence addressed to him.²

Bhartrhari's theory of the non-reality of words met with strong opposition from other Indian philosophers.³ It is accepted only by the grammarians in India, but the importance of the linguistic principle underlying the *sphoṭa* theory is very great.


¹ Satkari Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, p. 113 f.

² Puṇyarāja on VP, II. 119.

³ J. Brough, *op. cit.*, pp. 167 ff.

CHAPTER

6



LAKṢAṆĀ

METAPHOR

METAPHOR

SOMETIMES a word is used to denote a referent other than its normal one. Such metaphoric usage is common in all languages. If we take the word as denoting its normal primary meaning, the sentence may become nonsensical in the context. This produces a 'psychic resistance' in the listener, and there is a sort of break in the flow. It excites attention and requires interpretation for understanding the purport. The actual referent of the word has to be taken as different from its normal one, but in some way connected with it, either through similarity or through some other relation. This function of the word, denoting a referent different from its normal and primary one, but somehow related to it, is called *lakṣaṇā* or *upacāra*; other terms like *gauṇī vṛtti* and *bhakti* are also used to refer to this secondary significative function of words.

The three essential conditions generally accepted by the later Ālaṃkārika-s as necessary in a *lakṣaṇā* or transfer are (a) the inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the context, (b) some

relation between the primary and the actual referent of the word and (c) sanction for the transferred sense by popular usage, or a definite motive justifying the transfer.¹ Of these three conditions the first two are accepted by all writers; but the motive element justifying the use of a metaphor which has not received the sanction of established usage is not stressed by the earlier writers; even later writers belonging to the other schools of thought are not interested in the motive element in *lakṣaṇā*; it is only the literary critics who give great prominence to it.

The well-known example of *lakṣaṇā* in Sanskrit is the sentence *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges). Here the primary meaning of the word *gaṅgāyām* is 'on the river Ganges'; this is not suitable to the context, since the village cannot actually be on the stream itself; hence the actual meaning of the word *gaṅgā* is taken to be *gaṅgātata* 'the bank of the river Ganges'; the relation between the normal meaning of the word and its actual meaning here is one of proximity (*sāmīpya*).² This secondary meaning

¹ *Kāvyaprakāśa*, II. 9;

*mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito 'tha prayojanāt
anyo 'rtho lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā.*

See also *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 5.

² In English the expression 'a village on the river' does not seem to be a transfer, since it is sanctioned by everyday usage. One of the normal meanings of the preposition 'on' is accepted to be 'nearness', so that the expression 'a village on the river' can directly mean 'a village on the bank of the river'.

of the word is not understood directly from the word, but only indirectly through its primary and normal meaning. It is the normal meaning that occurs to our mind immediately on hearing a word; when this is found to be incompatible with the context, we resort to *lakṣaṇā* and get the actual sense which is related to the normal one and which removes the incompatibility. The special motive underlying the metaphorical usage is rather vague and depends mainly on contextual factors; in the present case it may be to indicate that the village has the qualities of sanctity and coolness associated with the sacred river.

The Normal and the Actual Meanings in a Transfer

Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra-s* applies the term *upacāra* to this secondary function of words. He says that such transfer of meaning is quite common, when the actual referent is closely related to the normal and primary referent, and he enumerates with examples ten such relations.¹

(a) ASSOCIATION. e.g. *yaṣṭikāṃ bhojaya* (Feed the stick). In this sentence the Brahmin is referred to as 'stick', as he is always associated with the stick which he carries. Another example of the same relation is the use of the term *kuntāḥ* (lances) for 'the lance-bearers' in the sentence *kuntāḥ praviṣanti* (The lances enter).

¹ *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 2. 62: *sahacaraṇa-sthāna-tādarthyā-ṛtta-māna-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya-yoga-sādhana-dhīpatyebhyo brāhmaṇa-maṇca-kaṣa-rāja-saktu-candana-gaṅgā-śāṭakā-nna-puruṣeṣv atadbhāve 'pi tadupacāraḥ*. See also Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* on the *sūtra*.

(b) LOCATION. e.g. *mañcāḥ krośanti* (The cots cry). Here the term *mañca* (cot) is used to refer to 'the children on the cot'.

(c) PURPOSE. e.g. *kaṭam karoti* (He makes a mat). The sentence means: 'He collects reeds for the purpose of making a mat.' Here the reeds intended for making a mat are referred to as a mat.

(d) BEHAVIOUR. e.g. *yamo rājā* (The king is the God of Death). Here the term *yama* (God of Death) is used in the sense of 'one who acts like Yama'.

(e) MEASURE. e.g. *āḍhakaśaktavaḥ* (One *āḍhaka* of flour). Here the term *āḍhaka* denoting the measure is used to mean 'that which is measured' (*āḍhakena mitāḥ śaktavaḥ*).

(f) WEIGHING. e.g. *tulācandanam* (One *tulā* of sandal). Here *tulā* is used in the sense of 'that which is weighed in the balance' (*tulāyām dhṛtaṁ candanam*).¹

(g) PROXIMITY. e.g. *gaṅgāyām gāvaś caranti* (The cows are grazing on the Ganges). Here *gaṅgā* is used in the sense of 'the bank of the Ganges'.

(h) INHERENT CONNECTION. e.g. *kṛṣṇaḥ śāṭakaḥ* (the black cloth). The word 'black' primarily means

¹ (e) and (f) are similar; the former refers to the measurement of volume, and the latter to the measurement of weight. *Āḍhaka* primarily means the measure and secondarily the volume measured by it; *tulā* primarily means the balance which gives a particular weight, and secondarily that which is weighed in it. According to Pāṇini such shifts of meaning are included

‘blackness’ but here it means ‘the thing having blackness’. The use of the term denoting quality for the thing qualified (e.g. ‘I love beauty’) come under this.

(i) CAUSE. e.g. *annam prāṇāḥ* (Food is life). Here food which is the cause of life is referred to as life itself.

(j) PROMINENCE. e.g. *ayaṁ kulam* (He is the family). Here *kula* is used in the sense of the prominent person in the *kula* (family).

In all these examples Gautama gives popular examples of figurative usage from everyday life; the list is intended only to be illustrative, and not to be exhaustive. He also refers¹ to the Mīmāṃsaka view that the primary meaning of every word is the universal and that the particular to which it refers in a sentence is known through the secondary function *upacāra*; but he does not accept that view, since according to him a word means the universal, the form and the particular.

In the *Mahābhāṣya*, Patañjali too discusses such transference of meaning.² He gives four different relations between the primary and the actual referents in such cases, and illustrates them with examples.

(a) LOCATION. e.g. *mañcā hasanti* (The cots laugh), *girir dahyate* (The hill is burning). Here the term ‘cots’ stands for ‘the children in the cots’ and the term ‘hill’ stands for ‘the trees on the hill’.

in the primary sense itself. See Pāṇini, II. 3. 46. *vide supra*, p. 41. Also Thieme, ‘Pāṇini and the Pāṇinīyas’, *JAOS*, vol. 76, p. 9 f. K. Kunjunni Raja, ‘Pāṇini’s Attitude towards *Lakṣaṇā*’, *ALB*, vol. 29, pp. 177-87. ¹ *Nyāyasūtra*, II. 2. 64.

² *Mbh*, II, p. 218: *caturbhiḥ prakārair atasmin sa ity etad bhavati, tātsthyāt, tāddharmyāt, tatsāmīpyāt, tatsāhacaryād iti*.

(b) QUALITY. e.g. *jaṭi brahmadattaḥ* (The man with matted hair is Brahmadatta). It means that he is like Brahmadatta and is worthy of the same treatment.¹

(c) PROXIMITY. e.g. *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges), *kūpe gargakulam* (Garga's house is on the well).

(d) ASSOCIATION. e.g. *kuntān praveśaya* (Fetch the lances), *yaṣṭiḥ praveśaya* (Fetch the sticks). Here the terms 'lances' and 'sticks' are used to indicate those who carry them.

The Mīmāṃsaka-s in their attempt to find out the basic rules of interpretation so as to explain the Vedic passages in a sensible manner have naturally to deal with metaphorical transfers of meaning. In the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*-s, Jaimini enumerates six bases for figurative description;² these are explained in detail by Śabara in his *bhāṣya*.

(a) TATSIDDHI (Accomplishment of the purpose). e.g. *yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ*³ (The grass-bundle is the sacrificer), *yajamāno vā ekakapālaḥ*⁴ (The *puroḍāśa* cake prepared in a single pan is the sacrificer). These Vedic sentences are not to be taken literally, since in that

¹ The well-known example is *siṃho māṇavakaḥ* (The boy is a lion). *Laghumañjūṣā* (p. 134) wrongly gives this example as from the *Mbh*.

² *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, I. 4. 23: *tatsiddhi-jāti-sārūpya-praśaṃsā-bhūma-liṅgasamavāya iti guṇāśrayāḥ*. See also Śabara's *bhāṣya* on that.

³ *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, II. 6. 5.

⁴ *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, I. 6. 3. 4; *ekakapāla* means that which is prepared in one pan, and refers to the *puroḍāśa* cake.

case they would be nonsensical. They have to be explained in a figurative sense. The grass-bundle and the cake accomplish the purpose served by the sacrificer, and hence are indicated by the term 'sacrificer'.

(b) JĀTI (Same origin).¹ e.g. *āgneyo vai brāhmaṇaḥ*² (The Brahmin is Āgneya). This figurative use is based on the fact that both the Brahmin and Agni are said to have had the same origin from Prajāpati.

(c) SĀRŪPYA (Similarity). e.g. *ādityo yūpaḥ*³ (The sacrificial post is the sun). This metaphor is based on the similarity of the post to the sun in brightness and height, and is meant to eulogize the post.

(d) PRAŚAMSĀ (Praise). e.g. *apaśavo vā anye go-asvebhyaḥ* (Those other than cows and horses are not animals), *yan malinam avāsas tat* (That which is dirty is not clothing), *yad aghṛtam abhojanam tat* (That without butter is not food). In these cases the words *paśu* (animal), *vāsas* (clothing) and *bhojana* (food) are used pregnantly in the sense of 'praiseworthy animals', etc.⁴

¹ See Kumārilabhaṭṭa in *Tantravārttika*, p. 362: *jātir iti cātra janmopādānaṃ vivakṣitam*.

² *Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa*, II. 7. 3. 1.

³ *ibid.*, II. 2. 5. 2.

⁴ These are similar to the *arthāntarasamkramitavācya* variety of *dhvani* of the later Ālaṃkārika-s. Even the pregnant use of words as in 'A is A' (An explosive is an explosive; it must be guarded with constant precaution) is similar (cf. Empson, *The Structure of Complex Words*, p. 351).

These examples could also be explained by taking the negative prefix to mean incomplete or imperfect nature, rather than complete negation. Cf. *anudarā kanyā*, 'a girl without a waistline'.

(e) BHŪMA¹ (Preponderance). e.g. *sṛṣṭīr upada-dhāti* (The *sṛṣṭi* bricks are placed). Here the word *sṛṣṭi* means the bricks that are associated with a group of hymns with and without the word *sṛṣṭi*.

(f) LIṄGASAMAVĀYA (Presence of indicative sign). e.g. *chatrīṇo yānti* (People with umbrellas are going). Here the reference to the umbrella is only to indicate the people, not to describe them, and the sentence may be used even if there be only a few umbrellas. Similarly the sentence *daṇḍīno gacchanti* (People with sticks are going) can be applied for a group of people, some with and others without sticks.

According to Mukulabhaṭṭa,² the great Mīmāṃsā teacher Bhartṛmitra noted five relationships that generally exist between the primary and the actual referents in the case of a *lakṣaṇā*:

(a) ABHIDHEYA-SAMBANDHA (Some kind of relation with the literal meaning). e.g. *dvirepha* (literally, having two 'r's) which indicates 'the bee', through the word *bhramara*. Another example is *turaṅgakāntāna-nahavyavāhaḥ*³ in the sense of the submarine fire, through its relation to the word *baḍavāmukhāgni*. (*turaṅgakāntā* = mare = *baḍavā*; *ānana* = face = *mukha*; *havyavāha* = fire

¹ The examples of *bhūman* and *liṅgasamavāya* come under the *ajahatsvārthā* variety of *lakṣaṇā*. vide *infra*, p. 250.

² *Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā*, p. 17:

*abhidheyena sambandhāt sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ
vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāl lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā.*

Bhartṛmitra is considered to be an ancient Mīmāṃsaka.

³ *Śiśupālavadha*, III. 33.

=*agni*).¹ Such a *lakṣaṇā* is acceptable only if it is sanctioned by popular usage, or if there is a special motive for resorting to such circumlocution; otherwise it is a defect. This defect is called *neyārtha* by the *Ālaṃkārika*-s.² If the speaker invents such new words at will without any purpose, the listeners will not be able to understand him, and hence it is a defect. According to Mukulabhaṭṭa all cases where the expressed literal sense indirectly leads to some other idea are to be considered as instances of this type of *lakṣaṇā*; thus in the well-known example of *arthāpatti*, ‘*pīno devadattaḥ divā na bhuṅkte*’ (Devadatta who is fat does not eat during the day), the idea about Devadatta eating at night is obtained through *lakṣaṇā*. According to this all implied meanings will have to be brought under *lakṣaṇā*. This is not acceptable to others.

(b) *SĀDRŚYA* (Similarity). e.g. *siṃho māṇavakaḥ* (The boy is a lion).

(c) *SAMAVĀYA* (Association, such as proximity): e.g. *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges).

(d) *VAIPARĪTYA* (Contrariety). e.g. *bṛhaspatir ayaṃ mūrkhah* (This fool is the teacher of gods). All ironical sentences come under this type of *lakṣaṇā*.

(e) *KRIYĀYOGA* (Association with some action). e.g. *samare śatrughnas tvam* (You are Śatrughna in battle). The proper name is applied to one who fulfils its etymological sense of killing enemies.

¹ *Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā*, p. 11 f.

² *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, VII. 157.

Many other similar lists are given by later writers also. Nāgeśa gives¹ a list of five relations, adding *tādarthya* (purpose) to the four given by Patañjali. Mammāṭa, Viśvanātha and Hemacandra also give similar lists.² All these various relations between the primary and the actual referents necessary for *lakṣaṇā* could be arranged into two classes: (1) similarity and (2) relations other than similarity. Kumārilabhaṭṭa distinguishes clearly the transfer based on similarity or common qualities between the primary and actual referents, and that based on other relations. The former function is called *gauṇī vṛtti* and the latter *lakṣaṇā*. According to Kumārilabhaṭṭa and other Mīmāṃsaka-*gauṇī* and *lakṣaṇā* are two separate functions of words;³ but other schools of thought, who also accept this distinction, consider them as two varieties of the secondary power of words, and they use the term *lakṣaṇā* to cover both, the former being called *gauṇī lakṣaṇā* or *upacāra*⁴ and the latter *śuddhā* (pure) *lakṣaṇā*. There has been some confusion among writers in the use of the various terms, but there is no difference of

¹ *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*, p. 7:

*tātsthyāt tathaiva tāddharmyāt tatsāmīpyāt tathaiva ca
tatsāhacaryāt tādarthyāt jñeyā vai lakṣaṇā budhaiḥ.*

² *Kāvya prakāśa*, II. 9-12; *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 5-11; *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, p. 24 f.

³ *Tantravārttika*, p. 354:

*abhidheyāvinābhūte pravṛttir lakṣaṇeśyate
lakṣmāṇaguṇair yogād vṛtter iṣṭā tu gauṇatā.*

⁴ Har Datt Sharma, 'The Meaning of the Word "Upacāra"', *Poona Orientalist*, vol. I, pp. 26 ff.

opinion about the distinction between metaphors based on similarity and those based on other relations. Modern writers on semantics like Stern and Ullmann also make the same distinction between transfers based on similarity and those based on other relations.¹

Mammaṭa in his *Kāvya-prakāśa* quotes ² Kumārila-bhaṭṭa's definitions of *lakṣaṇā* and *gauṇī* and says that for pure *lakṣaṇā* there need not be any invariable concomitance between the primary and the actual referents. If there is an invariable association between the two, there could be no transfer in cases like *mañcāḥ krośanti* (The cots cry), since the relation between the cots and the children is only temporary. Moreover, there will be no necessity for resorting to transfer, since the related sense could be derived through implication itself. If the relation is one of similarity, the transfer is qualitative (*gauṇī*); if it is any other relation such as that of cause and effect, owner and owned, measure and measured, part and whole, etc., it is pure *lakṣaṇā*.

It is clear that the various schools of thought in India were unanimous in accepting that in a transfer there must be some kind of relation between the primary and the actual referents.³ The secondary meaning is

¹ *Meaning and Change of Meaning; The Principles of Semantics, passim.*

² *Kāvya-prakāśa*, loc. cit. (He quotes it as *abhidheyāvinābhūta-pratītiḥ*): *avinābhāvo 'tra sambandhamātram, na tu nāntarīyakatvam, tathāhve hi mañcāḥ krośantiyādau na lakṣaṇā syāt, avinābhāve cākṣepenaiva siddher lakṣaṇāyā nopayoga ity uktam.*

³ Hence it seems strange that some of the later writers should have overlooked this fundamental point in the course of their

resorted to when the primary meaning is found incompatible with the context. This secondary meaning is not got immediately and directly from the word, but only through the primary meaning. The knowledge of the actual referent arises only indirectly; first we understand the primary meaning of the word; when this is found unsuitable in the context, the meaning is transferred to something related to the primary sense.

Gauṇī Vṛtti (Qualitative Transfer)

Following Śābara, Kumārilabhaṭṭa discusses some of the theories about the real nature of a qualitative metaphor such as *siṃho devadattaḥ* (Devadatta is a lion).

(a) One theory is that the word 'lion' is denotative of the whole aggregate of the class, its qualities and actions. Even though all the elements of this meaning

arguments. Thus to show that the condition for a transfer is not the impossibility of the literal sense in the context, but its incompatibility with the intention of the speaker, it is argued that in the well-known example *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges), it is the intention of the speaker that gives the meaning 'the bank of the Ganges' to the word *gaṅgā*, and that if the intention were otherwise, the implied meaning of the term *ghoṣa* (village) might be 'fish', since even by resorting to that sense the impossibility of the literal sense in the context could be removed. See *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 287: *yadi cānvayānupapattir lakṣaṇābījaṃ syāt tadā kvacid gaṅgāpadasya tīre kvacid ghoṣapadasya matsyāḍau lakṣaṇeti niyamo na syāt*. Also, *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 114. In this argument they forget that there is no conceivable relation between the village and fish and that such a transfer of meaning is not at all possible. (See also *supra*, p. 177.)

are not applicable to the boy Devadatta, the word is applied to him indirectly on the basis of some of the elements found in him.¹ Śabara rejects this view on the ground that an aggregate cannot refer to one part separately. As Kumārilabhaṭṭa says, the term 'hundred' cannot refer to 'fifty' even though the latter is part of the total aggregate.² Moreover, according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, the primary meaning of a word is the universal, and not actions or qualities.

(b) Another theory that Kumāriḷa discusses is that in a qualitative metaphor the character of one is imposed on another.³ In the sentence *siṃho devadattaḥ* (Devadatta is a lion) the complete nature of the lion is imposed on Devadatta on the basis of the actions and qualities of Devadatta which are found to be similar to those of the lion. Śabara and Kumārilabhaṭṭa criticize this view on the ground that such an identity is absolutely impossible, since the man and the lion have distinct characteristics. It is only under delusion on the part of the speaker, or the hearer, or both that the characteristics of one object can be imposed on another.

¹ *Tantravārttika*, p. 356 : *anyeṣāṃ tu darśanaṃ sarva eva hi siṃhādiśabdā jāṭiguṇakriyāsamudāyavācinaḥ samastārthāsambhave devadattādiṣu katipayaguṇakriyāyogād upacaryanta iti.*

This is similar to the view mentioned by Stern (*Meaning and Change of Meaning*, p. 304) : 'In this case, as in most other cases, it is one element of the many in the meaning of "lion" that is intended by the speaker.'

² *ibid.* : *samudāyārthavācītvē naikadeśe bhaved gatīḥ śataśabdān na pañcāśan mukhyarūpeṇa gamyate.*

³ *ibid.*, p. 357 : *kaścit punar āha samāropitatadbhāvo gaṇa iti.*

There is, thus, the imposition of water on a mirage. But in the case of a metaphor there is no delusion; both the speaker and the listeners are equally aware of the difference between the man and the lion; hence none can have the power to impose the character of the lion on the boy.¹ Here an important linguistic principle is pointed out that in all cases of intentional metaphors there must be the awareness of the distinction between the primary and the actual referents. As the criterion of the definition of a metaphor, Stählin observes² the same point that 'the transfer does not involve an essential identity between the two referents'.

(c) The Mīmāṃsaka view is that a qualitative metaphor is based on the existence of certain common qualities between the primary and the actual referents. They argue that all significations of a word are, in some way, connected with its primary meaning, and that we should not assume any other potency in a word, if it is possible to explain the secondary meanings also as derived from the primary ones.³ In the sentence *siṃho devadattaḥ* (Devadatta is a lion) the word *siṃha* (lion) connotes the universal *siṃhatva* (lion-ness) which indicates such qualities as courage, the presence

¹ *ibid.*, p. 358:

*dvāu api pratipadyete siṃhapuṃsor viviktatām
nādhyaṛopayitum śaktiḥ tenaikasyāpi vidyate.*

² Quoted by Stern, *loc. cit.*

³ *Tantravārttika*, p. 356: *ajahatsvārthāḥ sarvāḥ śabdapravṛttayaḥ,
pūrvāśaktyanusārasambhave śaktyantarakalpane pramāṇābhāvāt.*

of which in Devadatta justifies calling him a lion.¹ This interpretation is quite sufficient to explain the usage. If, on the other hand, we begin to assume that a word has different meanings in different contexts, there will be confusion, since it will be difficult to understand the precise meaning of a word, and since we will be forced at times to assume for words meanings not at all well known.

Whenever we hear a word, it is only the well-known, normal primary sense that we recognize immediately.² Then we find that it is not compatible with the context and so we know that the word has been used figuratively on the basis of the similarity between the primary and the actual referents. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka asserts that the figurative meaning proceeds directly from the primary meaning itself. The power that resides in the word as significativeness is only with reference to the primary referent; other figurative meanings are derived from this and are dependent on this.³

A Buddhist View

There is a discussion on the true nature of the transfer of meaning in a qualitative metaphor like

¹ cf. *ibid.*, p. 354:

*vahnitvalakṣitād arthād yat paiṅgalyādi gamyate
tena māṇavake buddhiḥ sādṛśyād upajāyate.*

² *ibid.*, p. 358: *pūrvānubhūta evārthaḥ smaryate prathamam padāt.*

³ *ibid.*: *sarvathā tāvad ayaṁ gaṇamukhyavibhāgaḥ śrotṛṇām artha-
viśeṣāvadhāraṇe vyāpṛiyate. te ca padavelāyām anadhyāropitasvārthavṛtti*

agnir māṇavakaḥ (The boy is fire) in Sthiramati's commentary on the *Triṃśikā* of Vasubandhu. The three relevant conditions that are generally accepted as essential for a qualitative metaphor are given there¹ as (a) the primary referent of the word, (b) the actual referent resembling the primary one and (c) a common quality existing between the two. In the case of the example considered, the primary meaning of the word *agni* is 'fire', the actual referent is the boy who resembles it and the qualities common to both are the bright, tawny colour and the fiery nature.

An objection is raised against this common view. The metaphor cannot be applied to the boy either on the basis of the universal common attribute of 'fire-ness' or on the basis of the qualities in a particular fire. The colour or the fiery nature is not an essential quality of the fire, as otherwise the 'fire-ness' will be present in the boy also, and there will be no necessity for a metaphorical transfer. Again, it cannot be applied to the boy on the basis of the qualities in a particular fire, for quality being inseparably linked with the substratum, the brightness of the boy is essentially different from the brightness of the fire. What we can say is that the quality of the fire is similar to that of the boy; the

eva śiṃhādīpadam adhyavasāya devadattādīpadasāmānādhikaraṇyānyathānupapātyā gaṇatām kalpayanti.

¹ *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pt. I, p. 17: *upacāro hi triṣu bhavati nānyatamābhāve, mukhyāpadārthe tatsadṛṣe tayoś ca sādṛṣye. tad yathā mukhye 'gnau tatsadṛṣe māṇavake tayoś ca sādḥāraṇadharme kapilātve tikṣṇātve vā saty agnir māṇavaka ity upacāraḥ kriyate.*

quality can be metaphorically applied to that of the boy, but not to the boy himself.¹

Moreover, according to the Buddhist logicians there is no primary referent for a word; for the essential nature of an object transcends the pale of all forms of knowledge and expression. Each word is applied to its object only indirectly by a sort of transfer, or *upacāra*. The thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) cannot be directly denoted by a word.² It is only the mental image, or *vikalpa*, that is denoted by words, and this image is not an objective reality, being the negation of its counter-correlate (*anyāpoha*), the exclusion of all things other than itself.

We meet the same view in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* of the Buddhist writer Nāgārjuna also.³ There, as a *prima facie* objection, it is said that if the words are themselves devoid of essential nature, it should not be possible to apply them to refute that essential nature. Non-existent fire does not burn; then how could words which have no reality be used to prove that very

¹ *ibid.*: *avinābhāvitve copacārābhāvo 'gnāu iva māṇavake 'pi jāti-sadbhāvāt. tasmān na māṇavake jātyupacārah sambhavati. nāpi dravyopacārah, sāmānyadharmābhāvāt. na hi yo 'gnes tikṣṇo guṇaḥ kapilo vā sa eva māṇavake . . . evam agni-guṇasyaiva māṇavakagūṇe sādṛśyād upacāro yuktah.*

³ *ibid.*: *mukhyapadārtho nāsti, tasya sarvajñānābhidhānaviśayaṭi-krāntatvāt . . . api ca sarva evāyaṃ guṇa eva, na mukhyo 'sti.*

² *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, p. 1:

*sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet
tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvaṃ alam.*

unreality? ¹ The answer is to be found in the Buddhist view that even though words have no direct connection with the ultimate reality, they have the power of practical utility (*arthakriyākāritā*) as they can refer to the objects indirectly through metaphoric transfer, or *upacāra*.

It may be observed that among the schools which are opposed to the Buddhists and which accept the primary meaning of words to be the universal, some of the Mīmāṃsaka-s also accept that it is through the secondary significative power that words denote the particular objects in a sentence. According to them the primary meaning of a word is the universal which is the essential quality common to all the particular instances of the class; but when the word is used in a sentence it has to refer to the particulars. Some scholars assume that the particular comes from the universal because of the invariable connection between the two, while others explain it as being due to the secondary significative power, or transfer.²

Thus to the Buddhists of the Yogācāra school, as well as to some of the Mīmāṃsaka-s, there is an element of transfer of meaning even in ordinary sentences. So the normal cases of transfers like 'The boy is fire'

¹ *ibid.*, p. 2: *na hy asadagninā śakyam dagdhum . . . evam asatā vacanena na śakyaḥ sarvabhāvaḥ pratiśedhaḥ kartum*. cf. Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. 2. 28 for such an argument.

² *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 17 ff.: *katham tarhi gavādīpadād vyakter bhānam iti cet, jāter vyaktisamānasamvitsamvedyatvād iti brūmaḥ. . . . athavā vyakter lakṣaṇayāvagamah.*

have to be considered as transfers of the second degree. Such qualitative metaphors are termed *gauṇī* by the Mīmāṃsaka-s. But to the Buddhists the first type of ordinary usage is a metaphoric transfer from the absolute point of view (*pāramārthika*), whereas ordinary metaphors are transfers from the worldly (*vyāvahārika*) point of view.

Jahallakṣaṇā, Ajahallakṣaṇā and Jahadajahallakṣaṇā

We have seen that in all cases of metaphorical transfer of meaning there should be some intimate relation between the primary and the actual referents. According to the degree of intimacy to which the primary meaning is retained in the actual meaning it is possible to distinguish three kinds of *lakṣaṇā*-s. Of course in a transfer one cannot exclude completely the primary meaning of the word; but its retention may be to a greater or lesser extent.¹

(a) *Jahallakṣaṇā* or *Jahatsvārthā lakṣaṇā*: In a sentence like *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges), the primary sense of the term *gaṅgā* (Ganges) is abandoned and the secondary meaning 'the bank of the Ganges' is taken. This is *jahallakṣaṇā*. In this type of *lakṣaṇā* there will be the non-intelligibility of the syntactical relation between the terms, if we take the primary meaning of the word; hence the primary

¹ cf. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, IV. I. 6: *lakṣaṇā ca yathāsaṃbhavaṃ saṃnikṛṣṭena viprakṛṣṭena vā svārthasaṃbandhena pravartate*.

Also Kumārilabhaṭṭa, *Tantravārttika*, p. 356: *ajahatsvārthāḥ sarvāḥ śabdapravṛttayah*.

sense has to be rejected to a great extent and another sense connected with it has to be taken to suit the context. Mammaṭa calls it *lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā*.

(b) *Ajahallakṣaṇā* or *Ajahatsvārthā lakṣaṇā*: It is not necessary that the primary sense should be completely excluded in all cases of transfers.¹ Sometimes the primary sense is not substantially modified, but only specified by context, or restricted by its syntactic function, or extended by the inclusion of another sense. In all such cases the secondary sense includes the primary sense also. In the example *kuntāḥ praviśanti* (The lances enter) the word *kuntāḥ* indicates through *lakṣaṇā* the lances and also the men who carry them. The sentence *chattriṇo yānti* (People with umbrellas are going) indicates, through *lakṣaṇā*, a group consisting of some with and others without umbrellas. And in the Vedic example *sṛṣṭir upadadhāti* (The *sṛṣṭi* bricks are placed), the word *sṛṣṭi* means, by *lakṣaṇā*, the bricks that are associated with a group of hymns with and without the word *sṛṣṭi*. This type of transfer is called *ajahallakṣaṇā*. Mammaṭa calls it *upādānalakṣaṇā*.² According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s the primary meaning of a word is the universal; its power is exhausted on expressing the general sense, and the meaning of the particular has to be got through *lakṣaṇā* of the *ajahatsvārthā* type.³ Mammaṭa does not accept the necessity of assuming

¹ *Tattvabindu*, p. 155: *na ca sarvatra svārthaparitṛyāgenaiva lakṣaṇetyaikāntikam. lakṣaṇīyānurodhenaiva hi sarvatra parigraha-paritṛyāgau.*

² loc. cit.

³ *vide supra*, pp. 72 ff.

lakṣaṇā to get the idea of the particular from that of the universal; he follows the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsaka-s in maintaining that, on account of the invariable connection between the universal and the particular, the latter is cognized as implied in the former.

(c) *Jahadajahallakṣaṇā*: Besides these two varieties of *lakṣaṇā* the Vedāntin-s accept a third variety, called *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, in cases where only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is preserved, while the rest is rejected.¹ In examples like *paṭo dagdhaḥ* (The cloth is burnt) or *grāmo dagdhaḥ* (The village is burnt), it is only a part of the cloth or village that is actually meant as having been burnt. Only a part of the primary meaning of the word *paṭa* or *grāma* is retained. Again in a sentence like *so 'yaṃ devadattaḥ* (This is that Devadatta), the term *saḥ* (that) refers to Devadatta as determined by the past time and space and the term *ayam* (this) refers to the same Devadatta as determined by the present time and space. The sentence does not mean that the two incompatible determinants 'this' and 'that' are identical; nor does it mean that the person as determined in the term 'this' is identical with him when determined in the term 'that'. It only means the identity of the substantive Devadatta, by rejecting the incompatible elements. The two qualified entities cannot be

¹ Datta, op. cit., p. 283; Huparikar, op. cit., p. 470 f.; *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, IV. 26.

identical; but they refer to the same substantive, Devadatta. So the identity here refers to the individual Devadatta who is unrelated to time, past or present. The Vedāntin-s are very much interested in this type of *lakṣaṇā* since they have to explain sentences such as *tat tvam asi*¹ (Thou art That) and *aham brahmāsmi*² (I am Brahman). In the sentence ' *tat tvam asi* ' *tvam* (thou) as part of the sentence does not mean 'Śvetaketu as son of Uddālaka', but as stripped of all individual attributes such as limited intelligence; *tad* (That) means the Universal Soul, stripped of all qualifications such as omniscience. It is only the Pure Consciousness in the individual soul that is identified with that in the Universal Soul. Such instances where a word signifying a qualified entity gives up one part of its primary meaning and retains another part, belong to the *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*.³ Sadānanda in his *Vedāntasāra*⁴ calls it *bhāgalakṣaṇā*. It is also known as *bhāgatyaḡalakṣaṇā* (a transfer where a part of the primary sense is rejected).⁵

¹ *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, VI. 8. 7. ² *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad*, I. 4. 10.

³ Mallinātha in his commentary on *Ekāvali* (p. 68) defines it thus:

*svārthaikāṃśatyāḡād aṃśāntaram eva lakṣyate yatra
sā jahadajahatsvārthā tat tvam asityādiviṣayadṛśyeyam.*

See also Śaṅkara, *Svātmanirūpaṇa*, v. 35:

*jahadajahatīti sā syād yā vācyārthaikadeśam apahāya
bodhayati caikadeśam so 'yaṃ dvija itivād āśrayed enām.*

Vedāntaparibhāṣā, IV. 26: *yatra hi viśiṣṭavācakah śabdah svārthai-
kadeśam vihāya ekadeśe vartate, tatra jahadajahallakṣaṇā.*

⁴ *Vedāntasāra*, p. 95.

⁵ Appayadikṣita, *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha*, p. 55.

Discussing such sentences as 'A is B', William Empson says ¹ that if the identity is accepted literally, it becomes nonsense and consequently, there is a feeling of resistance. When the machinery of interpretation is brought into play, there is a feeling of richness about the possible interpretations. This view is similar to that of the Indian philosophers; but later, when Empson says ² that 'people who believe "*hoc est corpus*" or "That art Thou" would strongly deny that they are metaphors', he seems unconscious of the fact that the Indian philosophers actually included the sentence *tat tvam asi* under metaphor, though they distinguish it from purely qualitative metaphors like 'The boy is a lion'. But it is true that Ālaṃkārika-s and the Naiyāyika-s do not recognize this type of metaphor.

The theory of *lakṣaṇā* is important in all philosophical systems which try to discuss the nature of the ultimate Reality which is beyond expression. In the ordinary sense of the word the Absolute is beyond definition. Śaṃkara himself says in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣadbhāṣya* ³ that words denote things through one or the other of the following: name, form, action, distinction, genus and quality; but in Brahman there is none of these differences and hence It cannot be

¹ *The Structure of Complex Words*, p. 334.

² *ibid.*, p. 351.

³ II. 3. 6: *nāma vā rūpaṃ vā karma vā bhedo vā jātir vā guṇo vā, taddvāreṇa hi śabdapravṛttir bhavati, na caiṣāṃ kaścīd viśeṣo brahmany asti, ato na nirdeṣṭuṃ śakyate.*

described.¹ When Brahman is described as Intelligence, Bliss, etc., It is described by means of a name, form or action superimposed on It. If we want to describe Its true nature free from the difference due to the limiting adjuncts, it is an impossibility. The only way is by negation, 'Not this, not this'. However, it is possible for words to suggest meanings and ideas beyond the range of their expressive power. Vague suggestions may be useful in poetry, but not in logical discussions of philosophical problems. Metaphorical expressions which are fundamentally based on the literal meanings are helpful in extending the range of expression without making the idea too vague for objective communication.

(d) *Lakṣitalakṣaṇā*. A fourth variety of *lakṣaṇā* called *lakṣitalakṣaṇā* is recognized by some of the early writers. This occurs when the relation between the primary and the actual referents is not direct, but indirect through some other word, as in the case of the word *dvirepha*.² Here the literal meaning of the word is 'a word having two "r"s' and it indicates the word *bhramara*, and through that word it means the 'bee'. According to the modern Naiyāyika-s, however, it can

¹ But see Bhartṛhari who says that there is nothing inexpressible; if there is anything, then the word 'inexpressible' will apply to it.

VP, III. 3. 20:

*avācyaṃ iti yad vācyaṃ tad avācyaṭayā yadā
vācyaṃ ity avasīyeta vācyaṃ eva tadā bhavet.*

² *Nyāyakośa*, p. 702; Datta, op. cit., p. 283.

be included under *jahallakṣaṇā* itself. According to the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* even qualitative metaphor (*gaunī vṛtti*) comes under this type of *lakṣaṇā*, since the relation between the two referents in such cases is only indirect, effected through the implication of the common quality.¹

Śuddhā, Sāropā and Sādhyavasānā

Mukulabhaṭṭa in the *Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā*² gives another threefold classification of *lakṣaṇā*. (a) When the actual referent appears to be aloof and clearly distinct from the primary referent, it is the *śuddhā* or pure type. (b) When the difference between the two referents is not clear and there is superimposition of the one on the other, it is called the *sāropā* (superimponent) type. (c) And when the apparent closeness of the two referents is so great that there is no apprehension of the difference at all, it is the *sādhyavasānā* type of *lakṣaṇā* (intro-susceptive). In this third variety the object of superimposition is completely eclipsed or swallowed by the thing superimposed; the former is not expressed by a word, only the latter is expressed instead. The *sāropā* and the *sādhyavasānā* types of *lakṣaṇā*-s, especially when they are based on similarity, play a great part in the literary figures of speech; the *sāropā* type is the basis of the figure of

¹ Thus 'You are a lion' means: You possess the courage which is implied in 'lion-ness'. See Datta, loc. cit.

² *Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā*, p. 9:

*taśaśthe lakṣaṇā śuddhā syād āropas tv adūrage
nigīrṇe 'dhyavasānaṃ tu rūḍhy āsannataratvataḥ.*

speech *rūpaka*, as in *mukhaṃ candraḥ* (The face is the moon), and the *sādhyaśānā* type is the basis of the figure of speech *rūpakātīśayokti* as in *ayaṃ candraḥ* (This is the moon) referring to the face. Criticizing this view Mammaṭa says¹ that there can be no complete aloofness between the primary and the actual referents even in instances like *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges), since the motive element underlying the transfer could be got only by apprehending their identity.²

Classification of Lakṣaṇā

We have seen that *lakṣaṇā* could be classified from various points of view: (a) on the basis of the nature of the relation between the primary and the actual referents, (b) on the basis of the intensity of that relation and (c) by the degree of distinction between the two. Again the transfer can be intentional (*prayojanavati*) or natural (*nirūḍhā*). There are minor differences of opinion among scholars about the subdivisions;³ but the main bases of classification are accepted by all.

¹ *Kāvya-prakāśa*, loc. cit.

² It is clear that the identity referred to for a *lakṣaṇā* is a kind of false identity, as otherwise there will be no incompatibility of the primary sense. cf. Kumārila's statement about *gaṇi vṛtti* given above on p. 244.

³ While Vidyānātha in the *Pratāparudrīya* speaks of only four varieties of *lakṣaṇā*, Viśvanātha mentions eighty subdivisions. For details see P. V. Kane, *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Notes, p. 63.

BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION	NAME OF THE SUBDIVISION
(a) Nature of relation between primary and actual referents.	1. Similarity <i>Gauṇī lakṣaṇā</i> or <i>Gauṇī vṛtti</i> . 2. Other relations <i>Suddhā lakṣaṇā</i> .
(b) Intensity of relation between the referents (this division is not applicable to <i>Gauṇī lakṣaṇā</i>).	1. Primary sense rejected <i>Jahallakṣaṇā</i> or <i>Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā</i> . 2. Primary sense partly retained <i>Ajahallakṣaṇā</i> or <i>Upādānalakṣaṇā</i> . 3. Primary sense partly retained <i>Jahadajahallakṣaṇā</i> or <i>Bhāgatyaṅgalakṣaṇā</i> . 4. Relation being indirect <i>Lakṣitalakṣaṇā</i> .
(c) Degree of distinction between the two referents.	1. Completely distinct <i>Suddhā</i> (not applicable to <i>Gauṇī lakṣaṇā</i>). 2. Actual referent falsely identified with the primary one <i>Sāropā</i> . 3. Actual referent falsely identified with and eclipsed by the primary referent <i>Sādhyavasānā</i> .
(d) Purpose.	1. Intentional <i>Prayojanavati</i> . 2. Unintentional <i>Nirūdhā</i> .

Incompatibility of the Primary Sense

Incompatibility of the primary sense in the context is an essential condition for *lakṣaṇā*, since no recourse to a secondary figurative meaning is necessary so long as the primary meaning itself serves the context. The direct and natural relation of a word is with its primary meaning, and it is this primary meaning that comes to our mind as soon as we hear the word. It is only when this meaning brings about some resistance to the understanding of the sentence owing to its unsuitability in the context that we try to explain it with the help of the secondary significative force of the word. As Śābara repeatedly points out, it is to be resorted to only when the direct meaning of the word is clearly impossible in the context; whenever the direct statement and the implied meaning are in conflict, preference is to be given to the former.¹

According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s the secondary meaning of a word is known through a reasoning of the *arthāpatti* type, which consists in the postulation of a fact to explain two known facts which are apparently unaccountable. In the well-known example, *pīṇo devadattaḥ divā na bhuṅkte* (The fat Devadatta does not eat during the day), the two known facts, namely, Devadatta being fat and his not eating during the day, are contradictory unless we postulate the fact that he

¹ Śābarabhāṣya on sūtra I. 4. 2: *śrutilakṣaṇāviśaye ca śrutir jyāyasi*; IV. 3. 26: *śrutiś ca lakṣaṇāyā garīyasi*; VI. 1. 51: *śrutilakṣaṇāviśaye ca śrutir nyāyā, na lakṣaṇā*; VII. 2. 13: *agatiś caiṣā yal lakṣaṇāśrayanam*.

eats at night. In the case of *lakṣaṇā* we have to find a way to reconcile two known facts, namely, the primary meaning of the word known through remembrance and the intention of the speaker inferred from the context. When a boy is spoken of as a lion, the primary meaning of the term 'lion' is found to be impossible and the secondary meaning is known, through immediate inference of the *arthāpatti* type, to be 'one similar to a lion in courage, etc.' as the only one which is related to the primary meaning of the term and which can remove the conflict between the primary meaning and the contextual meaning.¹

Now, what is meant by the incompatibility of the literal sense (*mukhyārthabādha* or *anupapatti*)? According to the ancient Naiyāyika-s and the later Ālaṃkārika-s it is only the impossibility of establishing the logical connection in the sentence. The Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Prābhākara school also take this view; Śālikanātha defines *lakṣaṇā* as 'that which is resorted to for conveying a new sense which can be related to the sentence-meaning through the cognition of its primary sense, when that primary sense of the word has no logical connection with the sentence-meaning.'² But according to the later Naiyāyika-s and the Vedāntin-s, as well as the later grammarians, the incompatibility of the primary sense lies not merely in the difficulty of

¹ Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 284.

² *Vākyārthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 13:

*vācyaśārthasya vākyārthe sambandhānupapattitah
tatsambandhavaśāpṛāptasyānvayāl lakṣaṇā matā.*

establishing the logical connection in the sentence, but in the unsuitability of the primary sense with the intended sense in the context (*tātparyānupapatti*).¹ The Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Bhāṭṭa school also favour this view; in the *Tattvabindu*² Vācaspati criticizes Śālikanātha's definition of *lakṣaṇā* and says that any kind of incompatibility of the primary sense should be taken as the condition of *lakṣaṇā*, not merely its incompatibility with the sentence meaning.

In all cases of *lakṣaṇā* where the primary meaning of a word is not retained (*jahallakṣaṇā*) as in *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges) that primary sense is unsuitable in establishing logical connection with the sentence-meaning. But in cases where the primary sense is not completely rejected (*ajahallakṣaṇā*) the sentence-meaning can still be understood if the word is taken in its primary sense, and hence there will be no *lakṣaṇā*, if we take the first of the above-mentioned explanations of 'incompatibility of primary sense'. Thus the sentence *chattriṇo yānti* (The men with umbrellas are marching) can mean 'a group of people with and without umbrellas are marching', even though the literal meaning refers only to the umbrella-bearers. Similarly, in a sentence, *kākebhya dadhi rakṣyatām* (Protect the curd from crows), the primary meaning of the word *kāka* (crow) is not

¹ *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, p. 285: *lakṣaṇā śakyasaṃbandhas tātparyānupapattitāḥ*; *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 114: *vastutas tu tātparyānupapattir eva tadbijam*; *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 30.

² p. 156 f.

impossible in the context; but it is clear that the intention is to have the curd protected from all animals. To include all such instances under *lakṣaṇā* we have to take incompatibility with the intended sense as the condition for *lakṣaṇā*. Moreover, all cases of impossibility of establishing logical connection with the sentence-meaning can be explained by the incompatibility of the literal sense with the intention of the speaker or the purport of the sentence.¹

Those who hold impossibility of establishing a logical connection with the sentence-meaning as the condition of *lakṣaṇā* explain such instances by taking the words to be the *upalakṣaṇa* for the actual referents. Thus in *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām*, the word *kāka* (crow) is an *upalakṣaṇa* for all animals that might eat the curd (*dadhyupaghātaka-s*). *Upalakṣaṇa* is the act of implying any analogous object where only one is specified. The word *kāka* (crow) is an indication for the animals which might eat the curd; the word is a means of referring to the whole group including the crow to which the literal meaning of the word refers.²

One of the conditions for a sentence is accepted to be *yogyatā* or congruity of sense; a decisive knowledge of congruity is a pre-requisite for arriving at a valid judgment from a statement.³ Thus the statement *agninā siñcati* (He wets it with fire) is given as an example for the breach of this condition, since the

¹ Datta, op. cit., p. 283 f.; Huparikar, op. cit., pp. 460 ff.

² *Nyāyakośa*, p. 172.

³ *vide supra*, pp. 161 ff.

concept of fire is incongruous with that of wetting. If there is any incompatibility of the primary sense, as we find in all cases of *lakṣaṇā*, how can there be *yogyatā* in the sentence? The explanation is that in the case of *lakṣaṇā*, the incompatibility of the sense is only for the sense when taken literally, and is not real. This could be removed by resorting to the secondary meaning of the word. Even in cases like *agninā siñcati*, if the incongruity could be explained by resorting to a secondary meaning, the sentence would be regarded as correct.

Nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā or Faded Metaphor

The third condition for a *lakṣaṇā* is that the secondary sense must have the sanction of everyday usage, or it must be resorted to with a special motive to suggest some new ideas. The ancient writers stressed the necessity of sanction by popular usage; but not the motive element in the use of words in the figurative sense. It is the later literary critics who give great prominence to the suggestion of new ideas as a motive for resorting to *lakṣaṇā*.

Śabaravāmin remarks that *lakṣaṇā* is based on usage in everyday life. It is an arbitrary assumption of a sense by society. Sometimes the newly assumed sense becomes so prominent through usage, that the primary, original, sense of the word is not normally noticed, except by the grammarians.¹ The secondary sense is

¹ Śabarabhāṣya on sūtra I. 4. 2: *lakṣaṇā iti ced varam lakṣaṇā kalpitā, na yāgābhidhānam. laukikī hi lakṣaṇā haṭho 'prasiddhakalpanā.*

generally accepted as the primary sense itself, and the original sense is taken as the etymological sense. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that old and deep-rooted *lakṣaṇā-s* express the secondary sense as if it were the primary sense itself, and that in the case of modern and newly made *lakṣaṇā-s*, some are possible, but some are impossible, since they are not allowed by usage.¹ This classification is accepted by Mammaṭa also.² In the case of *nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā-s* (faded metaphors) the actual meaning is as good as the normal meaning itself and there is no need for incompatibility of the original meaning or any special motive to sanction its usage. In the case of these faded metaphors the association of the word with the original, primary, meaning has almost disappeared, and the word becomes an ordinary name for the actual referent without any other cognitive or emotive association. Every language is full of such faded metaphors, and Sanskrit abounds in them. Many of the synonyms in Sanskrit can be classed under this category. For all practical purposes the metaphoric meaning has become the normal meaning of the expression.

Mukulabhaṭṭa says³ that we recognize *lakṣaṇā* only in those cases established by the usage of ancients, and

¹ *Tantravārttika*, p. 683:

*nirūḍhā lakṣaṇāḥ kāścit sāmāthyād abhidhānavat
kriyante sāmpratam kāścit kāścin naiva tv aśaktitāḥ.*

² *Śabdavyāpāravicāra*, p. 7: *nirūḍhā kāścānyā tu kāryā sā kācid anyathā.*

³ *Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā*, p. 11 f.: *ṛddhavyavahārābhyanyujñāteṣu eva śabdeṣu tajjātiyaśabdadarśanāl lakṣaṇātvam abhyupagamyate, na tu sarvatra, anyathā sarveṣāṃ eva śabdānāṃ yenakenacij jātilēśena sarvān arthān prati lakṣaṇāśabdasya vaktum śakyatvāt.*

that analogous cases must also be warranted by usage, as otherwise any word might have any meaning; if there is a special motive which is clear enough, metaphors can be resorted to. Thus on the analogy of the existing word *dvirepha* (a word having two 'r's, namely, *bhramara*) for 'bee', we cannot coin a word like *dvika* (a word with two 'k's, namely, *kokila*) for 'cuckoo'.

In the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Viśvanātha says that we should not confuse the etymological sense of a word with its primary sense. If we take the meaning of expertness as the secondary meaning of the word *kuśala* (etymologically taken to be 'one who cuts the *kuśa* grass'), even the meaning 'cow' for the word *gauḥ* will have to be taken as secondary, since etymologically it could be explained as 'one that walks' (from the root *gam*).¹ Hemacandra is definite that we should take all such instances of *nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā* like *kuśala* and *dvirepha* as the normal meaning (*mukhyārtha*) itself.²

Motive Element in Lakṣaṇā

In India it is the later literary critics like Ānandavardhana and his followers who made a clear distinction

¹ *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, p. 9: *anyaddhi śabdānām vyutpattinimittam anyac ca pravṛttinimittam; vyutpattilabhyasya mukhyārthatve 'gauḥ śete' ity atrāpi lakṣaṇā syāt*. See also *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p. 348: *na ca vyutpattibalād eva sarvatra śabdaḥ pravartate*.

² *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, p. 25: *kuśaladvirephadvipādāyas tu sāksātsamketaviśayatvān mukhyā eveti na rūḍhir lakṣyasyārthasya hetutvenāsmābhir uktā*.

between intentional metaphors (*prayojanavatī lakṣaṇā*) and unintentional metaphors (*nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā*) and pointed out ¹ the importance of the former in enriching the content of literature by suggesting new ideas and by stimulating subtle shades of emotions. Even earlier Ālaṃkārika-s like Daṇḍin and Vāmana had noticed that metaphorical expressions play an important role in literature. Daṇḍin ² considered metaphorical expressions as the basis of *samādhi-guṇa* in literature, while Vāmana ³ included all qualitative metaphors under the figure of speech called *vakrokti*. The Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s were not interested in the motive element. It is the later Ālaṃkārika-s who stress this aspect of *lakṣaṇā*.

According to Ānandavardhana the motive element in *lakṣaṇā* is apprehended by the function of suggestion only.⁴ In an intentional transfer the motive is apprehended from the word alone; thus in the well-known example *gaṅgāyaṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges), the suggested sense of coolness and purity is apprehended from the word *gaṅgā*; but the word has no such conventional meaning. The motive element can neither be included in *lakṣaṇā*, because the three necessary

¹ *Kāvyaṭprakāśa*, II. 9-18.

² *Kāvyaḍdarśa*, I. 93:

*anyadharmas tato 'nyatra lokasīmānurodhinā
samyag ādhīyate yatra sa samādhiḥ smṛto yathā.*

³ *Kāvyaḍlaṃkārasūtravṛtti*, IV. 3. 8: *sādrśyāl lakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ.*

⁴ *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 54; *Kāvyaṭprakāśa*, II. 12: *prayojanaṃ hi vyañjanā-vyāpāragamyam eva*; also vv. 15-16.

factors, namely, incompatibility, relation between the primary sense and the actual sense, and sanction by usage or special motive, are absent in this case. The function of *lakṣaṇā* is exhausted when the incompatibility of the primary sense is removed by adopting the secondary sense, and should not be extended to the motive element. But the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s, who do not accept suggestion (*vyāñjanā*) as a separate function of words, take the motive element in intentional transfers also as part of the main *lakṣaṇā* itself.¹ Moreover, in many cases the motive underlying the transfers is vague and ambiguous and depends entirely on contextual factors, and cannot, therefore, be objectively ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty and accuracy, however great its importance may be in literature.

It is true that in the example *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* the qualities of coolness and sanctity suggested by the word *gaṅgā* are associated with the village; even if the sentence had been *gaṅgātate ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the bank of the Ganges) these qualities could be implied. This suggestion belongs to the suggestive power (*vyāñjanā-vyāpāra*) of the word. The definite purpose of the *lakṣaṇā* is to help in the process of suggestion. In *lakṣaṇā* there is a break in the flow, due to the incompatibility, and the listener has to think about the possible interpretations; thus the *lakṣaṇā* stimulates our attention to the suggestive elements that formed the motive in resorting to the metaphorical expression.

¹ This is discussed in the chapter on *Vyāñjanā*.

Hence there is a great deal of truth in the argument that the motive element in a transfer does not form part of it, but that it is conveyed by the suggestive power of the word.

Compound Words

According to the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s no special denotative function need be accepted in the case of compound words; they explain with the help of *lakṣaṇā* all cases of compounds where the intended sense is not got directly from the members of the compound themselves. Thus in the case of a Bahuvrihi compound like *citraguḥ* (possessing brindled cows) they resort to *lakṣaṇā* to obtain the sense of the owner. But the grammarians assume a special power to explain the new meaning distinct from those of its members, since *lakṣaṇā* in regard to either *citra* or *go* is not sufficient to bring about the signification of the owner of the brindled cows.¹ The word *citra* cannot indicate the owner of brindled cows, and if the word *go* were to indicate the owner of cows, the meaning of the word *citra* will be incompatible with that of the owner, since it is not the owner that is brindled.² The

¹ *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, p. 177: *citragur ityādaū svāmyādipratitaye śaktir āvaśyakī, na ca lakṣaṇayā nirvāhaḥ*; see also *Mbh.* under *sūtra* II. 1. 1.

² *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabdakhaṇḍa, p. 732: *na ca citrapadaṃ citra-gosvāmilakṣakam, tatra gopadārthānanvayāt. nāpi gopadaṃ lakṣakam, gosvāmini citrapadārthānanvayāpatteḥ*. See also P. C. Chakravarti, *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 309.

grammarians assign the power of expressing such additional senses to the compounds, taking the whole as an indivisible unit of speech.¹ The Mīmāṃsaka-s explain this difficulty by taking the whole sentence as *lakṣaṇā*. In a Tatpuruṣa compound like *rājāpuruṣaḥ* (The king's man) for *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*, the relation denoted by the genitive is known through *lakṣaṇā*. The Naiyāyika-s resort to *lakṣaṇā* only in the case of one word, either *citra* or *go*, and take the other as suggestive of the purport (*tāparyagrāhaka*).² The Tatpuruṣa compound has *lakṣaṇā* for the first word only; in the case of a Karmadhāraya compound there is no necessity to resort to *lakṣaṇā*, since the sense of identity of the members is obtained from the relation of the meanings themselves.³

The Mīmāṃsaka-s assume that since the natural relation of a word is to its primary meaning, no recourse should be taken to the secondary function of words, if it is possible to explain the passage by resorting to the primary meaning itself. This is stressed in their discussion of the meaning of the term *niṣādashapati*.⁴ If it is taken as a Karmadhāraya compound, it means 'a king who is a *niṣāda*'; but, if taken as a Tatpuruṣa compound, it means 'king of the *niṣāda-s*'. Their final

¹ *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, V. 31: *saṁāse khalu bhinnaiva śaktiḥ*.

² *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 238: *na hi bahuvrīhau samastapadānām lakṣaṇikatvāt. . . ekapadamātralakṣaṇāyāpi bahuvrīher vyavasthāpyatvāt*.

³ *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, p. 157: *karmadhāraye ca na śaktir na vā lakṣaṇā padārthayoḥ padābhyām abhedasya ca saṁsargatayā lābhāt*.

⁴ *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, VI. 1. 51-2.

conclusion is that the word has to be taken as a Karma-dhāraya compound, in which case the members retain their primary meanings, and not as a Tatpuruṣa compound, since that involves recourse to *lakṣaṇā*.¹

The Mimāṃsaka-s and the Vedāntin-s consider that there can be *lakṣaṇā* not only for words, but also for sentences. The eulogistic passages from the *artha-vāda* portion of the Vedic texts are thus explained by resorting to the sentence-*lakṣaṇā*.² It is difficult to explain an ironical statement by assuming *lakṣaṇā* for a particular word in it; for it is not a single word, but the whole passage that gives the implication. The Naiyāyika-s, however, do not admit *lakṣaṇā* for sentences; they assume *lakṣaṇā* only for words; in certain cases where there is difficulty in explaining the passage, they consider that some other word is indicative of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyagrāhaka*). Thus in the example *gambhīrāyāṃ nadyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village on the deep river), the term *nadī* or *gambhīra* is said to indicate through *lakṣaṇā* the bank of the deep river, the other word being taken as indicative of the intention of the speaker.³

¹ Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, p. 315.

² *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, IV. 31-4: *lakṣaṇā ca na padamātravṛttiḥ, kiṃ tu vākyavṛttiḥ api evaṃ arthavādavākyānāṃ prasaṃsārūpāṇāṃ prāśastye lakṣaṇā*; see also *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, pp. 140 ff.

³ *ibid.*, p. 143: *gambhīrāpadaṃ nadīpadaṃ vā tatra gambhīranadī-tīralakṣakam, padāntaraṃ tu tatra tātparyagrāhakam iti siddhāntavidāḥ*.

Bhartrhari's Views on Lakṣaṇā

Bhartrhari believes that the unit of speech is the sentence which is indivisible and that the meaning of a sentence cannot necessarily be grasped from a knowledge of the meanings of the words. He refers to the usual division of meanings of words into primary and secondary, and gives various popular views about the distinction between the two.

(a) According to those who hold that a word can have more than one meaning, the distinction between primary and secondary meanings is based on the relative frequency of usage.¹

(b) Those who hold that a word can have only one sense consider that the word having the primary sense and the word having the secondary sense are different, though they sound alike.²

(c) One theory, attributed to the great grammarian Vyāḍi by Puṇyarāja, is that the primary meaning of a word is that which is well known and which depends only on its form, whereas the secondary meaning is that which is established with effort with the help of the context. The former is what the word conveys by itself, whereas the latter is different from this and

¹ VP. II. 265:

*anekārthatvaṃ ekasya yaiḥ śabdasyānugamyate
siddhyasiddhikṛtā teṣāṃ gauṇamukhyaprakalpanā.*

See also *supra*, p. 36.

² *ibid.*, II. 259, quoted *supra*, p. 36, n. 3.

depends on the other words in the sentence and on the context.¹

(d) Another view considers the words to refer to the qualities. That object which possesses these qualities to a greater extent is called the primary referent and the other is called the secondary. Bhartṛhari does not support this view, since it is against usage.²

(e) According to some others the secondary usage is based on similarity. 'Devadatta is a lion' only means that Devadatta possesses some qualities similar to those of the lion. Or, it may even be based on some confusion of the one for the other because of the similarity.³

¹ *ibid.*, II. 266-7, 280:

*arthaprakaraṇāpekṣo yo vā śabdāntaraiḥ saha
yuktāḥ pratyāyaty arthaṃ taṃ gaṇam āpare viduḥ.
śuddhasyocārāṇe svārthaḥ prasiddho yasya gamyate
sa mukhya iti vijñeyo rūpamātranibandhanah.
śrutimātreṇa yatrāsya tādarthyaṃ avasīyate
mukhyaṃ taṃ arthaṃ manyante gaṇaṃ yatropapāditam.*

See also Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini I. I. 9: *yatra ca gaṇatvaṃ na tatrāntareṇārthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarābhi-saṃbandhāt bhavati saṃpratyayaḥ.*

² *ibid.*, II. 274:

*naivādhikatvaṃ dharmāṇāṃ nyūnatā vā prayojikā
ādhikyam api manyante prasiddher nyūnatāṃ kvacit.*

³ *ibid.*, 275-6:

*jātiśabdo 'ntareṇāpi jātiṃ yatra prayujyate
saṃbandhisadṛśād dharmāt taṃ gaṇam āpare viduḥ.
viparyāsād ivārthasya yatrārthāntaratām iva
manyante sa gavādis tu gaṇa ity ucyate kvacit.*

According to Bhartṛhari it is meaningless to discuss the primary and secondary referents of an individual word; the sentence has to be considered as a whole, and in the particular context in which it is uttered. In many of the familiar instances the individual word-meanings have no special significance in the context. Thus when a mother says, 'the tiger eats children who cry', she does not mean that if her child cries, he will be eaten by the tiger; what she really means is that her child should not cry.¹ Similarly, if a traveller says to his companion, 'We must go; look at the sun', the meaning conveyed is not merely that of looking at the sun; the implied sense here is that it is getting late.² Again, if a child is told, 'See that the crows do not steal the butter', he knows quite well that he should not let a dog steal it.³ Sometimes in compound words the component parts may not have any real existence of their own; thus the thing meant by *brāhmaṇakambala*

¹ *ibid.*, II. 322:

*vyāghrādivyapadeśena yathā bālo nivartyate
asatyō 'pi tathā kaścit pratyavāyo vidhīyate.*

and Puṇyārāja's commentary thereon: *yathā rudantaṃ vyāghro bhakṣayātīti bālasyaocyate na tatra vyāghrabhakṣaṇaṃ vastusthityā sambhavatī kevalaṃ mā kadācit tvaṃ rodīti itī rodananiśedha eva tasya kriyate.*

² *ibid.*, II. 312:

*gantavyaṃ dṛśyatāṃ sūrya itī kālasya lakṣaṇe
jñāyatāṃ kālā itī etat sopāyam abhidhīyate.*

³ *ibid.*, II. 314:

*kākebhya rakṣyatāṃ sarpiṃ itī bālo 'pi coditah
upaghātāpare vākya na śvādībhya na rakṣati.*

(a blanket for the Brahmin) does not contain the thing meant by the word *brāhmaṇa*.¹ It is not possible to explain satisfactorily all such usages by resorting to the metaphoric meaning of particular words in the sentence. Again in cases like ironical statements, the meanings of individual words give a sense entirely different from the actual meaning of the sentence in the context.² It is true that many of the later writers have tried to include all such instances under *lakṣaṇā* or metaphor itself; but Bhartṛhari has clearly shown the unsatisfactory nature of a theory depending entirely upon word-meanings, even though he is not oblivious of the usefulness of the discussion of word-meanings as an easy method in the study of language. The *dhvani* theory propounded by the great literary critic Ānandavardhana is partly an answer to this problem.³

¹ *ibid.*, II. 14:

*brāhmaṇārtho yathā nāsti kaścid brāhmaṇakambale
devadattādayo vākye tathaiva syur anarthakāḥ.*

² *ibid.*, II. 249:

*stutinindāpradhāneṣu vākyeṣu artho na tādṛśaḥ
padānāṃ pravibhāgena yādṛśaḥ parikalpyate.*

³ *cf.* J. Brough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', p. 172.

CHAPTER

7

VYĀÑJANĀ

SUGGESTION

SUGGESTION

THE theory of literal and metaphorical meaning, developed by the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s in ancient India, was further extended by Ānandavar-dhana¹ in the latter half of the ninth century in order to include emotive and other associative meanings also under linguistic meaning. Centuries earlier, Bhartṛhari had exposed the unsatisfactory nature of a linguistic theory which depends entirely on individual words and their lexical meanings; the *śphoṭa* doctrine which he brought forward emphasized the importance of taking the whole utterance as a significant unitary linguistic symbol. Bhartṛhari had also shown that the meaning of an utterance depends on contextual factors, and that the logical interpretation of the

¹ In the *Dhvanyāloka*. It is in the form of *kārikā*-s (short verses) and their explanations in prose called the *vṛtti*. The problem as to whether the two portions are by the same author or by different authors is still hotly discussed (P. V. Kane, *The History of Sanskrit Poetics*, pp. 154-90; for bibliography, see p. 154 f. of the same).

sentence-meaning on the basis of the individual word-meanings is defective in many cases. At times the meaning of the whole utterance is different from what the individual words indicate. Ānandavardhana took the cue from Bhartṛhari and developed the theory of language on the lines suggested by him; but since he was concerned only with the question of literary appreciation, he did not proceed with the full discussion of all the intricate problems connected with speech activity. He confined his attention to his own field of poetic meaning. In the *Dhvanyāloka*, he openly declares his indebtedness to the *sphoṭa* doctrine.¹

Even the Vedic sages understood the fact that the literal meaning of an utterance is only a part of its total meaning and that those who try to analyse the literal meaning may completely lose sight of the real significance of speech. One of the well-known hymns of the *Rgveda*² distinguishes between the man who understands only the literal meaning of a poem and the man who looks more into the inner significance of the passage than to the meanings of the words therein; the former 'sees, but does not see; he hears, but does not hear'; it is only to the latter that Speech 'reveals herself completely, like a loving wife to her husband'.

uta tvaḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācam

uta tvaḥ śṛṇvan na śṛṇoty enām

¹ He does not refer to the *sphoṭa* doctrine as such, but refers to the term *dhvani* used by the grammarians.

² *Rgveda*, X. 71. 4. This is quoted in the *Nirukta*, I. 19, and *Mahābhāṣya*, I, p. 4.

*uto tvasmai tanvaṃ visasre
jāyeva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ.*

In another passage in the *Ṛgveda*¹ it is said that great poets select their words, 'winnowing away the chaff from the grain', and only men of equal scholarship and literary taste can fully appreciate their poems.²

Ānandavardhana does not attack the usual division of speech utterances into sentences and words, into stems and suffixes, and the distinction between the primary and the transferred or metaphorical sense of words (*abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*). He accepts all these, but in addition, he postulates a third potency of language which he calls 'the capacity to suggest a meaning other than its literal meaning'.³ This suggestive power of language is called *Vyañjanā*.

¹ *Ṛgveda*, X. 71. 2:

*saktum iva titaiṇā punanto yatra dhīrā manasā vācam akrata
atrā sakhāyaḥ sakhyāni jānate bhadraiṣāṃ lakṣmīr nihitādhi vāci.*

This is also quoted in the *Nirukta*, IV. 10 and in the *Mahābhāṣya*, I, p. 4.

² A. H. Gardiner, *The Theory of Speech and Language*, p. 61:

'A curious position sometimes confronts the commentator of letters or ancient texts. The sentences hang together and yield a sense which is satisfactory and certain up to a point, but no further. To the audience addressed by the author the background of fact was known, so that he could "see what was meant". But the interpreter is left perplexed and baffled, because for him that background is unascertainable.'

³ cf. J. Brough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', P. 173.

It is a matter of common experience that an utterance may mean much more than its literal sense. The Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s, interested more in accuracy and precision in the use of words which they want to analyse objectively than in the fullness of expression and in the possibilities of extending the range of meanings to the domain of the inexpressible, are satisfied with the normal literal sense; but the poets and the critics who deal with the totality of human experience cannot neglect vast portions of language behaviour. 'Most philosophic discussions of meaning confine themselves to a relatively small portion of language behaviour, namely, statements which describe or report a state of affairs—the propositions of the natural sciences, or, more generally, such statements as are traditionally handled by logic.'¹ Thus Wittgenstein dismisses the subject of colloquial languages by saying: 'The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously complicated'.² In *Philosophical Investigations*, he says, again,³ 'It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed.' Abnormal cases are only exceptions. Otherwise our language games will lose their points. This view is on the basis that every word has a definite and fixed meaning and that this is all that need be considered. But, as Angus Sinclair says, 'in a passage of poetry or of impressive prose . . . a word has in itself no fixed and definite

¹ *ibid.*, p. 176.

² *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.002.

³ § 142.

meaning and has a slightly different meaning in every context'.¹ The Indian literary critics do not deny the existence of fixed literal meanings for words and sentences. But they believe that over and above all these, there is the suggested meaning or 'the social-cultural meaning', as a modern linguist² puts it, which varies from context to context. 'In addition to the regularly recurring responses to the lexical items and structural arrangements there are also throughout a linguistic community recurring responses to unique whole utterances or sequences of utterances.'³ These 'social-cultural meanings' fall within the domain of the power of *vyañjanā*. Ānandavardhana's basic postulate is that utterances possess a literal meaning, and can also convey a further meaning—the 'social-cultural meaning'. This includes everything other than the literal meaning (the primary and the metaphorical senses). And under the term 'meaning' is included not only the information conveyed, but also the emotion induced; this naturally necessitates the assumption of suggestive power for language. For even the Naiyāyika-s and the Mīmāṃsaka-s cannot argue that the emotions induced by language are brought about by the literal power of the words. Again, Ānandavardhana did not confine himself to the words and sentences as indicators of meaning; he included all the contextual factors, the intonation.

¹ *The Conditions of Knowing*, p. 171 n.

² Charles C. Fries, 'Meaning and Linguistic Analysis', *Language*, vol. 30, p. 67.

³ *ibid.*, p. 66.

stress, gestures and even the pure sounds used in the utterance, as well as the literal sense, as indicators of the full meaning of an utterance. Not only the expressive symbols (*vācaka-s*), but the indicative signs (*bodhaka-s*) like gestures also form part of language. As Russell says, even 'music may be considered as a form of language in which emotion is divorced from information'¹.

Using Bhartṛhari's terminology we may say that not only the *prākṛta-dhvani-s* or the normal sound-patterns which reveal the linguistic sign (*śphoṭa*), but even the *vaikṛta-dhvani-s* or the individual modifications of the sound may have an important role in speech-activity. Thus, we have to include in language, 'even the set of deviations from the norm of the sound segments that signal the meaning that a speaker is drunk, the whispering of an utterance that signals the meaning that the content of it is secret, and the unusual distribution that is the cue to a metaphor'.² The voice of the speaker can indicate whether it is a man or a woman, a child or a grown-up person and can give even the identity of the speaker to those who know his voice.³ Ānandavardhana is concerned only with poetic language, and therefore, omits many of these elements.

¹ *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits*, p. 73.

² Charles C. Fries, *op. cit.*, p. 67 n.

³ According to Śaṅkara, such information is conveyed by the voice and not by the words, and cannot, therefore, be considered as part of the meaning of speech. See his commentary on *Brahmasūtra*, I. 3. 28: *adṛśyamāno 'pi puruṣaviśeṣo 'dhyāyanadhvani-śravaṇād eva viśeṣato nirdhāryate, devadatto 'yam adhīte, yajñadatto 'yam adhīte iti. na cāyam varṇaviśayaḥ. . .*

of speech from his field of observation. He is concerned only with the suggestion of elements that are of aesthetic value. Though *vyāñjanā*, in the broadest sense of the term, embraces all such elements, it is only in its restricted sense as applied to poetry that Ānandavardhana studies the problem. His aim is to establish the doctrine of *dhvani*, which is *vyāñjanā* applied to poetry.

Theory of Dhvani

Ānandavardhana uses the term *dhvani* for his theory of poetic suggestion. He says¹ that this term is taken directly from the grammarians; just as the sounds of utterances (*dhvani* in the grammarian's sense) reveal the integral linguistic sign (*sphoṭa*), so also a good poem with its sound, as well as the literal sense, reveals, over and above the literal sense, a charming sense which has great aesthetic value. On account of this similarity of function, the term *dhvani* is applied to suggestive poetry when the suggested sense predominates over the literal sense. The term is also used to denote the suggested sense or the function of suggestion.

In the *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana establishes his theory that suggestion is the soul of poetry.² He says that

¹ *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 47 f.; *prathame hi vidvāṃso vaiyākaraṇāḥ, vyākaraṇamūlatvāt sarvavidyānām, te ca śrūyamāṇeṣu varṇeṣu dhvanir iti vyavaharanti. tathaiivānyais tanmatānusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ kāvyatattvārthadarśibhir vācyavācakaśaṃmiśraḥ śabdātmā kāvyam iti vyapadeśyo vyāñjakatvasāmyād dhvanir ity uktaḥ.*

² *ibid.*, p. 2: *kāvyaśātmā dhvaniḥ.*

beautiful ideas in poetry are of two kinds: literal (*vācya*) and implied (*pratīyamāna*). The latter is something like charm in girls which is distinct from the beauty of the various parts of the body; this implied sense is something more than the literal meaning and depends on the whole poem, and not merely on its parts.¹ The expressed sense is invariably an idea or a figure of speech; but the suggested sense may be of three kinds: an idea, a figure of speech, or an emotion. This suggested sense is not understood by those who merely know grammar and lexicon; it is understood only by men of taste who know the essence of poetry.² This suggested sense is the most important element in poetry; in fact it is the soul of poetry. In all good poetry prominence is found to be given to this element. Such poetry in which the words and their literal meanings occupy a subordinate position and suggest some charming sense (an idea, a figure of speech or an emotion) is called *dhvani*.³ It is the highest type of poetry. In cases where the suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed sense, as in some of the figures of speech like *samāsokti* and *paryāyokta*,⁴ there

¹ *ibid.*, p. 14:

*pratīyamānam punar anyad eva vastv asti vāṇiṣu mahākavīnām
yat tatprasiddhāvayavātiriktaṁ vibhāti lāvṇyam ivāṅganāsu.*

² *ibid.*, p. 29:

*śabdārthaśāsanajñānamātrenaiva na vedyate
vedyate sa hi kāvyārthatattvajñair eva kevalam.*

³ *ibid.*, p. 33:

*yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tam artham upasarjanīkṛtasvārthau
vyākṛtaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ.*

⁴ For details about these see *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, ch. X.

is no *dhvani*; this type of poetry too has some charm, though not much; this type is called *guṇibhūtaṣyaṅgya*. Poetry which does not contain any suggested sense cannot be considered as good poetry, however charming the expressed sense may be. The quality of poetry depends on the importance given to the element of suggestion.

Strictly speaking, the doctrine of *dhvani* is only an extension of the *rasa* theory propounded by the ancient sage Bharata, according to which the main object of a dramatic work is to rouse a *rasa* or aesthetic emotion in the audience.¹ Ānandavardhana extended this theory to poetry also. Many of his predecessors had understood the importance of *rasa* in poetry; but no one had systematically dealt with it before. There is no conflict at all between the theory of *dhvani* and the theory of *rasa*; the former stresses the method of treatment, whereas the latter deals with the ultimate effect. Suggestion, by itself, is not enough in drama or poetry; what is suggested must be charming, and this charm can come only through *rasa* or emotion. The emotion is not something which can be expressed directly by the words, it can only be suggested.

The whole theory of *rasa* realization in literature and drama is based on the well-known passage in the

¹ On the *rasa* theory see A. Sankaran, *Theories of Rasa and Dhvani*; K. C. Pandey, *Indian Aesthetics*. (For detailed bibliography see P. V. Kane, *The History of Sanskrit Poetics*, p. 350.)

Nāṭyaśāstra:¹ *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyogād rasaniṣ-pattiḥ*. *Rasa* is realized in some way from the combination of the *sthāyibhāva* (permanent and dominant emotional mood) with the *vibhāva-s* (the objects of emotion such as the hero and the heroine, and the exciting causes such as the spring, flowers, moonlight and the bower), *anubhāva-s*² (the external manifestations of emotion such as the movement of the eyebrows, glances and smile) and the *vyabhicāribhāva-s*³ (accessory moods which come and go helping in the manifestation of the *rasa*). Bharata mentions⁴ eight dominant emotional moods, or *sthāyibhāva-s* that may be aroused by a dramatic representation into the state of aesthetic pleasure. These are *rati* (love), *hāsa* (laughter), *śoka* (sorrow), *krodha* (anger), *utsāha* (energy), *bhaya* (fear), *jugupsā* (repugnance) and *vismaya* (wonder); the *rasa-s* corresponding to these are respectively called *śṛṅgāra*, *hāsa*, *karuṇa*, *raudra*, *vīra*, *bhayānaka*, *bībhatsa* and *adbhuta*. Later writers accept a ninth *rasa* called *śānta* corresponding to the *sthāyibhāva* of *nirveda* (detachment).⁵ Really the *rasa* or the aesthetic pleasure derived from literature is one and the same in all cases; the division into the various *rasa-s* is based on the

¹ vol. I, p. 274. For details see P. V. Kane, op. cit., pp. 340-56.

² Eight of these *anubhāva-s* are called *sāttvikabhāva-s*; these are perspiration, tears, etc. See *Daśarūpa*, IV. 3-6.

³ Bharata mentions thirty-three such fleeting accessory moods like *nirveda* or detachment and *glāni* or fatigue. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, I, pp. 356 ff.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 349 ff.

⁵ cf. V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasas*.

difference in the *sthāyibhāva-s* which contribute to the *rasa-s*.¹ This *rasa* is a condition produced in the spectator, is a single feeling and a pleasureable one.

The *sūtra* of Bharata, defining the process of *rasa* realization, is interpreted differently by different scholars.² Lollaṭa, who is a Mīmāṃsaka, believes that the *rasa* is *produced* in the hero or heroine; the spectator ascribes it to the actor because of the cleverness of acting, and the spectator's delight is based on the appreciation of the realistic acting.³ Śaṅkuka, who is a Nāyāyika, considers *rasa* to be a matter of inference. The *sthāyibhāva* in the original hero is inferred to exist in the actor (though, actually it does not exist in him). The spectator forgets the difference between the hero and the actor, and infers the *rasa* in the actor. These two views fail to explain how the spectator gets aesthetic pleasure by witnessing tragedies. Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka's theory of the enjoyment of *rasa* lays stress on the subjective aspect of *rasa* as the aesthetic experience

¹ P. V. Kane, loc. cit.

² Four main interpretations are by Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka and Abhinavagupta. Jagannātha (*Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 28) refers to eight interpretations. About these various interpretations, see S. K. De, 'The Theory of Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics', pp. 207-53. See also Huparikar, op. cit., p. 513.

³ See Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, ch. VI for a discussion of these views. The portion has been edited with English translation and notes by Raniero Gnoli in *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, Is.M.E.O., Rome, 1956. The original works of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭanāyaka are not extant.

of the spectator. He distinguishes poetic language from ordinary language, and postulates for the former two functions, *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva* in addition to the primary function *abhidhā* (which includes *lakṣaṇā* also). *Bhāvakatva* is the power of universalization (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*) which strips the *vibhāva-s*, *sthāyibhāva-s*, etc., of their individual and personal aspects and generalizes them in the minds of the spectators endowed with the power of imagination; and *bhojakatva* is the power by which the *sthāyibhāva* reaches its climax and is enjoyed by the spectators (this experience is described as something which cannot be defined in words).

Abhinavagupta, following Ānandavardhana, maintains that *rasa* is realized through suggestion. According to him the *sthāyibhāva-s*, as well as the fleeting *vyabhicāribhāva-s*, are dormant in the minds of the spectators and are roused by the stimulus of *vibhāva-s*, etc., and reach the state of *rasa*. He says that *rasa* is suggested by the power of *vyañjanā* and that *rasa* realization is not indescribable. His view is similar to that of Bhaṭṭanāyaka whom he criticizes for postulating new functions for words; for *bhojakatva* is nothing but suggestion.¹

Abhinavagupta mentions three different psychological stages in the realization of *rasa* in literature. 'The first stage involves the cognition of the formal or intellectual elements of the poem, and serves as a means

¹ *Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 25: *bhogas tu vyaktiḥ, bhogakṛttvaṃ tu vyañjanāḍ aviśiṣṭam*.

to the second. The second stage consists of the idealization of things in poetry or drama by the power of imagination in the reader or spectator. The third stage can be marked as the climax of the inexpressible affective (emotional) condition of the reader or spectator. When thus the formal or intellectual, imaginative and emotional elements of a poem blend into one predominant sentiment and, making a simultaneous appeal, awaken the *sthāyibhāva* of the reader or spectactor, the relish of *rasa* is manifested as a unity in the heart, leaving no trace of the constituent elements; and this is why the *rasa dhvani* is called *asamlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya* or the suggested sense with imperceptible stages.¹

Criticisms Against the Dhvani Theory

The theory of *dhvani* had to pass through an ordeal of fierce criticism before it was accepted universally by the Ālaṃkārika-s.² The various schools of philosophy in India, like the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā, do not recognize the suggestive power of words at all. Later grammarians, however, accept it as necessary from the standpoint of grammar.³

In the *Dhvanyāloka* Ānandavardhana himself refers to many of the views against the doctrine of *dhvani*,⁴

¹ Huparikar, *The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching*, p. 525.

² Jagannātha says (*Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 425) that the *Dhvanyāloka* settled the principles to be followed in poetics.

³ *Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 160: *vaiyākaraṇānām apy etatsvikāra āvaśyakaḥ*

⁴ *Dhvanyāloka*, I. 1.

some holding that it does not exist, some saying that it is included in *lakṣaṇā*, and others considering *dhvani* to be something beyond the province of words, which is known only to men of literary taste. He has also referred to the criticisms of the Naiyāyika-s who want to include *dhvani* under inference.¹ Manoratha, a contemporary of Ānandavardhana, seems to have ridiculed the idea of *dhvani* as absurd.² In Jayaratha's commentary on the *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, twelve anti-*dhvani* theories are mentioned.³ We shall consider here the main arguments against *dhvani*.

(a) DHVANI AND ANUMĀNA

The Naiyāyika-s reject the suggestive power of words. Mahimabhaṭṭa, in his *Vyaktiviveka* written with the specific purpose of proving that *dhvani* is included in *anumāna* or inference,⁴ says that the implied sense in literature is always conveyed by the expressed sense through the process of inference itself and that there is no necessity to accept a new potency for words. Mahimabhaṭṭa is not the discoverer of this anti-*dhvani* theory, for Ānandavardhana himself anticipates this objection and criticizes it in the third chapter of

¹ *ibid.*, pp. 201 ff.

² *ibid.*, p. 8 and the commentary *Locana* thereon: *granthakṛt-samānakālabhāvinā manorathanāmnā*. . . .

³ p. 9. See V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, pp. 149 ff.

⁴ *Vyaktiviveka*, I. 1:

*anumāne 'ntarbhāvaṃ sarvasyāpi dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum
vyaktivivekaṃ tanute prapamya mahimā parāṃ vācam.*

the *Dhvanyāloka*.¹ Ānandavardhana's main argument against the inference theory of poetic charm is that inference depends on the knowledge of *vyāpti* or an invariable concomitance between the middle and the major terms of a proposition. In literature there is no such invariable relation between the primary sense and the suggested sense, and therefore, the latter cannot be inferred from the former. There cannot be valid inference when there is the fallacy of undistributed middle (*anaikāntikatva*). Ānandavardhana illustrates his point by means of an analogy.² He says that the relation between the expressed sense and the implied sense is something similar to that between a light and a pot; the light reveals the pot, even though there is no invariable relation between the two. Again, in inference the minor term becomes related to the major term through its relation to the middle term. Thus a degree of mediacy is an essential feature of inferential process, but 'in suggestion one feels that the degree of mediacy that is necessarily characteristic of inference is wanting'.³

In the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayantabhaṭṭa refers to the *dhvani* theory as one adopted by a wiseacre, and dismisses

¹ *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 201: *vyāñjakatvaṃ śabdānāṃ gamakatvam, tac ca līngatvam ataś ca vyañgyapratītiḥ līngipratītiḥ eveti līngalīngibhāva eva teṣāṃ vyañgyavyañjakabhāvo nāparaḥ kaścit.*

² *ibid.*; see also *Locana* thereon: *pradīpālokāḍau līngalīngibhāva-sūnye 'pi hi vyañgyavyañjakabhāvo 'sti.*

³ S. Kuppaswami Sastri, *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, p. 38.

it as unworthy of serious consideration by scholars.¹ According to the later Naiyāyika-s, the *vyāṅgyārtha* or the suggested sense of a word is really inference from its primary and secondary meanings and is not separate from them.²

Precision and accuracy are the chief objects of logic and it should always demand the use of a word in its plain, primary and unambiguous sense. The secondary meaning is also accepted, since it can be ascertained with a fair amount of accuracy through the primary meaning. But the suggested meaning is too vague and fleeting and subjective to have any place among logical meanings.³ Logic whose only appeal is to reason, takes accuracy and precision as indispensable and recognizes only as much of the suggested sense as can reasonably be inferred from the expressed sense; the subtle and subjective suggestions implied in language are not subjects of logical discussion. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein laid down that 'whatever can be said, can be said clearly. And what we cannot speak about, we must leave in silence'. Great poetry is written on the fringe of that silence; it aims at conveying the inexpressible, by means of suggestion. Logicians may dismiss it altogether as unreal, or include a part of it in inference and reject the rest; but the literary critic has to pay

¹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 45:

*yam anyah paṇḍitaṃ manyah prapade kaṃcana dhvanim. . .
athavā nedṛśi carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate.*

² *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, pp. 144-54.

³ D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 284 f.

special attention to it, for the suggested sense plays an important part in poetry where the appeal is more to the emotion and sentiment than to reason. A philosophy of language¹ which would eliminate whole areas of human discourse as meaningless and unintelligible has little significance for human culture. It is only through the power of language to suggest things which cannot be expressed directly, that it can convey philosophical truth. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Bergson says:² 'Language is incapable of apprehending and expressing reality. But language may be used in another way, not to represent, but to bring the hearer to a point where he himself may transcend language and pass to incommunicable insight. It is a dialectical ladder which, when we have ascended, may be kicked away.' This insight and intuition cannot be expressed directly by words, but they can be communicated through the power of suggestion.

(b) DHVANI AND ARTHĀPATTI

The view that *dhvani* is to be included in *arthāpatti*³ is similar to the previous one; for *arthāpatti* is a kind of immediate inference based on the universal relation between the absence of the major and the absence of the middle terms. Jespersen defines suggestion as

¹ As that of Wittgenstein. See W. M. Urban, *Language and Reality*, p. 12.

² See Urban, loc. cit.

³ Mentioned by Jayaratha in the *Vimarsinī* commentary on *Alamkārasarvasva*, p. 9.

impression through suppression. He says:¹ 'In all speech activity there are three things to be distinguished: expression, suppression and impression. Expression is what the speaker gives, suppression is what he does not give, though he might have given it, and impression is what the hearer receives. It is important to notice that an impression is often produced not only by what is said expressly, but also by what is suppressed. Suggestion is impression by suppression.' Prof. Kuppusvami Sastri says that this kind of suggestion has to be accepted by all schools of thought and that in the case of ordinary sentences, the individual words give only their isolated meanings, leaving the *samsarga* or the mutual relation of the words to be conveyed by suppression or suggestion.² The Naiyāyika-s call this *sāmsargamaryādā*, while the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s consider it as based on *lakṣaṇā*. There is apparent contradiction between the juxtaposition of words in a sentence and their not being related to serve some purpose; hence the *samsarga* is cognized through a process of inference of the *arthāpatti* type. We may note here that even in *lakṣaṇā* the transferred sense is obtained through *arthāpatti*; and Mukulabhaṭṭa actually quotes the well-known example of 'the fat boy who does not eat during the day' as a variety of *lakṣaṇā*.³

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s accept *śrutārthāpatti* to explain elliptical sentences. This has to be distinguished

¹ *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 309.

² *op. cit.*, pp. 20-2.

³ *Abhidhāvyūttimāṭṛkā*, p. 19.

from *dhvani*, for here the expressed sense itself is incomplete. *Arthāpatti*, being a means of valid knowledge, implies accuracy and definiteness of the sense cognized through it; but in poetic suggestion the implied sense is rather vague and can be fully understood only by men of literary taste who can appreciate the context of situation.

(c) DHVANI AND LAKṢAṆĀ

Some of the Ālaṃkārika-s like Mukulabhaṭṭa tried to include *vyāñjanā* or the suggestive power under *lakṣaṇā* itself. They accept that at times it is possible to convey, through sentences, ideas different from the literal sense; but all such instances can be included in *lakṣaṇā* itself. According to Mukulabhaṭṭa¹, one variety of *lakṣaṇā* mentioned by the Mīmāṃsaka scholar Bhartṛmītra is that wherein the expressed literal sense indirectly leads to some other idea (*abhidheyena sambandha*). Thus, even instances of *arthāpatti* will come under *lakṣaṇā*. Mukulabhaṭṭa defines *lakṣaṇā*² in such a way that all instances where the expressed sense indicates other ideas are included in it, and he says that *dhvani*, propounded as a new doctrine by some literary critics, actually falls within the sphere of *lakṣaṇā* itself.³

Ānandavardhana refers to this anti-*dhvani* theory and says that *lakṣaṇā* and *dhvani* differ from each other

¹ *ibid.*, p. 17.

² *ibid.*, p. 3: *arthāvaseyasya punar lakṣyamānatvam ucyate.*

³ *ibid.*, p. 21: *lakṣaṇāmārgāvagāhītvam tu dhvaneḥ sahrdayair nūlanatayopavarṇitasya vidyate.*

with regard to their nature and subject matter. *Lakṣaṇā* operates when there is some kind of inconsistency in the primary sense; it indicates the secondary metaphorical sense after cancelling its primary sense; but in suggestion the primary sense need not be discarded.¹ This argument is based on the assumption that *lakṣaṇā* involves the impossibility of the literal sense and not merely the inconsistency of the literal sense with the intention of the speaker. For we know that in cases of *ajahatsvārthā lakṣaṇā*, the literal sense is not completely rejected.

Lakṣaṇā is based on the primary sense of a word and is its extension;² it is part of the primary sense itself and some have called it the tail of the primary sense (*abhidhāpuccha*). *Dhvani*, on the other hand, depends on suggestion; and suggestion can occur even in cases where there is absolutely no expressed sense, as in the case of emotion suggested by the sound of music³ or the sight of dances. The emotive element in language can never be explained in terms of the expressive or the metaphorical senses of words. In *lakṣaṇā* the implied sense is always indicated indirectly through the primary sense of the word; but in the case of *dhvani* it is possible for both the meanings to occur

¹ *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 192: *vyāñjakatvamārge tu yadārtho 'rthāntaram dyotayati, tadā svarūpaṃ prakāśayann evāsau anyasya prakāśakaḥ pratīyate pradīpavat.*

² *ibid.*, p. 55: *vācakatvāśrayeṇaiva guṇavṛttir vyavasthitā.*

³ *ibid.*, p. 194: *gītadhvaninām api vyāñjakatvam asti rasādiviśayam, na ca teṣāṃ vācakatvaṃ lakṣaṇā vā kathamcīl lakṣyate.*

almost simultaneously.¹ Again, the suggested sense is determined by the contextual factors, the intonation, the facial expression, gestures, etc., whereas *lakṣaṇā*, as well as *abhidhā*, are independent.²

Even the subjects of *lakṣaṇā* and *dhvani* are different. The meaning conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* is always an idea; but the suggested sense can be an idea, a figure of speech or an emotion.

Even though *dhvani* is different from *lakṣaṇā*, there is an element of suggestion in all cases of deliberate and intentional metaphors. The motive element underlying the deliberate use of metaphors comes under suggestion.³ Ānandavardhana says that *lakṣaṇā* operates only when there is inconsistency of the primary sense and that its function is exhausted when this inconsistency is removed by resorting to the secondary meaning which is related to the primary sense. The motive element which prompted the use of the metaphor cannot be explained by *lakṣaṇā* itself. In the example *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (The village is on the Ganges) the primary meaning of the word *gaṅgā* is the river Ganges;

¹ In *asaṃlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya* even though the emotion is based on the primary sense, the sequence is not felt.

² See Huparikar, op. cit., pp. 493 ff.

³ *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 54:

*mukhyāṃ vṛttiṃ parityajya guṇavṛttiyārthadarśanam
yam uddiśya phalaṃ tatra śabdo naiva skhaladgatiḥ.*

See also *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, II. 13-18; *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 15. For the use of the term *skhaladgati* in the sense of *lakṣaṇā* see Dharmakīrti *Pramāṇavārttika*, II. 37.

this cannot apply in the sentence, for the village cannot be on the stream itself. This hitch is at the root of the secondary interpretation adopted. The term *gaṅgā* is interpreted as indicating 'the bank of the Ganges'. Thus, the discrepancy is removed and with that the power of *lakṣaṇā* is also exhausted. The ideas of holiness and purity that are suggested by the statement cannot be implied by *lakṣaṇā* itself, because this 'overtone' of the word does not depend on the three conditions of *lakṣaṇā* (inconsistency of the primary sense, direct relation of the implied sense to the primary sense and a clear purpose or the sanction of popular usage behind the transfer); it is determined by the emotional atmosphere which envelops the word and is something elusive. Even in the absence of *lakṣaṇā*, the word *gaṅgā* can suggest the qualities of purity and sanctity; ¹ *lakṣaṇā* does not give the suggested sense, but it points the way to the richness of the ideas associated with the word. What might be left unnoticed in ordinary cases is emphasized by the *lakṣaṇā*; because the inconsistency of the meaning (or the strangeness of the collocation of words) produces a break in the flow, and makes the listeners think about the purpose behind it. Thus, *lakṣaṇā* leads the way to the land of suggestion.

(d) DHVANI AND ABHIDHĀ

The Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Prābhākara school who follow the *anvitābhidhāna* theory of verbal comprehension

¹ Thus, sanctity and purity can be implied even in the sentence *gaṅgātīre ghoṣaḥ* (the village is on the bank of the Ganges).

consider *dhvani* to be included in the primary function *abhidhā* itself; for according to them the meaning of a word is what is conveyed by it. There is no restriction to the scope of the significative force of a word. In a sentence a word conveys not only its own individual meaning, but also its relation to the other words in the sentence. The *samsargā* or the mutual relation of the word-meanings suggested by their juxtaposition in a sentence is also included in the primary meaning itself. In certain contexts a word may suggest new ideas beyond its normal sense, but all those come under *abhidhā* itself. Just as the range of an arrow can be extended farther and farther depending on the force with which it is discharged, the meaning of a word can be extended to any length.¹

¹ *Locana*, p. 188: *prābhākaraśane 'pi dīrghadīrgho vyāpārah;* p. 18: *yo 'py anvitābhidhānavādī yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha itī hṛdaye gṛhītvā śaravad abhidhāvvyāpāram eva dīrghadīrgham icchati...*

Abhinavagupta explicitly states that it is the view of the followers of Prabhākara and that it is based on the *anvitābhidhāna* theory. Govinda, in the *Pradīpa* commentary on the *Kāvya-parakāśa*, referred to it as the view of Bhāṭṭa-s; and Jhalakikara refers to this theory as that of *bhaṭṭamatopajīvinah* (in his edition of the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, V. 47). S. K. De pointed out this mistake in the second volume of his *Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics*, p. 192. See also V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, p. 150. Still this mistake has crept even into the work of Professor P. V. Kane. In his notes on *Sāhityadarpaṇa* he refers to this theory as that of 'some followers of Kumārila' (p. 64). Trivedi, in his notes on *Ekāvali* (p. 370) alludes to it as the view of Lollaṭa.

Ānandavardhana and his followers attack this view from the standpoint of the *abhihitānvaya* theory. The suggested sense cannot be conveyed by the power of *abhidhā*, for it is only the definite conventional sense, which is directly related to the word, that is conveyed by *abhidhā*. The power of the primary function of the word is exhausted when this task is performed.¹ Even the sentence meaning cannot be expressed by the words through the primary function alone. Another function has to be accepted to explain suggested meanings. The primary sense is directly related to the word, but the suggested sense is, at times, known only indirectly through the expressed sense. Moreover, suggestion need not always depend on words; the melody of music, gestures, etc. are suggestive of sense.² The primary sense is definite and fixed; but the suggested sense changes according to the changes in the contextual factors. The primary sense of a word can be objectively learned by any one from a lexicon; but the suggested sense in poetry can be fully appreciated only by men of taste.³

¹ Śabara on *sūtra* I. 1. 25: *padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāni*; *Kāvyaṭṭakāśa*, II. 10: *viśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacchet kṣiṇaśaktir viśeṣane*. See also *Locana*, p. 16.

² *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 188 f.: *vācyaḥ hy arthaḥ sāksāc chabdasya saṃbandhī taditaras tu abhidheyaśāmarthyākṣiptaḥ saṃbandhisambandhī; avācakasyāpi gītaśabdāde rasādīlakṣaṇārthāvagamadarśanāt, aśabdasyāpi ceṣṭāder arthaviśeṣaprakāśanaprasiddheḥ*.

³ *ibid.*, p. 29: *vedyate sa tu kāvyārthatattvajñair eva kevalam*. See L. Renou, 'The Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics', *ALB*, vol. 18, p. 21 f.

(e) DHVANI AND TĀTPARYAVṚTTI

Some of the Ālaṃkārika-s like Dhanika and Dhanamjaya include *dhvani* under *tātparyavṛtti*, a function of the sentence postulated to explain the verbal comprehension arising from a sentence. The direct relation of the word is to its isolated meaning; in a sentence the primary function of the words is exhausted, when the isolated meanings of the individual words are presented. The mutual relation of the isolated word-meanings or the *saṃsarga* as it is called, is not conveyed by the words directly. It is not expressed, it is only suggested. This is done according to them by the *tātparyavṛtti*. Can poetic suggestion also be included in this? ¹

Tātparyavṛtti is postulated to explain the literal meaning of a sentence, whereas *vyañjanā* comes at the next stage. The power of the former is exhausted by establishing the logical connection of the word-meanings, and cannot give further suggestions. Abhinavagupta says ² that when an expression gives its own literal meaning, and in addition suggests some other sense, we cannot regard both these distinct senses as conveyed by the same power. The former proceeds directly from the words, while the latter comes

¹ *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, II. 6: *padārthānām samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣavapur apadārtho 'pi vākyārthaḥ samullasatīty abhihitānvayavādinām matam*. This *tātparyavṛtti* is the same as the *saṃsargamaryādā* of the Naiyāyika-s. See Kuppaswami Sastri, op. cit., p. 20 f.; Huparikar, op. cit., pp. 504-11. Also *supra*, pp. 213 ff.

² *Locana*, p. 13; also *Dhvanyāloka*, pp. 118 ff.

from this literal sense. *Tātparya* pertains to the expressed sense, whereas *dhvani* pertains to non-expressive factors also such as music, gesture, etc.

Dhanamjaya and Dhanika oppose the *dhvani* theory and include it under *tātparya*; ¹ according to them the power of *tātparya* is not exhausted in giving the logical connection of the word-meanings, but can extend to any length. Some of the later *Ālaṃkārika*-s have accepted *tātparya* almost as synonymous with suggestion.

(f) DHVANI AND VAKROKTI

In the *Vakroktijīva*, Kuntaka denied the independent existence of *dhvani*, and included it under *vakrokti* or 'a striking mode of speech'. ² His *vakrokti* is all-pervading and is almost analogous to *dhvani* itself.

Classification of Dhvani

The main division of *dhvani* is into two types: ³ *avivakṣita-vācya* and *vivakṣitānyapara-vācya*. The former is based on *lakṣaṇā* and is also called *lakṣaṇāntūla*; in this type the literal meaning is not intended. The motive element in all cases of intentional metaphors comes under this. Corresponding to the two varieties of *lakṣaṇā*, namely, *jahallakṣaṇā* and *ajahallakṣaṇā*, the

¹ *Avaloka* commentary on the *Daśarūpaka*, p. 157:

etāvaty eva viśrāntis tātparyasyeti kimkṛtam?

yāvatkāryaprasāritvāt tātparyam na tulādhytam.

² *Vakroktijīva*, I. 10: *vakroktir eva vaidagdhyaḥṅgibhaṇitir ucyate.*

³ A fairly detailed classification of *dhvani* is given in the *Dhvanyāloka*, chs. I and II; *Kāvyaṇṣa*, IV; *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, IV, etc.

avivakṣita-vācya type of *dhvani* is also subdivided into two: *atyantatiraskṛta-vācya* where the literal sense is completely set aside and *arthāntarasaṃkramita-vācya* where the literal meaning is shifted. This second sub-variety comprises cases where a word is used in an enhanced or diminished sense. Edgerton compares this with the 'emphasis' of classical western rhetoricians;¹ though in fact the point of view here is somewhat different.² What Empson calls the pregnant use of words of the type 'A is A' comes under this variety of *dhvani*.³ The ancient Mīmāṃsaka-s also recognized the use of *lakṣaṇā* for praising an object and gave examples like 'Dirty clothes are not clothes' (*yan malinam avāśas tat*).⁴ This pregnant use of words is found in negation also; for negation can be partial. Thus, in the previous example the word *avāśas* (not clothes) means only 'not clothes in the fullest sense of the term'.⁵ When Shelley says to the skylark, 'Bird thou never wert', he does not mean that the skylark does not belong to the class *Aves*.⁶ Around the logical meaning of each word there floats an emotional atmosphere which envelops and penetrates it.⁷ The

¹ F. Edgerton, 'Indirect Suggestion in Poetry: A Hindu Theory of Literary Aesthetics', p. 700.

² J. Brough, op. cit., p. 174.

³ *The Structure of Complex Words*, p. 351.

⁴ *vide supra*, p. 237.

⁵ Thus, the term *avidyā* is explained as 'imperfect knowledge' rather than 'absence of knowledge'.

⁶ See Ogden and Richards, op. cit., p. 238.

⁷ Vendryes, *Language*, p. 182.

pregnant use of the word can either bring all the feeling tones associated with it along with the logical sense, or can deprive all feeling tones from the sense of the word. And such use by which the normal sense is either enhanced or diminished can produce a suggestion of praise or blame. An example of this type of *dhvani* given by Ānandavardhana is: 'Only when favoured by the rays of the sun are lotuses *lotuses*'.¹ Here '*lotuses*' carries the meaning 'lotuses in the full sense of the word; lotuses with all the qualities of beauty which make them worth being called lotuses'.

The second division of *dhvani*, *vivakṣitānya-para-vācya* is sometimes also called *abhidhāmūla* as it is based on *abhidhā* or the primary meaning of the word. In this type the literal sense is in fact intended, but subserves the implied sense. This is also divided into two sub-varieties: *saṃlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya* where the stages of realizing the suggested sense from the expressed sense can be well perceived, and *asaṃlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya* where the stages in the realization of the suggested sense are imperceptible. The latter is more important and is concerned with the suggestion of poetic emotion. The permanent moods (*sthāyibhāva-s*) latent in the readers are roused along with the understanding of the expressed sense in the form of the *vibhāva-s* (causes of emotion), *anubhāva-s* (after-effects of emotion) and *vyabhicāri-bhāva-s* (transient moods); the intermediate steps between the understanding of the expressed

¹ *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 62: *ravikiraṇānugrhitāni kamalāni kamalāni*.

sense and the realization of *rasa* are not perceived. In this case the *rasa* or *bhāva* is suggested by the express mention of the *vibhāva-s*, etc. and it occupies the principal position in the poem. If the suggested emotion is subordinate to the expressed sense, it is included in the *guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya*¹ variety of poetry. And if the *vibhāva-s*, etc. are not expressly mentioned, they have to be gathered from the context and hence the stages in the realization of the emotions will be perceptible.²

The type of *dhvani* called *saṃlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya* is again subdivided into *vastu-dhvani* where a fact is suggested and *alaṃkāra-dhvani* where the suggested element is a figure of speech. It can again be classified from another point of view, into that based on words (*śabda-śaktimūla*) and that based on the meanings (*arthaśaktimūla*); in the former the actual words used are vital to the suggestion and cannot be substituted by their synonyms, while in the latter it is the contextual factors and the social and cultural background that are important in bringing out the suggestion. Or it may be based on both at the same time (*ubhayaśaktimūla*).

¹ *Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya* is that type of poetry where the charm of the suggested sense is not more striking than that of the expressed one. It is divided into eight varieties on the basis of the suggested sense being obvious, abstruse, subordinate to the expressed sense, subordinate to another factor, of doubtful importance, of insufficient importance, not beautiful or brought about by intonation. See *Kāvya prakāśa*, V. 1-2:

*agūḍham aparasyāṅgaṃ vācyaśiddhyaṅgaṃ asphuṭam
saṃdigdhatulyaprādhānye kākvākṣiptam asundaram
vyaṅgyam evaṃ guṇibhūtavyaṅgyasyāṣṭau bhidāḥ smṛtāḥ.*

² Then it becomes an instance of *saṃlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya*.

Main Subdivisions of Dhvani

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| | (a) <i>Atyantatiraskṛta-vācya</i>
(Literal sense completely
set aside). Based on
<i>Jahāllakṣaṇā</i> . | |
| I. <i>Avivakṣitavācya</i> or
<i>Lakṣaṇāmūla</i>
(Literal sense not
intended) | (b) <i>Arthāntarasamkramita-vācya</i>
(Literal meaning shifted)
Pregnant use of words. | |
| | (a) <i>Asamlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya</i>
(Stages of knowing the
suggested sense imper-
ceptible) | $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Rasa}, \\ \textit{Bhāva}, \\ \text{etc.} \end{array} \right.$ |
| II. <i>Vivakṣitānyapara-vācya</i>
or <i>Abhidhāmūla</i>
(Literal sense
intended, but
subserves the
implied sense) | (b) <i>Samlakṣyakrama-
vyaṅgya</i> (Stages
of knowing the
suggested sense
perceptible) | |
| | | $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Śabdaśaktimūla} \\ \textit{Arthaśaktimūla} \\ \textit{Ubhaya-} \\ \textit{śaktimūla} \end{array} \right.$ |

In the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Viśvanātha criticizes ¹ Ānandavardhana for including under poetry suggestions of a fact or a figure of speech. He says that the suggestion of poetic emotion alone can be considered as the soul of poetry and refuses to recognize any piece of poetry in which emotional elements are absent. Every statement implies many other ideas which are not actually expressed. Thus, the statement 'Devadatta went to the village' implies that he was being

¹ p. 4. He defines poetry as *vākyaṃ rasātmakam* (p. 5).

attended by a servant¹ (in the social context of that time in India), but there is no poetry in that. Ānandvardhana himself was fully conscious of the importance of emotional elements in poetry. The facts and the 'figures of speech' suggested must ultimately lead to the realization of *rasa*. He says that the real function of the figures of speech in poetry is to serve in the development of *rasa*.² Abhinavagupta makes the idea clear by saying that really the suggestion of *rasa* (*rasa-dhvani*) alone is the soul of poetry and that the suggestion of ideas and figures of speech (*vastu-dhvani* and *alamkāra-dhvani*) ultimately terminates in the development of *rasa*.³

Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani is based on words and gives the feeling tones of a word. Sapir says that it is very difficult to come to any scientific conclusion regarding feeling tones. 'To be sure there are socially accepted feeling tones or ranges of feeling tone for many words over and above the force of individual association, but they are exceedingly variable and elusive things at best'.⁴ It is determined mainly by the frequency with which it is used in emotional contexts.⁵

¹ *ibid.*: *anyathā devadatto grāmaṃ yāti vākye tadbhṛtyasya tadanu-saraṇarūpavyaṅgyāvagater api kāvyatvaṃ syāt.*

² *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 85 f.

³ *Locana*, p. 27: *rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalamkāradhvani tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete.*

⁴ E. Sapir, *Language*, p. 41.

⁵ See V. K. Gokak, *The Poetic Approach to Language*, p. 21. On the emotive elements in language, see Ullmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 96 ff.; Ogden-Richards, *op. cit.*, pp. 149 ff.

According to Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha, in the case of a homonymous word or expression having more than one primary sense, when the contextual factors restrict it to one of the senses possible, the other sense that still lurks in it is conveyed by the power of suggestion.¹ This they give as an example of *vyañjanā* based on words. Jagannātha Paṇḍita has rightly rejected² this view on the ground that all the senses in such cases are primary and are brought to the mind of the listener through the power of *abhidhā* itself. The contextual factors can only restrict its application, they cannot deprive it of its primary senses. So there is no necessity to bring in *vyañjanā* here.

Jagannātha Paṇḍita says³ that in the case of *yogarūḍha* words like *paṅkaja* (lotus, mud-born), where the etymological meaning is applicable it is restricted in its use by the popular usage; the power of *abhidhā* expresses its popular meaning. Sometimes the etymological sense is also conveyed by the power of suggestion, by a subtle supplementation.

¹ *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, II. 19:

*anekārthasya śabdasya vācakatve niyantrite
saṃyogādyaiv avācārthadhikṛdvyāptir añjanam.*

Sāhityadarpaṇa, II. 14. On the contextual factors *vide supra*, pp. 48 ff.

² *Rasagaṅgādhara*, pp. 110 ff.

³ *ibid.*, p. 118:

*yogarūḍhasya śabdasya yoge rūḍhyā niyantrite
dhiyaṃ yogasprśo 'rthasya yā sūte vyañjanaiva sā.*

‘We seem at times to glimpse behind a word another sense, deeper and half-hidden, and to hear faintly the entry of another meaning, in and with which others begin to sound, and all accompany the original meaning of the word like the sympathetic chimes of a bell. Hence that deep and sonorous ring in words which is lacking in artificial and invented languages; and hence also the multiplicity, the indefiniteness, the strange suggestiveness and evasiveness of so much poetry.’¹ Hugo von Hofmannsthal says that this is a peculiarity of oriental poetry: ‘It leads us into the innermost nature of oriental poetry, into the very mystery and being of language. For this mysteriousness is the deepest element in eastern language and poetry alike, in so far as everything in it is metaphorical, everything remotely descended from ancient roots. The original root is sensuous, primitive, concise and strong, but the word moves away from it by subtle transitions to new related meanings and then meanings only remotely related; yet in the remotest meaning there is still some echo of the original sound of the word, still some darkly mirrored image of the first sensuous impression.’²

The ancient etymological meaning that lurks behind the normal meaning can be brought back to life by a subtle supplementation. Examples can be found in all good poetry. In the *Kāvya-prakāśa*,

¹ F. Wisemann, ‘Language Strata’, *Logic and Language*, p. 13.

² Quoted by Wisemann, *op. cit.*, p. 13 f.

Mammāṭa refers to the use of the word *kapālin* by Kālidāsa in the *Kumārasaṃbhava* verse: ¹

dvayaṃ gataṃ saṃprati śocanīyatām
saṃāgamaprārthanayā kapāliṇaḥ
kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvatas
tvam asya lokasya ca netrakaumudī

(By seeking association with *kapālin*—Śiva, the holder of the begging bowl—two things have become pitiable: the brilliant digit of the moon and thyself (Pārvatī), moonlight to the eyes of the world). Here the term *kapālin* directly denotes Śiva; but etymologically it means ‘the holder of the begging bowl’, and therefore aptly suggests his poverty and worthlessness.

In the case of homonymous expression (*śleṣa*) if both the meanings are applicable in the context, the meanings are known through the primary sense *abhidhā*; but if one is contextual and the other noncontextual, the power of *abhidhā* might bring the recollection of both, but the contextual factors will restrict it to one of the meanings. The figure of speech such as simile that is suggested in such cases is through *śabdaśakti-mūla-dhvani*, because the suggestion is based on the actual words used, and the words cannot be substituted by their synonyms.

Arthaśaktimūla-dhvani is based on the expressed meaning. The suggested sense need not be an idea or a figure of speech; under this type are included instances

¹ V. 71. See also *Kāvyaṇṇaprakāśa*, V. 47.

where the emotions and transient feelings are suggested from contextual factors, without the express mention of the *vibhāva-s*, *anubhāva-s*, etc.¹ These are explained as coming under *vastu-dhvani* itself. Even though the primary sense of a word is definite and fixed, it can suggest various other ideas through factors such as the peculiar character of the speaker, or the person addressed, the sentence, the presence of another person, the expressed meaning, the occasion, the place, the time, the intonation or the gestures.² The idea or the figure of speech suggested could be either feasible in itself (*svataḥ-sambhavi*) or invented by the imagination of the poet (*kaviṣṭhoktiniṣpanna*).

From the point of view of the *vyāñjaka-s* or the indicators of suggestion the different varieties of the type, *saṃlakṣyakrama-vyañgya*, could be subdivided into *pada-prakāśya* or revealed by a word and *vākya-prakāśya* or revealed by the whole sentence. The other type, *asaṃlakṣyakrama-vyañgya*, is also classified³ as arising from individual sounds, words or parts of words, sentences,

¹ Thus, the bashfulness of Pārvatī is suggested in the *Kumāra-sambhava* verse (VI. 84):

*evamvādini devaṛṣau pārśve pītur adhomukhī
līlākamaḥpatrāṇi gaṇayāmāsa pārvatī.*

See *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 102.

² *Kāvya-prakāśa*, III. 21-2:

*vaktṛboddhavyakāḥkūṇāṃ vākyavācyaṇyasaṃnidheḥ
prastāvadeśakālāder vaiśiṣṭyāt pratibhājuṣām
yo 'rthasyānyārthadhīhetur vyāpāro vyaktir eva sā.*

cf. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 16-7.

³ *Dhvanyāloka*, III. 2; see J. Brough, op. cit., p. 175.

‘stylistic structure’ (*sanghaṭanā*) or the whole poem. Ānandavardhana recognizes the importance of taking the whole stanza or even the poem as a whole, in order that the overtones of the suggested sense are fully grasped.

Intonation

The importance of intonation as a factor in conveying the nuances of the natural sentences of everyday speech was not unknown to the ancient Indian thinkers. In the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bharata refers¹ to the different varieties of tone, tempo and pitch to be employed by the actors to bring out the subtle meanings in their speeches. Even the early grammarians distinguished those variations of the sounds in length, etc., which actually formed an integral part of the words themselves and could, therefore, be studied objectively, and those variations which suggest certain syntactic over-meanings and the subtle shades in the speaker’s intention. Thus, the division of vowels into short, long and prolated, constitutes an integral part in the form of the words in Sanskrit; the distinction of the accents into high (*udātta*), low (*anudātta*) and circumflex (*svārīta*) forms an integral part of the words in Vedic Sanskrit. They are part of the phonemic system, or the *prākṛta-dhvani* of the language (in Bhartṛhari’s terminology). But other personal variations in the mode of utterance such as those in speech,

¹ *Nāṭyaśāstra*, vol. II, p. 391 f.

pitch and intonation, as well as the peculiarities of manual gesture and facial expression cannot be put to a uniform objective analysis, even though they play an important part in suggesting the shades of meaning. These are analogous to the *vaikṛta-dhvani* (again, in Bhartrhari's terminology). The former plays an important part in bringing out the linguistic meaning, whereas the latter helps in suggesting emotive meanings, and the social-cultural meanings.

Bharata refers¹ to two main types of *kāku* or intonation in a sentence: *sākāṅkṣa* or expectant and *nirākāṅkṣa* or non-expectant. The former intonation shows that the meaning of the sentence is not complete and that it requires something more to complete it, while the latter type of intonation shows that the sense is complete. Rājaśekhara deals with the problem of intonation in speech in greater detail:² he divides the expectant intonation into three sub-varieties as suggesting (a) an objection or disapproval (*ākṣepagarbhā*) (b) question (*praśnagarbhā*) and (c) doubt or uncertainty (*vitarkagarbhā*). The non-expectant intonation is also divided into three varieties: (a) denoting a statement (*vidhirūpa*), (b) giving an answer (*uttararūpa*) and (c) asserting a decision (*nirṇayarūpa*). He defines *kāku* or intonation as a quality in the mode of utterance, which brings out the intention of the speaker clearly.³ With

¹ *ibid.*, p. 391: *dividhā kākuḥ sākāṅkṣā nirākāṅkṣā ceti, vākyasya sākāṅkṣatvanirākāṅkṣatvāt*.

² *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, p. 31 f.

³ *ibid.*, p. 31: *abhiprāyavān pāṭhadharmaḥ kākuḥ*.

the change in intonation the same sentence can mean different things: a question, an assertion or a doubt. Only the main varieties are given here, for there are innumerable distinctions in intonation, which suggest subtle shades of meaning, cognitive or emotive. In the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, Bhoja also discusses ¹ the importance of intonation in bringing out the *vivakṣā* or intention of the speaker. Later *Ālaṃkārika*-s accept intonation as a means of suggesting meanings not actually expressed by words. Intonation brings to light all manner of emotional attitudes; irony, pathos, argumentativeness, menace and so forth.² One variety of *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* is based on intonation and is called *kākvākṣipta*.³ More than one type of intonation may be combined in different ways to indicate various emotional attitudes.

It is of interest to note that the protagonists of the *dhvani* theory enlarged the term *artha* or meaning to include all that is conveyed by a poem. It includes not only the cognitive meaning, but also the emotive or volitional senses and the 'social-cultural' significance of utterances suggested with the help of contextual factors. Another important point to be noted is that Ānandavardhana and his followers accepted the grammarian's view about the unity of the sentence-meaning; 'the *dhvani*-theory to a large extent operates in terms of larger unities and not individual words'.⁴

¹ Dr. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, pp. 13 ff.

² A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 202.

³ *vide supra*, p. 305 n. 1.

⁴ J. Brough, op. cit., p. 174.

But at the same time 'it is possible from another point of view to indicate that the operative factor in producing the overtones of the implied meaning may on occasion be a single word or phrase.'¹ Many of the criticisms against the *dhvani* theory are due to the fact that the poets and the literary critics did not confine themselves to a relatively small portion of language behaviour which is definite, but tried to extend it to the totality of human experience, including the emotional.

¹ *ibid.*

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IN INDIA various aspects of the problem of meaning have been discussed by the different systems of thought: those of the Vaiyākaraṇa-s or the grammarians, the Naiyāyika-s or the logicians, the Mīmāṃsaka-s or the followers of the school of Vedic exegesis, and the Ālaṃkārika-s or the literary critics.

Grammatical studies started in India very early. Yāska, author of the *Nirukta* discussing the etymology of the words collected in the *Nighaṇṭu*, is generally considered to be earlier than Pāṇini, the most important of the grammarians. Pāṇini (c. 400 B.C.) gives a scientific analysis of the structure of Sanskrit in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Kātyāyaṇa (c. 300 B.C.) wrote the *Vārttika-s* on it, correcting and supplementing the *sūtra-s*, and Patañjali (c. 150 B.C.) in his *Mahābhāṣya* discusses the *sūtra-s* and the *Vārttika-s*. Vyāḍi had earlier written the *Samgraha* which is not extant. The greatest writer after Patañjali was Bhartṛhari (c. A.D. 450) author of the *Vākyapadīya* dealing with the philosophy of grammar, and of a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*. Kaiyaṭa (c. A.D. 1000) wrote the *Pradīpa* commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*. Linguistic problems are discussed in the *Laghumañjūṣā* and the *Paramalaghumañjūṣā* by Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, also known as Nāgojibhaṭṭa (A.D. 1670-1750), and in the *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇasāra* of Koṇḍabhaṭṭa (c. A.D. 1600). On the

sphoṭa doctrine the *Sphoṭavāda* by Nāgeśa deserves to be mentioned.

The Yoga school gives tacit support to the *sphoṭa* doctrine. The *Yogasūtra-s* are attributed to Patañjali whom orthodox Indian tradition often identifies with the grammarian of that name. Its *bhāṣya* is attributed to Vyāsa. Neither the *Yogasūtra-s* nor the *bhāṣya* refers to the term *sphoṭa*. Among the commentaries on the *bhāṣya*, one by Śaṅkara discusses the *sphoṭa* doctrine in detail.

The Mīmāṃsā school, concerned with the interpretation of Vedic texts relating to the sacrificial rituals, evolved the main principles of interpretation of statements or sentences. The basic text of this school is the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-s* of Jaimini (c. 300 B.C.) on which Śabara (c. A.D. 200) wrote an elaborate *bhāṣya*. Two different schools, the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara, were founded towards the close of the sixth century by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Prabhākara respectively, based on differing interpretations of Śabara's *bhāṣya*. Kumārilabhaṭṭa wrote the *Ślokavārttika* on the first part of the first chapter of the original text and its *bhāṣya*, the *Tantravārttika* on the further portion till the end of the third chapter, and the *Tūptikā* on the rest. Prabhākara's well-known work is the *Brhatī* on the *bhāṣya*. Later writers on the Bhāṭṭa school include Pārthasārathimīśra (c. A.D. 1050), author of the *Śāstradīpikā* and *Nyāyaratnamālā* and Someśvara (c. A.D. 1200) author of the *Nyāyasudhā*. The Prābhākara school found an able exponent in Śālikanātha (c. A.D. 800), author of the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, including the

Vākyaarthamātrkāvr̥tti. The *Tāttvabindu* by Vācaspatimiśra (c. A.D. 850) and the *Mānameyodaya* by Nārāyaṇabhāṭṭa (c. A.D. 1600) discuss linguistic problems from the Bhāṭṭa point of view.

The Advaita Vedānta school of philosophy usually follows the Bhāṭṭa school regarding rules of textual interpretation, etc. Linguistic discussions of this school may be found in the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana-sarasvatī (c. A.D. 1600) and the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarājādharin (c. A.D. 1600). Maṇḍanamīśra (c. A.D. 800) wrote the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, defending the *sphoṭa* doctrine against the attacks of the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Buddhists.

The Nyāya school of Indian logic has its basic text in the *Nyāyasūtra-s* of Gautma Akṣapāda (c. A.D. 100) on which Vātsyāyana (c. A.D. 300) wrote the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. Uddyotakara (c. A.D. 600) defended the *bhāṣya* against the attacks of Buddhists in his *Nyāyavārttika*. Vācaspatimiśra (c. A.D. 850) wrote the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* on this. In the tenth century Jayantabhāṭṭa wrote the *Nyāyamañjarī* which is a comprehensive work on the Nyāya system. The *Nyāyakusumāñjalī* of Udayana also belongs to this period.

Among Buddhist logicians who have discussed problems on linguistics may be mentioned Diñnāga (c. A.D. 450), author of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dharmakīrti (c. A.D. 600), author of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Śāntarakṣita (c. A.D. 750), author of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and his disciple Kamalaśīla who wrote the *Pañjikā*

commentary on it. The *Apoḥasiddhi* of Ratnakīrti (c. A.D. 1000) attempts to defend the Apoha theory.

The Navya-Nyāya school of modern Indian logic started with the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya (c. A.D. 1200); it had several commentaries and subcommentaries. The *Śabdaśaktiprakāśkā* by Jagadīśa (c. A.D. 1700) and the *Śaktivāda* and the *Vyutpattivāda* by Gadādhara (c. A.D. 1700) deal with linguistic questions. The *Siddhāntamuktāvali* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana (c. A.D. 1600) and the *Tarkasaṃgraha* by Annambhaṭṭa (c. A.D. 1600) form the popular textbooks on Indian logic combining the Nyāya system and the Vaiśeṣika system.

Among Indian literary critics the earliest and the most important is Bharata, author of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* which is an encyclopaedic work dealing with the theory and practice of dramas, including music and dancing, and which contains the earliest discussions on the aesthetic theory of *rasa*. Bharata is referred to by Kālidāsa, and the present text of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is much earlier than A.D. 400. Then came Bhāmaha (c. A.D. 600), author of the *Kāvyaḷaṃkāra*, Daṇḍin (c. A.D. 650-700) author of the *Kāvyaḷadarśa*, Vāmana (c. A.D. 800), author of the *Kāvyaḷaṃkārasūtravṛtti* and Udbhaṭa, (c. A.D. 800), author of the *Kāvyaḷaṃkārasārasaṃgraha*. In the latter half of the ninth century appeared Ānandavardhana, author of the *Dhvanyāloka*, who showed the importance of the suggestive element in poetry and correlated Bharata's *rasa* theory with his *dhvani* theory. Chief among those who criticized the *dhvani* theory are Mahimabhaṭṭa (c. A.D. 1000), author of the *Vyaktiviveka*,

and Kuntaka (c. A.D. 1000), author of the *Vakroktijīvitā*. Abhinavagupta (c. A.D. 1100) who wrote the *Locana* commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Abhinavabhāratī* commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* established once for all the basic principles of poetry in India. Among other writers are Dhanamjaya (A.D. 976-96), author of the *Daśarūpaka*, Bhoja (c. A.D. 1000), author of the *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*, Mammaṭa (A.D. 1050-1100), author of the popular *Kāvya-prakāśa* and the *Śabdavyāpāravicāra*, Viśvanātha (c. A.D. 1300), author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Vidyānātha (c. A.D. 1300), author of the *Pratāparudrīya*, Appayadīkṣita (c. A.D. 1500), author of the *Kuvalayānanda* and the *Vṛttivārttika*, and Jagannātha Paṇḍita (c. A.D. 1600), author of the *Rasagaṅgādhara*.

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